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Profile: Andrew Cling (University of Alabama, Huntsville)
  1. Andrew D. Cling (2014). The Epistemic Regress Problem, the Problem of the Criterion, and the Value of Reasons. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):161-171.
    There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to (...)
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  2. Andrew D. Cling (2008). The Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.
    The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all require either additional reasons or an external condition on support that is arbitrary (...)
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  3. Andrew D. Cling (2007). Review of Steven D. Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (11).
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  4. Andrew D. Cling (2004). The Trouble with Infinitism. Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
    One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is (...)
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  5. Andrew D. Cling (2003). Self-Supporting Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279–303.
    Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically (...)
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  6. Andrew D. Cling (2002). Based Virtue Ethics 53–67 Ben Caplan/Quotation and Demonstration 69–80 Adam Sennet/An Ambiguity Test for Definite Descriptions 81–95. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 111 (295).
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  7. Andrew D. Cling (2002). Justification-Affording Circular Arguments. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):251 - 275.
    An argument whose conclusion C is essential evidence for one of its premises can provide its target audience with justification for believing C. This is possible because we can enhance our justification for believing a proposition C by integrating it into an explanatory network of beliefs for which C itself provides essential evidence. I argue for this in light of relevant features of doxastic circularity, epistemic circularity, and explanatory inferences. Finally, I confirm my argument with an example and respond to (...)
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  8. Andrew D. Cling (2001). Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):493-495.
  9. Andrew D. Cling (1997). Epistemic Levels and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Studies 88 (2):109-140.
    The problem of the criterion says that we can know a proposition only if we first know a criterion of truth and vice versa, hence, we cannot know any proposition or any criterion of truth. The epistemic levels response says that since knowledge does not require knowledge about knowledge, we can know a proposition without knowing a criterion of truth. This response (advocated by Chisholm and Van Cleve) presupposes that criteria of truth are epistemic principles. In general, however, criteria of (...)
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  10. Andrew D. Cling (1994). Posing the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Studies 75 (3):261 - 292.
    Although it has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy , the problem of the criterion raises questions which must be addressed by any complete account of knowledge . But the problem of the criterion suffers not onl.
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  11. Andrew D. Cling (1992). Mind and Cognition. Teaching Philosophy 15 (2):196-198.
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  12. Andrew D. Cling (1989). Empirical Justification. By Paul K. Moser. The Modern Schoolman 67 (1):71-73.
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  13. Andrew D. Cling (1988). Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation. By Donald Davidson. The Modern Schoolman 65 (3):207-209.
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  14. Andrew D. Cling (1988). The Rationality of Induction. By D. C. Stove. The Modern Schoolman 65 (4):292-294.
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  15. Andrew D. Cling (1985). Foundationalism and Permanence in Descartes' Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):145-156.