Search results for 'Andy Sanford' (try it on Scholar)

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Profile: Andy Sanford (Western Michigan University)
  1.  1
    David H. Sanford (1994). Causation and Intelligibility: David H. Sanford. Philosophy 69 (267):55-67.
    I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.
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  2. David H. Sanford (1985). Causal Dependence and Multiplicity: David H. Sanford. Philosophy 60 (232):215-230.
    Ted Honderich's ‘Causes and If p, even if x, still q ’ contains many good points I shall not discuss. My discussion is restricted to some of the points Honderich makes about causal priority in the final two sections of his paper. He considers several proposals, new and old, for accounting for causal priority before he presents a tentativeproposal of his own. He thinks that some of these proposals, besides having difficulties peculiar to themselves, share the deficiency of lacking the (...)
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  3.  26
    Anthony J. Sanford, Linda M. Moxey & Kevin Paterson (1994). Psychological Studies of Quantifiers. Journal of Semantics 11 (3):153-170.
    In this paper we present a summary review of recent psychological studies which make a contribution to an understanding of how quantifiers are used. Until relatively recently, the contribution which psychology has made has been somewhat restricted. For example, the approach which has enjoyed the greatest popularity in psychology is explaining quantifiers as expressions which have fuzzy or vague projections on to mental scales of amount. Following Moxey & Sanford (1993a), this view is questioned. Experimental work is summarized showing (...)
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  4.  10
    David H. Sanford (1988). Begging the Question as Involving Actual Belief and Inconceivable Without It. Metaphilosophy 19 (1):32–37.
    This article answers John Biro's "Knowability, Believability, and Begging the Question: a Reply to Sanford" in "Metaphilosophy" 15 (1984). Biro and I agree that of two argument instances with the same form and content, one but not the other can beg the question, depending on other factors. These factors include actual beliefs, or so I maintain (against Biro) with the help of some analysed examples. Brief selections from Archbishop Whatley and J S Mill suggest that they also regard reference (...)
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  5.  2
    A. J. Sanford, S. Garrod, A. Lucas & R. Henderson (1983). Pronouns Without Explicit Antecedents? Journal of Semantics 2 (3-4):303-318.
    Yule (1982) has argued that examples from speech show that pronouns may be interpreted nonreferentially. In the present paper, it is argued that pronouns elicit procedures for the identification of referents which are in explicit focus (Sanford and Garrod, 1981). Three experiments are offered in support of this view. The discussion centres on the need for carefully assessing the knowledge-states of listeners when pronouns are used in the absence of antecedents. It is proposed that felicitous use of pronouns without (...)
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  6.  4
    S. B. Barton & A. J. Sanford (1990). The Control of Attributional Patterns by the Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions. Journal of Semantics 7 (1):81-92.
    Recent evidence has shown that certain quantifiers (few, only a few) and quantifying adverbs (seldom, rarely) when used tend to make people think of reasons for the small proportions or low frequencies which they denote. Other expressions single out small proportions or low frequences, but do not lead to a focus on reasons (e. g. a few; occasionally). In the present paper, these observations are applied to the attribution of cause in short two–line vignettes which make reference to situations, and (...)
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  7.  24
    A. Whitney Sanford (2013). Anand Pandian: Crooked Stalks Cultivating Virtue in South India. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 26 (3):721-722.
    Anand Pandian: Crooked Stalks Cultivating Virtue in South India Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9308-4 Authors A. Whitney Sanford, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.
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  8.  36
    Anthony J. Sanford & Patrick Sturt (2002). Depth of Processing in Language Comprehension: Not Noticing the Evidence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (9):382-386.
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  9. David H. Sanford (1993). The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology. Noûs 27 (2):219-228.
    Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to solve this problem. (...)
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  10. David Sanford (1966). Red, Green, and Absolute Determinacy. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (65):356-358.
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  11.  13
    Frank E. Pollick, Helena M. Paterson, Armin Bruderlin & Anthony J. Sanford (2001). Perceiving Affect From Arm Movement. Cognition 82 (2):B51-B61.
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  12. David H. Sanford (1976). The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship. Journal of Philosophy 73 (8):193-207.
    I criticize and emend J L Mackie's account of causal priority by replacing ‘fixity’ in its central clause by 'x is a causal condition of y, but y is not a causal condition of x'. This replacement works only if 'is a causal condition of' is not a symmetric relation. Even apart from our desire to account for causal priority, it is desirable to have an account of nonsymmetric conditionship. Truth, for example, is a condition of knowledge, but knowledge is (...)
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  13.  13
    David H. Sanford (2004). If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. Routledge.
    This new edition includes three new chapters, updating the book to take into account developments in the field over the past fifteen years.
