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Profile: Andrew Sneddon (University of Ottawa)
  1. Andrew Sneddon (2013). Autonomy. Bloomsbury.
    Philosophers have various reasons to be interested in individual autonomy. Individual self-rule is widely recognized to be important. But what, exactly, is autonomy? In what ways is it important? And just how important is it? This book introduces contemporary philosophical thought about the nature and significance of individual self-rule. -/- Andrew Sneddon divides self-rule into autonomy of choice and autonomy of persons. Unlike most philosophical treatments of autonomy, Sneddon addresses empirical study of the psychology of action. The significance of autonomy (...)
     
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  2. Andrew Sneddon (2012). Prioritizing Non-Human Bioengineering. Ethics, Policy and Environment 15 (2):234 - 236.
    Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 234-236, June 2012.
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  3. Andrew Sneddon (2012). Recipes for Moral Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):43-54.
    Saul Smilansky notes that, despite the famous role of paradoxes in philosophy, very few moral paradoxes have been developed and assessed. The present paper offers recipes for generating moral paradoxes as a tool to aid in filling this gap. The concluding section presents reflections on how to assess the depth of the paradoxes generated with these recipes. Special attention is paid to links between putative moral paradoxes and debate about ethical particularism and generalism.
     
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  4. Andrew Sneddon (2011). A New Kantian Response to Maxim-Fiddling. Kantian Review 16 (1):67-88.
  5. Andrew Sneddon (2011). Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral Psychology. The MIT Press.
    The debate has continued in these terms to the present day. In Like-Minded, Andrew Sneddon argues that "reason" and "passion" do not satisfactorily capture all the important options for explaining the psychological foundations of morality.
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  6. Mark Young & Andrew Sneddon (2011). Communitarian and Liberal Themes in Moral Agency and Education. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):105-120.
    Philosophers and psychologists have been vigorously examining the psychological capacities that realize our moral agency. Our purpose is to take some of this work and present its implications for moral education. To connect recent work with more long-standing debates in moral education, we frame this discussion with Helen Haste’s 1996 examination of liberal and communitarian positions on moral agency and education. We argue that contemporary research does not confirm the descriptive theory of moral agency offered by either liberal theorists or (...)
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  7. Andrew Sneddon (2010). Thick Concepts and Holism About Reasons. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (4):461-468.
    Thick moral concepts are a topic of particular disagreement in discussions of reasons holism. These concepts, such as justice, are called “thick” because they have both evaluative and descriptive aspects. Thin moral concepts, such as good, are purely evaluative. The disagreement concerns whether the fact that an action is, for example, just always a reason in favor of performing that action. The present argument follows Jonathan Dancy’s strategy of connecting moral reasons and concepts to those in other domains. If Dancy (...)
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  8. Andrew Sneddon (2009). Alternative Motivation: A New Challenge to Moral Judgment Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53.
    Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases . I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior (...)
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  9. Andrew Sneddon (2009). Consent and the Acquisition of Organs for Transplantation. HEC Forum 21 (1):55-69.
    The two most commonly discussed and implemented rationales for acquiring organs for transplantation give consent a central role. I argue that such centrality is a mistake. The reason is that practices of consent serve only to respect patients as autonomous beings. The primary issue in acquiring organs for transplantation, however, is how it is appropriate to treat a newly non-autonomous being. Once autonomy and consent are dislodged from their central position, considerations of utility and fairness take a more prominent position. (...)
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  10. Andrew Sneddon (2009). Normative Ethics and the Prospects of an Empirical Contribution to Assessment of Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):447-455.
    The familiar argument from disagreement has been an important focal point of discussion in contemporary meta-ethics. Over the past decade, there has been an explosion of interdisciplinary work between philosophers and psychologists about moral psychology. Working within this trend, John Doris and Alexandra Plakias have made a tentative version of the argument from disagreement on empirical grounds. Doris and Plakias present empirical evidence in support of premise 4, that ethics is beset by fundamental disagreement. They examine Richard Brandt on Hopi (...)
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  11. Andrew Sneddon (2008). Locating Happiness. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 49:77-81.
