Search results for 'Andrew S. Eshleman' (try it on Scholar)

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Profile: Andrew Eshleman (University of Portland)
  1. Andrew S. Eshleman (2005). Can an Atheist Believe in God? Religious Studies 41 (2):183 - 199.score: 870.0
    Some have proposed that it is reasonable for an atheist to pursue a form of life shaped by engagement with theistic religious language and practice, once language and belief in God are interpreted in the appropriate non-realist manner. My aim is to defend this proposal in the face of several objections that have been raised against it. First, I engage in some conceptual spadework to distinguish more clearly some varieties of religious non-realism. Then, in response to two central objections, I (...)
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  2. Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 450.0
    When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for (...)
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  3. Andrew Eshleman (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.score: 450.0
    The free will defence attempts to show that belief in an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God may be rational, despite the existence of evil. At the heart of the free will defence is the claim that it may be impossible, even for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God, to bring about certain goods without the accompanying inevitability, or at least overwhelming probability, of evil. The good in question is the existence of free agents, in particular, agents who are sometimes free (...)
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  4. Andrew Eshleman (2005). Can an Atheist Believe in God? Religious Studies 41 (2):183 - 199.score: 240.0
    Some have proposed that it is reasonable for an atheist to pursue a form of life shaped by engagement with theistic religious language and practice, once language and belief in God are interpreted in the appropriate non-realist manner. My aim is to defend this proposal in the face of several objections that have been raised against it. First, I engage in some conceptual spadework to distinguish more clearly some varieties of religious non-realism. Then, in response to two central objections, I (...)
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  5. Andrew Eshleman (2010). Religious Fictionalism Defended: Reply to Cordry. Religious Studies 46 (1):91-96.score: 240.0
    In his paper, 'A critique of religious fictionalism', Benjamin Cordry raises a series of objections to a fictionalist form of religious non-realism that I proposed in my earlier paper, 'Can an atheist believe in God?'. They fall into two main categories: those alleging that an atheist would be unjustified in adopting fictionalism, and those alleging that fictionalism could not be successfully implemented, or practised communally. I argue that these objections can be met.
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  6. Andrew Eshleman (2004). Responsibility for Character. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):65-94.score: 240.0
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  7. Andrew Eshleman (1999). Arguing for Atheism. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):272-276.score: 240.0
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  8. A. S. Eshleman (2001). Being is Not Believing: Fischer and Ravizza on Taking Responsibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):479 – 490.score: 240.0
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  9. Andrew Eshleman (2000). Book Reviews:Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. [REVIEW] Ethics 111 (1):167-170.score: 240.0
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  10. Andrew Eshleman (2005). Peter Byrne God and Realism. (Aldershot and Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2003). Pp. V+187. £45.00, $79.95 (Hbk); £16.99, $29.25 (Pbk). ISBN 0 7546 14611 (Hbk), 0 7546 14670 (Pbk). [REVIEW] Religious Studies 41 (3):347-352.score: 240.0
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  11. Andrew Eshleman (ed.) (2008). Readings in Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West. Blackwell Pub..score: 240.0
    Through a diverse collection of carefully chosen selections, Readings in Philosophy of Religion: East Meets West offers an enlightening fusion of Western and non-Western religious thought that makes meaningful trans-cultural connections with the contemporary Western literature in philosophy of religion. Includes a substantial selection of non-Western religious perspectives that are accessible to both students and instructors Draws on carefully selected non-Western readings from contemporary secondary sources to supplement current religious philosophy discussions Provides further clarity with comprehensive chapter introductions to orient (...)
     
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  12. Matthew C. Eshleman (2008). The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith, or Reading Being and Nothingness in Reverse. Sartre Studies International 14 (2):1-22.score: 120.0
    This essay argues that an adequate account of bad faith cannot be given without taking the second half of Being and Nothingness into consideration. There are two separate but related reasons for this. First, the objectifying gaze of Others provides a necessary condition for the possibility of bad faith. Sartre, however, does not formally introduce analysis of Others until Parts III and IV. Second, upon the introduction of Others, Sartre revises his view of absolute freedom. Sartre's considered view of freedom (...)
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  13. Matthew Eshleman (2004). Sartre and Foucault on Ideal "Constraint". Sartre Studies International 10 (2):56-76.score: 120.0
    Although most of the contemporary debates around subjectivity are framed by a rejection of the metaphysical subject, more time needs to be spent developing the implications of abandoning the meta-physics of constraint. Doing so provides the key to approaching our pressing problem that concerns freedom, and only once invisible, ideal "constraints" have been adequately understood will all of the contemporary puzzlement that concerns intentional resistance to power be assuaged. While Sartre does not solve the problem of freedom bequeathed to us (...)
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  14. Martin Eshleman (1966). Aesthetic Experience, The Aesthetic Object and Criticism. The Monist 50 (2):281-298.score: 120.0
    The aesthetic experience, In husserl's language, Brackets or suspends the natural standpoint. Consciousness perceives the work of art not as an object of the factual world, But as a man-Made artifact to be enjoyed just for certain immediately experienced qualities. The work of art is neither a real physical entity nor a real psychical entity, But a purely intentional object, For which the physical object serves as a substratum. The critic must recreate the purely intentional object by completing the schema (...)
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  15. Matthew C. Eshleman (20013). Jean-Paul Sartre and Phenomenological Ontology. In Lester Embree & Thomas Nenon (eds.), Husserl’s Ideen. Springer. 327--349.score: 120.0
  16. Benjamin S. Cordry (2010). A Critique of Religious Fictionalism. Religious Studies 46 (1):77-89.score: 45.0
    Andrew Eshleman has argued that atheists can believe in God by being fully engaged members of religious communities and using religious discourse in a non-realist way. He calls this position 'fictionalism' because the atheist takes up religion as a useful fiction. In this paper I critique fictionalism along two lines: that it is problematic to successfully be a fictionalist and that fictionalism is unjustified. Reflection on fictionalism will point to some wider problems with religious anti-realism.
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  17. Ronald E. Santoni (2008). Is Bad Faith Necessarily Social? Sartre Studies International 14 (2):23-39.score: 24.0
    In a probing paper entitled "The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith, or Reading Being and Nothingness in Reverse," Matthew Eshleman challenges part of my intensive analysis of Sartre's "Bad Faith," arguing that bad faith is essentially a social phenomenon, and that social elements—the Other, in particular—play a " necessary role in making bad faith possible." Although I share many of Eshleman's interpretative points about the importance of the "social" in Sartre's account, I contend, here, with textual support, that (...)
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