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  14. David H. Sanford (2003). Fusion Confusion. Analysis 63 (277):1–4.
    Two fusions can be in the same place at the same time. So long as a house made of Tinkertoys is intact, the fusion of all its Tinkertoys parts coincides with the fusion of it walls and its roof. If none of the Tinkertoys is destroyed, their fusion persists through the complete disassembly of the house. (So the house is not a fusion of its Tinkertoy parts.) The fusion of the walls and roof does not persist through the complete disassembly (...)
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  15.  91
    David H. Sanford (1972). Begging the Question. Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
    A primary purpose of argument is to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of the conclusion. A question begging argument fails this purpose because it violates what W. E. Johnson called an epistemic condition of inference. Although an argument of the sort characterized by Robert Hoffman in his response (Analysis 32.2, Dec 71) to Richard Robinson (Analysis 31.4, March 71) begs the question in all circumstances, we usually understand the charge that an argument is (...)
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  16. David H. Sanford (1968). Contraries and Subcontraries. Noûs 2 (1):95-96.
    If two statements are contraries if and only if they cannot both be true, but can both be false, then some corresponding A and E categorical statements are not contraries, even on the presupposition that something exists which satisfies the subject term. For some such statements are necessarily true and thus cannot be false. There is a similar problem with subcontraries.
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  17.  41
    David H. Sanford, Determinates Vs. Determinables. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Everything red is colored, and all squares are polygons. A square is distinguished from other polygons by being four-sided, equilateral, and equiangular. What distinguishes red things from other colored things? This has been understood as a conceptual rather than scientific question. Theories of wavelengths and reflectance and sensory processing are not considered. Given just our ordinary understanding of color, it seems that what differentiates red from other colors is only redness itself. The Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson introduced the terms (...)
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  18. David H. Sanford (1974). Classical Logic and Inexact Predicates. Mind 83 (329):112-113.
  19. David B. Sanford (1972). Durer's Role in the "Herzensergiessungen". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 30 (4):441-448.
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  20. David H. Sanford (1975). Causal Necessity and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 28 (2):185 - 194.
    Myles Brand and Marshall Swain advocate the principle that if A is the set of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the occurrence of B, then if C is a set of conditions individually necessary for the occurrence of B, every member of C is a member of A. I agree with John Barker and Risto Hilpinen who each argue that this principle is not true for causal necessity and sufficiency, but I disagree with their claim that it is (...)
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  21.  6
    DavidH Sanford (1981). Superfluous Information, Epistemic Conditions of Inference, and Begging the Question. Metaphilosophy 12 (2):145–158.
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  22. David H. Sanford (1978). Causal Necessity and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 33 (2):185 - 194.
    Hume's arguments for the contention that causal necessity precludes logical necessity depend on the questionable principle that a cause must precede its effect. Hobbes' definition of entire cause, although it fails to account for causal priority, is not refuted by Hume. The objections of Myles Brand and Marshall Swain (Philosophical Studies, 1976) to my counterexample against Hume (Philosophical Studies, 1975) are ineffective. Their other objections to my criticisms of their argument against defining causation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (...)
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  23. David H. Sanford (1976). The Primary Objects of Perception. Mind 85 (April):189-208.
    The primary objects of hearing are sounds: everything we hear we hear by hearing a sound. (This claim differs from Berkeley’s that we hear only sounds and from Aristotle’s that we only hear sounds.) Colored regions are primary objects of sight, and pressure resistant regions are primary objects of perception by touch. By definition, the primary objects of perception are physical. The properties of the primary objects of perception are exactly the properties sense-datum theories attribute to sense-data. Indirect Realism holds (...)
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  24.  15
    Linda M. Moxey & Anthony J. Sanford (1993). Communicating Quantities: A Psychological Perspective (Essays in Cognitive Psychology). Psychology Press.
  25.  50
    Jonathan J. Sanford (2010). Are You Man Enough? Aristotle and Courage. International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):431-445.
    There are four features to Aristotle’s account of courage that appear peculiar when compared to our own intuitions about this virtue: his account of courage seems not, on its surface, to fit a eudaimonist model, courage is restricted to a surprisingly small number of actions, this restriction, among other things, excludes women and non-combatant men from ever exercising this virtue, and courage is counted as virtuous because of its nobility and beauty. In this paper I explore Aristotle’s account of courage (...)
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  26.  27
    David H. Sanford (1976). Competing Semantics of Vagueness: Many Values Versus Super-Truth. Synthese 33 (2-4):195--210.
