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Andrew Jason Cohen [16]Andrew J. Cohen [2]
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Profile: Andrew Jason Cohen (Georgia State University)
  1. Andrew Jason Cohen (2012). Exchanges and Relationships. Social Theory and Practice 38 (2):231-257.
    Many social scientists think of exchange in terms far broader than philosophers. I defend the broader use of the term as well as the claim that meaningful human relationships are usefully understood as constituted by exchanges. I argue, though, that we must recognize that a great number of non-monetary and non-material goods are part of our daily lives and exchanges. Particularly important are emotional goods. I defend my view against the important objection that it demeans intimate relationships. As an addendum, (...)
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  2. Andrew Jason Cohen (2012). On Universalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):39-75.
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  3. Andrew Jason Cohen (2010). A Conceptual and (Preliminary) Normative Exploration of Waste. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):233-273.
    In this paper, I first argue that waste is best understood as (a) any process wherein something useful becomes less useful and that produces less benefit than is lost—where benefit and usefulness are understood with reference to the same metric—or (b) the result of such a process. I next argue for the immorality of waste. My concluding suggestions are that (W1) if one person needs something for her preservation and a second person has it, is avoidably wasting it, and refuses (...)
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  4. Andrew Jason Cohen (2008). Existentialist Voluntarism as a Source of Normativity. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):89-129.
    I defend a neo-Kantian view wherein we are capable of being completely autonomous and impartial and argue that this ability can ground normativity. As this view includes an existentialist conception of the self, I defend radical choice, a primary component of that conception, against arguments many take to be definitive. I call the ability to use radical choice “existentialist voluntarism” and bring it into a current debate in normative philosophy, arguing that it allows that we can be distanced from all (...)
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  5. Andrew Jason Cohen (2007). What the Liberal State Should Tolerate Within its Borders. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):479-513.
    Two normative principles of toleration are offered, one individual-regarding, the other group-regarding. The first is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle; the other is “Principle T,” meant to be the harm principle writ large. It is argued that the state should tolerate autonomous sacrifices of autonomy, including instances where an individual rationally chooses to be enslaved, lobotomized, or killed. Consistent with that, it is argued that the state should tolerate internal restrictions within minority groups even where these prevent autonomy promotion of (...)
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  6. Andrew J. Cohen (2004). Defending Liberalism Against the Anomie Challenge. Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):391-427.
    Some claim that liberalism’s neutrality toward the Good encourages anomie, thereby disallowing social confirmation of beliefs, leaving the individual with an uncertainty about judgments that is opposed to confidence and self-respect. This is the “anomie challenge.” I begin by discussing toleration and neutrality and motivating the problem. I then look at responses to the challenge by liberal pluralists and liberalism’s critics. After dismissing both, I argue that the right to choose is the good to be advocated and that it allows (...)
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  7. Andrew Jason Cohen (2004). Defending Liberalism Against the Anomie Challenge. Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):391-427.
    Some claim that liberalism is detrimental to individuals as it encourages anomie which disallows social confirmation of beliefs, without which the individual is left with uncertainty about her judgments that is opposed to firm conviction, and thus, confidence and self-respect. All agree that self-respect is important; disagreement arises about how self-respect is best supported. Both anomie and loss of self-respect are meant to follow from liberalism’s unwillingness to endorse a conception of the Good. This is the “anomie challenge.” I begin (...)
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  8. Andrew Jason Cohen (2004). John Rist, Real Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Pp. VIII+295. Utilitas 16 (1):115-117.
  9. Andrew Jason Cohen (2004). What Toleration Is. Ethics 115 (1):68-95.
    Attempting to settle various debates from recent literature regarding its precise nature, I offer a detailed conceptual analysis of toleration. I begin by isolating toleration from other notions; this provides us some guidance by introducing the eight definitional conditions of toleration that I then explicate and defend. Together, these eight conditions indicate that toleration is an agent’s intentional and principled refraining from interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has (...)
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  10. Govert den Hartogh, Andrew Altman, Christopher Heath Wellman, Andrew Jason Cohen, Sarah Conly & Thomas Christiano (2004). 10. Philip Stratton‐Lake, Ed., Ethical Intuitionism: Re‐Evaluations Philip Stratton‐Lake, Ed., Ethical Intuitionism: Re‐Evaluations (Pp. 175-177). [REVIEW] Ethics 115 (1).
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  11. Andrew Jason Cohen (2001). John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism:A Case for Conservatism. Ethics 111 (2):411-414.
    Review of John Kekes' *A Case for Conservatism*.
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  12. Andrew J. Cohen (2000). Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Asocialism. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2/3):249-261.
    In this paper I look at three versions of the charge that liberalism’s emphasis on individuals is detrimental to community—that it encourages a pernicious disregard of others by fostering a particular understanding of the individual and the relation she has with her society. According to that understanding, individuals are fundamentally independent entities who only enter into relations by choice and society is seen as nothing more than a venture voluntarily entered into in order to better oneself. Communitarian critics argue that (...)
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  13. Andrew Jason Cohen (2000). Does Communitarianism Require Individual Independence? Journal of Ethics 4 (3):283-304.
    Critics of liberalism have argued that liberal individualismmisdescribes persons in ignoring the degree to which they aredependent on their communities. Indeed, they argue that personsare essentially socially constituted. In this paper, however, Iprovide two arguments – the first concerning communitariandescriptive claims about persons, our society, and the communitarian ideal society, and the second regarding thecommunitarian view of individual autonomy – that the communitariantheory of Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel,relies on individuals either being independent from theircommunities or having a (...)
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  14. Andrew Jason Cohen (2000). On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty, and (“Objectivist”) “Liberal Metaphysicians”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):39-75.
    It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I then (...)
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  15. Andrew Jason Cohen (1999). Communitarianism 'Social Constitution,' and Autonomy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):121–135.
    Communitarians like Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel, defend what we may call the ‘social constitution thesis.’ This is the view that participation in society makes us what we are. This claim, however, is ambiguous. In an attempt to shed some light on it and to better understand the impact its truth would have on our beliefs regarding autonomy, I offer four possible ways it could be understood and four corresponding senses of individual independence and autonomy. I also indicate (...)
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  16. Andrew Jason Cohen (1999). In Defense of Nietzschean Genealogy. Philosophical Forum 30 (4):269–288.
    Using Alasdair MacIntyre as a foil, I defend what I take to be a viable Nietzschean genealogical account, showing that a proper perspectivism is neither perniciously subjectivist nor absolutist. I begin by arguing against MacIntyre’s assertion that genealogists are committed to the view that rationality requires neutrality and that as there is no neutrality, there is no rationality. I then continue by offering something of a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s view, designed partly to clarify the error pinpointed in MacIntyre’s arguments, but (...)
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  17. Andrew Jason Cohen (1998). A Defense of Strong Voluntarism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):251-265.
    Critics of liberalism in the past two decades have argued that the fact that we are necessarily "situated" or "embedded" means that we can not always choose our own ends (for example, our conceptions of the good or our loyalties to others). Some suggest that we simply discover ourselves with these "connections." If correct, this would argue against (Rawlsian) hypothetical contract models and liberalism more broadly, make true impartiality impossible, and give support to traditionalist views like those of Alasdair MacIntyre, (...)
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