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  1. Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford (2011). Normative Theory in Decision Making and Moral Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):256-257.
    Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.
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  2. Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulfordb (2011). Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34:5.
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  3. Andrew M. Colman (2007). Love is Not Enough: Other-Regarding Preferences Cannot Explain Payoff Dominance in Game Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):22-23.
    Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  4. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Beyond Rationality: Rigor Without Mortis in Game Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):180-192.
    Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behavior (...)
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  5. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...)
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  6. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Depth of Strategic Reasoning in Games. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):2-4.
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  7. Andrew M. Colman (1998). Game Theory, Agent-Based Modeling, and the Evolution of Social Behavior. Complexity 3 (3):46-47.
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  8. Andrew M. Colman (1998). Modelling Imitation with Sequential Games. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):686-687.
    A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own, provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.
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  9. Andrew M. Colman (1998). The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent‐Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Complexity 3 (3):46-48.
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  10. Andrew M. Colman & Michael Bacharach (1997). Payoff Dominance and the Stackelberg Heuristic. Theory and Decision 43 (1):1-19.
    Payoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies that maximize against (...)
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  11. Andrew M. Colman (1995). Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Mixedstrategy Evolutionary Equilibria. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):550.
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  12. Andrew M. Colman (1991). Unreliable Peer Review: Causes and Cures of Human Misery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (1):141-142.
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  13. Andrew M. Colman (1984). Operant Conditioning and Natural Selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):684.
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  14. Andrew M. Colman (1982). Manuscript Evaluation by Journal Referees and Editors: Randomness or Bias? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):205.
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