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Profile: Andy Egan
Profile: Andy Egan (Rutgers University, University of St. Andrews)
  1. Andy Egan & James John, A Puzzle About Perception.
    experience supervene on the intrinsic properties of the experience.
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  2. Brian Weatherson & Andy Egan, Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality.
    There is a lot that we don’t know. That means that there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. For instance, we don’t know whether it rained in Seattle yesterday. So, for us at least, there is an epistemic possibility where it rained in Seattle yesterday, and one where it did not. It’s tempting to give a very simple analysis of epistemic possibility: • A possibility is an epistemic possibility if we do not know that it does (...)
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  3. Andy Egan (2014). There's Something Funny About Comedy: A Case Study in Faultless Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):73-100.
    Very often, different people, with different constitutions and comic sensibilities, will make divergent, conflicting judgments about the comic properties of a given person, object, or event, on account of those differences in their constitutions and comic sensibilities. And in many such cases, while we are inclined to say that their comic judgments are in conflict, we are not inclined to say that anybody is in error. The comic looks like a poster domain for the phenomenon of faultless disagreement. I argue (...)
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  4. Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2012). How We Feel About Terrible, Non-Existent Mafiosi. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):277-306.
    We argue for an imaginative analog of desire from premises about imaginative engagement with fiction. There's a bit about the paradox of fiction, too.
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  5. Andy Egan (2012). Comments on Jonathan Cohen's The Red and the Real. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):306-312.
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  6. Andy Egan (2012). Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.
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  7. Andy Egan (2011). Comments on Gendler's, “the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias”. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):65-79.
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  8. Andy Egan (2010). Disputing About Taste. In Ted Warfield & Richard Feldman (eds.), Disagreement. OUP.
    i> “There’s no disputing about taste.” That’s got a nice ring to it, but it’s not quite the ring of truth. While there’s definitely something right about the aphorism – there’s a reason why it is, after all, an aphorism, and why its utterance tends to produce so much nodding of heads and muttering of “just so” and “yes, quite” – it’s surprisingly difficult to put one’s finger on just what the truth in the neighborhood is, exactly. One thing that’s (...)
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  9. Andy Egan (2010). Projectivism Without Error. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 68.
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  10. Andy Egan (2009). Billboards, Bombs and Shotgun Weddings. Synthese 166 (2):251 - 279.
    It's a presupposition of a very common way of thinking about contextsensitivity in language that the semantic contribution made by a bit of context-sensitive vocabulary is sensitive only to features of the speaker's situation at the time of utterance. I argue that this is false, and that we need a theory of context-dependence that allows for content to depend not just on the features of the utterance's origin, but also on features of its destination. There are cases in which a (...)
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  11. Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.) (2009). Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    The ten new essays in this volume explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism.
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  12. Brian Weatherson & Andy Egan (2009). Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
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  13. Brian Weatherspoon & Andy Egan (2009). Introduction: Epistemic Modals and Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Andy Egan (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife (...)
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  15. Andy Egan (2008). Pretense for the Complete Idiom. Noûs 42 (3):381 - 409.
  16. Andy Egan (2008). Seeing and Believing: Perception, Belief Formation and the Divided Mind. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.
    On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It's clear that actual human beings don't live up (...)
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  17. Tyler Doggett & Andy Egan (2007). Wanting Things You Don't Want: The Case for an Imaginative Analogue of Desire. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (9):1-17.
    You’re imagining, in the course of a different game of make-believe, that you’re a bank robber. You don’t believe that you’re a bank robber. You are moved to point your finger, gun-wise, at the person pretending to be the bank teller and say, “Stick ‘em up! This is a robbery!”.
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  18. Andy Egan (2007). Review: Relativism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):387-390.
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  19. Andy Egan (2007). Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.
    I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might be under the palm tree'', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by assertions (...)
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  20. Andy Egan (2007). Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
    A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is (...)
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  21. Andy Egan (2007). Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory. Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.
    Many philosophers (myself included) have been converted to causal decision theory by something like the following line of argument: Evidential decision theory endorses irrational courses of action in a range of examples, and endorses “an irrational policy of managing the news”. These are fatal problems for evidential decision theory. Causal decision theory delivers the right results in the troublesome examples, and does not endorse this kind of irrational news-managing. So we should give up evidential decision theory, and be causal decision (...)
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  22. Andy Egan (2006). Appearance Properties? Noûs 40 (3):495-521.
    Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by its representational content is very attractive. Unfortunately, it is in conflict with some quite robust intuitions about the possibility of phenomenal spectrum inversion without misrepresentation. Faced with such a problem, there are the usual three options: reject intentionalism, discount the intuitions and deny that spectrum inversion without misrepresentation is possible, or find a way to reconcile the two by dissolving the apparent conflict. Sydney Shoemaker's (1994) (...)
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  23. Andy Egan (2006). Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
    Colors aren't as real as shapes. Shapes are full?fledged qualities of things in themselves, independent of how they're perceived and by whom. Colors aren't. Colors are merely qualities of things as they are for us, and the colors of things depend on who is perceiving them. When we take the fully objective view of the world, things keep their shapes, but the colors fall away, revealed as the mere artifacts of our own subjective, parochial perspective on the world that they (...)
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  24. Andy Egan & Adam Elga (2005). I Can't Believe I'm Stupid. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.
    It is bad news to find out that one's cognitive or perceptual faculties are defective. Furthermore, it’s not always transparent how one ought to revise one's beliefs in light of such news. Two sorts of news should be distinguished. On the one hand, there is news that a faculty is unreliable -- that it doesn't track the truth particularly well. On the other hand, there is news that a faculty is anti-reliable -- that it tends to go positively wrong. These (...)
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  25. Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson (2005). Epistemic Modals in Context. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 131-170.
    A very simple contextualist treatment of a sentence containing an epistemic modal, e.g. a might be F, is that it is true iff for all the contextually salient community knows, a is F. It is widely agreed that the simple theory will not work in some cases, but the counterexamples produced so far seem amenable to a more complicated contextualist theory. We argue, however, that no contextualist theory can capture the evaluations speakers naturally make of sentences containing epistemic modals. If (...)
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  26. Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48-66.
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  27. Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (2004). Prankster's Ethics. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):45–52.
    Diversity is a good thing. Some of its value is instrumental. Having people around with diverse beliefs, or customs, or tastes, can expand our horizons and potentially raise to salience some potential true beliefs, useful customs or apt tastes. Even diversity of error can be useful. Seeing other people fall away from the true and the useful in distinctive ways can immunise us against similar errors. And there are a variety of pleasant interactions, not least philosophical exchange, that wouldn’t be (...)
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  28. M. Ozawa, Andy Egan, A. Ishibashi & M. R. (1995). Burgerliche Intelligenz. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (4):617-635.
    Long time delay before lasing in a II-VI laser diode has been observed. Due to this delay, a nominal threshold current increases as the width of applied current pulse becomes shorter. This delay is attributed to the internal Q switching caused by the balance of injected carriers, temperature rise and gain-guiding. By fitting the calculated data to the experimental ones, rates of refractive index change with carrier concentration and with temperature have been estimated.
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  29. Andy Egan, Secondary Qualities, Self-Locating Belief, and Sensible Relativism.
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