Online research in philosophy

I introduce a different framework for thinking about peer disagreement -- one that distinguishes sharply between epistemic rationality and evidential support. I then defend the view that conciliationism provides the right answer to, "What credences is it rational to adopt in cases of peer disagreement?" and that non-conciliationism provides the right answer to, "What credences does the evidence support in cases of peer disagreement?" I then spend the second half of the paper applying some distinctions within rationality -- global vs. (...) local rational norms, wide-scope vs. narrow-scope rational norms -- to a defense of conciliationism against recent challenges by Tom Kelly and Brian Weatherson. I conclude by introducing what I think is an underdiscussed problem but a potentially fruitful one to think about: what is it rational to do relative to a set of mental states, some of which are beliefs or credences about rationality itself?

Note: New version MARCH 23. (shrink)

This paper is about the question of what to do under fundamental normative uncertainty. More specifically, it is about a problem that seems to confront all of the plausible answers to that question -- that it is impossible to compare the values of actions across different normative views or theories. I present a solution to that problem in 3 stages.

Comments EXTREMELY welcome.

Here are two ways to criticize a law: we can say that it prohibits conduct that oughtn't to be prohibited, and we can say that the burdens of complying with it are unfairly distributed. It's natural perhaps to think that the second criticism is parasitic on the first. I argue that, on the contrary, it is possible (and I suspect, common) for laws that forbid conduct that ought to be prohibited to nonetheless effectuate an unfair distribution of compliance burdens. I (...) explain how this is possible, and then suggest some practical remedies for this lingering unfairness.

Rough draft. Comments greatly appreciated! (shrink)

Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any (...) brand of non-cognitivism that has even a chance of solving the Frege–Geach Problem and some related problems involving probabilistic consistency can also thereby solve Smith’s problem. Because only versions of non-cognitivism that can solve the Frege–Geach Problem are otherwise plausible, all otherwise plausible versions of noncognitivism can meet Smith’s challenge. (shrink)