    A semantics of vagueness should reject the principle that every statement has a truth-value yet retain the classical tautologies. A many-value, non-truth-functional semantics and a semantics of super-valuations each have this result. According to the super-valuation approach, 'if a man with n hairs on his head is bald, then a man with n plus one hairs on his head is also bald' is false because it comes out false no matter how the vague predicate 'is bald' is appropriately made precise. (...)
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  27. D. H. Sanford (2011). Can a Sum Change its Parts? Analysis 71 (2):235-239.
    I consider two logically independent definitions of (mereological) sum identity when x is a sum of the ys and w is a sum of the zs. Def 1 x=y: every part of every y shares a part with some z, and every part of every z shares a part with some y. Def 2 x = y: all the ys are zs, and all the zs are ys. Neither allows a sum to change its parts. Peter van Inwagen tells a (...)
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  28.  53
    David H. Sanford (2003). Reply to Mr. Aranyosi. Analysis 63 (280):305–309.
    Although Aranyosi's claim that McTaggart's "set of parts" is a set rather than a fusion is correct, his attempt to restate McTaggart's conception needs revision. Aranyosi argues that "the fusion of cats is identical with the fusion of all cat-parts, 'regardless of whether all cat-parts are parts of cats or not.'" Fusions have unique decompositions into what David Lewis calls "nice parts." Cats are nice parts of cat fusions, as are maximal spatio-temporally connected parts. Part of Aranyosi's argument fails when (...)
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  29.  94
    David H. Sanford (2005). Distinctness and Non-Identity. Analysis 65 (288):269–274.
    The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
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  30.  17
    David H. Sanford (1975). Borderline Logic. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.
    To accommodate vague statements and predicates, I propose an infinite-valued, non-truth-functional interpretation of logic on which the tautologies are exactly the tautologies of classical two-valued logic. iI introduce a determinacy operator, analogous to the necessity operator in alethic modal logic, to allow the definition of first-order and higher-order borderline cases. On the interpretation proposed for determinacy, every statement corresponding to a theorem of modal system T is a logical truth, and I conjecture that every logical truth on the interpretation corresponds (...)
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  31.  28
    David H. Sanford (1975). Infinity and Vagueness. Philosophical Review 84 (4):520-535.
    Many philosophic arguments concerned with infinite series depend on the mutual inconsistency of statements of the following five forms: (1) something exists which has R to something; (2) R is asymmetric; (3) R is transitive; (4) for any x which has R to something, there is something which has R to x; (5) only finitely many things are related by R. Such arguments are suspect if the two-place relation R in question involves any conceptual vagueness or inexactness. Traditional sorites arguments (...)
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  32. David H. Sanford (1997). Chisholm on Brentano's Thesis. In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court 25--201.
    Roderick Chisholm provides, in different places, two formulations of Brentano's thesis about the relation between the psychological and the intentional: (1) all and only psychological sentences are intentional; (2) no psychological intentional sentence is equivalent to a nonintentional sentence. Chisholm also presents several definitions of intentionality. Some of these allow that a sentence is intentional while its negation is nonintentional, which ruins the prospects of defending the more plausible and interesting thesis (2). A generalization of the notion of logical independence (...)
     
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  33.  2
    Linda M. Moxey & Anthony J. Sanford (1986). Quantifiers and Focus. Journal of Semantics 5 (3):189-206.
    This paper concerns a neglected but potentially important aspect of natural language quantifiers. Certain quantifiers serve to identify various proportions of sets. Thus few, for example, identifies a smaller proportion of a set than many. However, different quantifiers may serve to identify similar proportions, yet produce somewhat different representations when they are used. The distinction between few and a few is considered in some detail, along with related expressions. It is claimed that these expressions serve to put into focus different (...)
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  34.  40
    David Sanford (1967). Negative Terms. Analysis 27 (6):201 - 205.
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  35.  9
    Simon C. Garrod & Anthony J. Sanford (1988). Discourse Models as Interfaces Between Language and the Spatial World. Journal of Semantics 6 (1):147-160.
    This paper outlines an argument that the meaning of spatial terms depends critically upon our mental models of space. We argue that such models capture the functional geometry of spatial scenes to represent various control relations between the objects in the scene. The discussion centres around two analyses. First, an analysis of the spatial descriptions taken from task oriented dialogue, which seem to reflect a number of distinct mental models of the same visual scene, and secondly an analysis of simple (...)
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  36.  46
    David H. Sanford (1981). Illusions and Sense-Data. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):371-385.
    Examples of sensory illusion show the failure of the attempt of traditional sense-datum theory to account for something's phenomenally appearing to be F by postulating the existence of a sense-datum that is actually F. the Muller-Lyer Illusion cannot be explained by postulating two sensibly presented lines that actually have the lengths the physical lines appear to have. Illusions due to color contrast cannot be explained by postulating sense-data that actually have the colors the physical samples appear to have.
