4 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Andrew W. Howat [3]Andrew William Howat [1]
  1. Andrew W. Howat (2013). Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth. Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468.
    This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Andrew William Howat (2011). Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.
  3. Andrew W. Howat (2006). Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists (Review). Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Andrew W. Howat (2006). Review: David L. Hildebrand. Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.