    Philosophers have long studied the nature of happiness and, as a consequence, have made recommendations about how to achieve it. The present paper argues that perhaps this has been a mistake. Empirical studies of happiness have been yielding important results in recent years, the implication of which is that happiness is more complex than philosophers have suspected. The crucial point is this: although very abstract and very individual-specific things can be said about happiness, there is nothing substantial that can be (...)
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  12. Andrew Sneddon (2008). The Depths and Shallows of Psychological Externalism. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):393 - 408.
    This paper examines extant ways of classifying varieties of psychological externalism and argues that they imply a hitherto unrecognized distinction between shallow and deep externalism. The difference is between starting points: shallowly externalist hypotheses begin with the attribution of psychological states to individuals, just as individualistic hypotheses do, whereas deeply externalistic hypotheses begin with agent-environment interaction as the basis of cognitive processes and attribute psychological states to individuals as necessary for such interaction. The over-arching aim is to show how deep (...)
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  13. Andrew Sneddon (2008). Two Views of Emotional Perception. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.
    One stream in contemporary philosophical and psychological study of the emotions argues that they are perceptual capacities. The present project is to compare and contrast two possible models of emotional perception. The central difference between these models is the notion of modularity, and the corresponding overall view of the nature of the mind, that they use. One model uses classic, Fodorian modules, which S.L. Hurley characterizes as “vertical”. The other model uses “horizontal” modules. I suggest some empirical tests that might (...)
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  14. Andrew Sneddon (2007). Two Views of Emotional Perception: Some Empirical Suggestions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S):161-183.
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  15. Andrew Sneddon (2007). A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding: Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):731 – 748.
    Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to a phenomenon they call 'moral dumbfounding'. Moral dumbfounding occurs when someone confidently pronounces a moral judgment, then finds that he or she has little or nothing to say in defense of it. This paper addresses recent attempts by Jonathan Haidt and Marc Hauser to make sense of moral dumbfounding in terms of their respective theories of moral judgment; Haidt in terms of a 'social intuitionist' model of moral judgment, and Hauser in terms (...)
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  16. Andrew Sneddon (2006). Action and Responsibility. Springer.
    What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. I argue that this type of answer, which I call "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, I offer (...)
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  17. Andrew Sneddon (2006). Equality, Justice, and Paternalism: Recentreing Debate About Physician-Assisted Suicide. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (4):387–404.
    Debate about physician-assisted suicide has typically focused on the values of autonomy and patient well-being. Margaret Battin, Rosamond Rhodes and Anita Silvers note that both those in favour of legalizing physician-assisted suicide and those who want this activity to be legally prohibited claim these values in support of their case. This is understandable, even reasonable, given the importance of these values in bioethics. However, these are not the only moral values there are. The purpose of this paper is to examine (...)
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  18. Andrew Sneddon (2005). Rawlsian Decisionmaking and Genetic Engineering. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 15 (01):35-41.
    This paper evaluates Sara Goering’s recent attempt to use the Rawlsian notion of the veil of ignorance as a tool for distinguishing permissible from impermissible forms of genetic engineering. I argue that her article fails due to a failure to include vital contextual information in the right way.
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  19. Andrew Sneddon (2005). Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference It Should Make. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.
    P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark (...)
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  20. Andrew Sneddon (2005). Michael Smith, Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 25 (3):224-226.
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  21. Andrew Sneddon (2004). Action: On Cause and Constitution. Dialogue 43 (01):157-.
    This is a response to Andrei Buckareff and Jing Zhu, who in "Causalisms Reconsidered" criticize my argument in, primarily, "Considering Causalisms" and, secondarily, in "Does Philosophy of Action Rest on a Mistake?".
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  22. Andrew Sneddon (2004). Prichard, Strawson, and Two Objections to Moral Sensibility Theories. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:289-314.
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  23. Andrew Sneddon (2003). Feeling Utilitarian. Utilitas 15 (03):330-.
    Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams are recent proponents of the influential objection against utilitarianism that it leads to important forms of alienation. The famous response is that such objections are mistaken. The objections picture agents being motivated by the principle of utility, but, e.g., Peter Railton argues we should see this principle as purely normative – agents can be motivated any way they like and still be ‘objective’ consequentialists. I argue that this type of position is inadequate as a full (...)
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  24. Andrew Sneddon (2002). Achterhuis, Hans, Ed. American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn. Review of Metaphysics 56 (2):409-410.
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  25. Andrew Sneddon (2002). Semanticity: Which Way to Turn? Philosophia 29 (1-4):211-239.
    In "What Minds Can Do" (1997), Pierre Jacob argues for the cognitive turn in the philosophy of mind. He formulates this in contrast with the linguistic turn, which privileges linguistic semanticity over mental semanticity. Jacob argues that the order of privilege should be the other way around. I argue for a third option, which I call the ecological turn, which dissolves the bifurcation explored by Jacob.
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  26. Andrew Sneddon (2002). Towards Externalist Psychopathology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):297-316.
    The "width" of the mind is an important topic in contemporary philosophical psychology. Support for active externalism derives from theoretical, engineering, and observational perspectives. Given the history of psychology, psychopathology is notable in its absence from the list of avenues of support for the idea that some cognitive processes extend beyond the physical bounds of the organism in question. The current project is to defend the possibility, plausibility, and desirability of externalist psychopathology. Doing so both adds to the case for (...)
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  27. Andrew Sneddon (2001). Does Philosophy of Action Rest on a Mistake? Metaphilosophy 32 (5):502-522.
    Philosophers of action tend to take for granted the concept of basic actions – actions that are done at will, or directly – as opposed to others that are performed in other ways. This concept does foundational work in action theory; many theorists, especially causalists, take part of their task to be showing that normal, complex actions necessarily stem from basic ones somehow. The case for the concept of basic actions is driven by a family of observations and a cluster (...)
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  28. Andrew Sneddon (2001). Advertising and Deep Autonomy. Journal of Business Ethics 33 (1):15 - 28.
    Concerns about advertising take one of two forms. Some people are worried that advertising threatens autonomous choice. Others are worried not about autonomy but about the values spread by advertising as a powerful institution. I suggest that this bifurcation stems from misunderstanding autonomy. When one turns from autonomous choice to autonomy of persons, or what is often glossed as self-rule, then one has reason to think that advertising poses a moral problem of a sort so far unrecognized. I diagnose this (...)
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  29. Andrew Sneddon (2001). Considering Causalisms. Dialogue 40 (02):343-.
    Depuis 1963, le causalisme a été l'approche dominante en théorie de l'action. Il est possible, cependant, de distinguer diverses sortes de causalisme. La version dominante, que j'appelle CTA, essaie de trouver une analyse causale de l'action. Une version plus restreinte — le causalismeR — se montre récalcitrante à ce genre d'entreprise et se contente d'essayer d'expliquer en quel sens on peut traiter comme causales les explications par les raisons. J'examine ici les motivations sous-jacentes à CTA, ainsi que plusieurs de ses (...)
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  30. Andrew Sneddon (2001). Taking Empirically Minded Moral Philosophy Seriously. Dialogue 40 (03):603-.
    This is a critique of Wayne Fenske's attempt to provide an a posteriori defense of internalism and consequently an argument against the possibility of amoralism.
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  31. Andrew Sneddon (2001). What's Wrong with Selling Yourself Into Slavery? Paternalism and Deep Autonomy (¿Por Qué Está Mal Moralmente Venderse Uno Mismo Como Esclavo? Paternalismo y Autonomía Profunda). Crítica 33 (98):97 - 121.
    Such thinkers as John Stuart Mill, Gerald Dworkin, and Richard Doerflinger have appealed to the value of freedom to explain both what is wrong with slavery and what is wrong with selling oneself into slavery. Practical ethicists, including Dworkin and Doerflinger, sometimes use selling oneself into slavery in analogies intended to illustrate justifiable forms of paternalism. I argue that these thinkers have misunderstood the moral problem with slavery. Instead of being a central value in itself, I argue that freedom is (...)
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