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Profile: Andrews Reath (University of California, Riverside)
Profile: Andrews Reath (University of California, Riverside)
  1.  40
    Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.) (2010). Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
    Engaging and critical, this volume will be invaluable to advanced students and scholars of Kant and to moral theorists alike.
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  2. Andrews Reath (2006). Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory. Oxford University Press.
    Andrews Reath presents a selection of his best essays on various features of Kant's moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and his conception of autonomy. Together the essays articulate Reath's original approach to Kant's views about human autonomy, which explains Kant's belief that objective moral requirements are based on principles we choose for ourselves. With two new papers, and revised versions of several others, the volume will be of great interest to all (...)
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  3.  66
    Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, Christine M. Korsgaard & John Rawls (eds.) (1997). Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls. Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honor. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of the subject: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and (...)
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  4.  40
    Andrews Reath (1989). Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility. Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination. Kant-Studien 80 (1-4):284-302.
  5.  71
    Andrews Reath (1994). Legislating the Moral Law. Noûs 28 (4):435-464.
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  6.  67
    Andrews Reath (1988). Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant. Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (4):593-619.
    This paper develops an interpretation of what is essential to kant's doctrine of the highest good, Which defends it while also explaining why it is often rejected. While it is commonly viewed as a theological ideal in which happiness is proportioned to virtue, The paper gives an account in which neither feature appears. The highest good is best understood as a state of affairs to be achieved through human agency, Containing the moral perfection of all individuals and the satisfaction of (...)
  7.  17
    Andrews Reath (2009). Setting Ends for Oneself Through Reason. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press
    Kantians often talk about the capacity to set ends for oneself through reason and those who do assume that Kant regarded the capacity to set ends as a rational power or a component of practical reason. ‘Natural perfection’, Kant says, ‘is the cultivation of any capacities whatever for furthering ends set forth by reason’, and he refers to ‘humanity’ as the ‘capacity to set oneself any end at all’ or ‘the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends’.¹ ‘Humanity’ comprises (...)
  8.  21
    Andrews Reath (2008). Autonomy, Taking One's Choices to Be Good, and Practical Law: Replies to Critics. Philosophical Books 49 (2):125-137.
  9.  17
    Andrews Reath (1998). Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):103-124.
  10. Andrews Reath (1989). Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):42-72.
  11.  7
    Andrews Reath (2013). Kant's Moral Philosophy. In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press 443.
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  12.  28
    Andrews Reath (2003). Value and Law in Kant's Moral Theory. [REVIEW] Ethics 114 (1):127-155.
    Paul Guyer’s Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness is a collection of essays written over a period of ten years on the roles of freedom, reason, law, and happiness in Kant’s practical philosophy. The centrality of these concepts has always been acknowledged, but Guyer proposes a different way to understand their interconnections. Kant extols respect for moral law and conformity to moral principle for its own sake while at the same time celebrating the value of human freedom and autonomy. Guyer (...)
  13.  1
    Andrews Reath (2013). The Ground of Practical Laws. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 571-582.
  14.  48
    Andrews Reath, Formal Approaches to Kant's Formula of Humanity.
    My aim in this paper is to explore different ways of understanding Kant’s Formula of Humanity as a formal principle. I believe that a formal principle for Kant is a principle that is constitutive of some domain of cognition or rational activity. It is a principle that both constitutively guides that activity and serves as its internal regulative norm. In the first section of this essay, I explain why it is desirable to find a way to understand the Formula of (...)
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  15.  19
    Andrews Reath (1993). Intelligible Character and the Reciprocity Thesis. Inquiry 36 (4):419 – 430.
    This paper surveys some themes of Allison's Kant's Theory of Freedom, and then raises a problem for his presentation of Kant's Reciprocity Thesis. Allison argues that a transcendentally free agent is bound to the moral law as follows. Rational agents fall under a justification requirement, and when transcendental freedom is added to the concept of rational agency, the justification requirement extends to the choice of fundamental maxims. Since facts about one's nature cannot justify the adoption of fundamental maxims, all that (...)
