In this paper I examine the most common objection to strict product liability: that it is unfair to manufacturers. Critics have maintained that it is unfair because it allows manufacturers to be held liable even when they have not been negligent, and are not morally blameworthy or at fault. In response to this objection, I argue 1) that there are in fact cases in which it is at least somewhat unfair to manufacturers to impose compensation requirements upon them in accordance (...) with the strict product liability doctrine, but 2) that there is also a class of cases in which it is fair to manufacturers to hold them responsible for compensating injured product users, as strict product liability requires, even though they have not been negligent and are not morally blameworthy or at fault. My analysis of the fairness issue provides a basis for some concluding remarks about the defensibility of the strict product liability doctrine. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the claim that businesspersons have what might be called "ethical immunity" with respect to the duty not to deceive. According to this ethical immunity claim, businesspersons are exempt from the ordinary ethical prohibition against deception; and widespread business deception is therefore ethically permissible. I focus on two arguments for the claim. One of the arguments, which has been presented by Albert Carr, relies upon an analogy between business on the one hand, and games in which (...) deception is permitted, on the other. The second argument is based upon the notion that exceptions to ethical duties may sometimes be justified on prudential grounds. In response to the arguments, I try to show that neither one provides strong support for the ethical immunity claim. (shrink)