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  16.  3
    Andrews Reath (2013). Categorical Imperative. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  17.  8
    Andrews Reath (2011). Will, Obligatory Ends and the Completion of Practical Reason: Comments on Barbara Herman's Moral Literacy. Kantian Review 16 (1):1-15.
    This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman's Moral Literacy norm-constituted power completes’ practical reason or rational agency.
  18.  15
    Andrews Reath (2012). Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Pp. Viii + 275. Utilitas 24 (04):554-557.
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  19.  18
    Andrews Reath (2012). A High Plains Drifter: Remarks on Engstrom's the Form of Practical Knowledge. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):79-88.
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  20.  13
    Andrews Reath (1989). The Categorical Imperative and Kant's Conception of Practical Rationality. The Monist 72 (3):384-410.
  21.  23
    Andrews Reath (2010). Formal Principles and the Form of a Law. In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press
    One aim of the Critique of Practical Reason is to establish that reason alone can determine the will. To show that it can, it suffices to show that there are practical principles given by reason alone – what Kant terms ‘practical laws’, or (roughly) requirements of reason on action. Chapter I of the Analytic accomplishes this aim by arguing that the moral law is an authoritative practical principle given as a ‘fact of reason’. The chapter begins in section 1 with (...)
  22.  19
    Andrews Reath (2009). Review: Engstrom, Stephen, The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative. [REVIEW] Ethics 120 (1):170-175.
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  23.  19
    Andrews Reath (2010). Contemporary Kantian Ethics. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge
    Kant’s project in ethics is to defend the conception of morality that he takes to be embedded in ordinary thought. The principal aims of his foundational works in ethics – the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason – are to state the fundamental principle of morality, which he terms the “Categorical Imperative”, and then to give an account of its unconditional authority – why we should give moral requirements priority over non-moral reasons – by (...)
  24.  10
    Andrews Reath (2008). Review: Horn, Christoph and Schnecker, Dieter (Eds.), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (8).
  25.  6
    Andrews Reath (2000). Onora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning:Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Ethics 110 (4):855-859.
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  26. Andrews Reath (1995). Autonomy And Practical Reason: Thomas Hill's Kantianism. Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik 3.
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  27. Andrews Reath (1994). Agency And The Imputation Of Consequences In Kant's Ethics. Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik 2.
    Kant holds that when an agent acts contrary to a strict moral requirement, all of the resulting bad consequences are imputable to the agent, whether foreseeable or not. Conversely, no bad consequences resulting from an agent's compliance with duty are imputable. This paper analyzes the underlying rationale of Kant's principles for the moral imputation of bad consequences. One aim is to show how Kant treats imputability as a question for practical reason occurring within the context of first-order moral norms, rather (...)
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  28. Andrews Reath (1998). Ethical Autonomy. In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge 1.
     
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  29. Andrews Reath (2010). Introduction. In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press
  30.  0
    Andrews Reath (2006). Kant's Critical Account of Freedom. In Graham Bird (ed.), A Companion to kant. Blackwell Publishing Ltd 275-290.
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  31.  0
    Andrews Reath (2013). Kant's Conception of Autonomy of the Will. In Oliver Sensen (ed.), Kant on Moral Autonomy. Cambridge University Press 32-52.
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  32. Andrews Reath (1997). Legislating for a Realm of Ends: The Social Dimension of Autonomy. In Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, Christine M. Korsgaard & John Rawls (eds.), Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls. Cambridge University Press 214--239.
     
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  33. Andrews Reath (1984). Morality and the Course of Nature: Kant's Doctrine of the Highest Good. Dissertation, Harvard University
    This study presents a defense of Kant's doctrine of the Highest Good. Though generally greeted with skepticism, I propose an interpretation that makes it an integral part of Kant's moral philosophy, which adds to the latter in interesting ways. Kant introduces the Highest Good as the final end of moral conduct. I argue that it is best understood as an end to be realized in history through human agency: a state of affairs in which all individuals act from the Moral (...)
     
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