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  37.  44
    David H. Sanford (1970). Locke, Leibniz, and Wiggins on Being in the Same Place at the Same Time. Philosophical Review 79 (1):75-82.
    Locke thought it was a necessary truth that no two material bodies could be in the same place at the same time. Leibniz wasn't so sure. This paper sides with Leibniz. I examine the arguments of David Wiggins in defense of Locke on this point (Philosophical Review, January 1968). Wiggins’ arguments are ineffective.
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  38.  11
    David H. Sanford (1977). The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to Barker. Dialogue 16 (3):485-498.
    According to John A Barker, whether an argument begs the question is purely a matter of logical form. According to me, it is also a matter of epistemic conditions; some arguments which beg the question in some contexts need not beg the question in every context. I point out difficulties in Barker's treatment and defend my own views against some of his criticisms. In the concluding section, "Alleged difficulties with disjunctive syllogism," I defend the validity of disjunctive syllogism against the (...)
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  39.  12
    Asifa Majid, Anthony J. Sanford & Martin J. Pickering (2006). Covariation and Quantifier Polarity: What Determines Causal Attribution in Vignettes? Cognition 99 (1):35-51.
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  40.  9
    David H. Sanford (1985). Causal Dependence and Multiplicity. Philosophy 60 (232):215-230.
    In "Causes and "If P, Even If X, still Q," Philosophy 57 (July 1982), Ted Honderich cites my "The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship," journal of Philosophy 73 (April 22, 1976) as an example of an account of causal priority that lacks the proper character. After emending Honderich's description of the proper character, I argue that my attempt to account for one-way causation in terms of one-way causal conditionship does not totally lack it. Rather than emphasize the (...)
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  41.  29
    David H. Sanford (1993). Disjunctive Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.
    Philosophers have had difficulty in explaining the difference between disjunctive and non-disjunctive predicates. Purely syntactical criteria are ineffective, and mention of resemblance begs the question. I draw the distinction by reference to relations between borderline cases. The crucial point about the disjoint predicate 'red or green', for example, is that no borderline case of 'red' is a borderline case of 'green'. Other varieties of disjunctive predicates are: inclusively disjunctive (such as 'red or hard'), disconnected (such as 'grue' on the usual (...)
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  42.  41
    David H. Sanford (1969). Time May Have a Stop. Analysis 29 (6):206.
    In "Time to Stop" (Analysis, 29,2, December 1968) Vernon Pratt argues that on a relativistic view of time the universe could not become static. He does not distinguish "it might be true at some time later than t that such-and-such is not the case" from "it might not be true that such-and-such is the case at some time later than t," and this distinction undermines his argument.
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  43.  11
    S. C. Garrod & A. J. Sanford (1982). The Mental Representation of Discourse in a Focussed Memory System: Implications for the Interpretation of Anaphoric Noun Phrases. Journal of Semantics 1 (1):21-41.
    To a cognitive psychologist discourse comprehension poses a number of interesting problems both in terms of mental representation and mental operations. In this paper we suggest that certain of these problems can be brought into clear focus by employing a procedural approach to discourse description. In line with this approach a general framework for the mental representation of discourse is discussed in which distinctions between different types of memory partitions are proposed. It is argued that one needs to distinguish both (...)
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  44.  42
    David H. Sanford (1981). Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):379 - 388.
    Fred Dretske holds that if one knows something, one need not eliminate every alternative to it but only the relevant alternatives. Besides defending this view in "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge" ("Phil. Stud.", 40, 363-378, n 81), he makes some tentative suggestions about determining when an alternative is relevant. I discuss these suggestions and conclude that there are problems yet to be solved. I do not conclude that there are insoluble problems or that Dretske's approach is on the wrong track. (...)
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  45.  37
    Jonathan J. Sanford (2002). Scheler on Feeling and Values. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:165-181.
    Max Scheler argues that there is much to learn about reality through faculties that lie beyond the boundary of reason. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler explores values (Werte), awareness of which depends primarily on affective receptivity rather than rational perceptionof the world. This essay explores the possibility of affective insight in light of Scheler’s analysis of values. Scheler’s notion of values as moral facts is first examined, next consideration is given to how we learn (...)
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  46.  27
    David H. Sanford (1979). Nostalgia for the Ordinary: Comments on Papers by Unger and Wheeler. Synthese 41 (2):175 - 184.
    Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we accept (...)
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  47.  6
    David H. Sanford (1992). The Anastylosis of Reason: Fitting Together Stich's Fragments. Inquiry 35 (1):113 – 137.
    Anastylosis is the reconstruction of a monument using the original fragments and filling in the missing parts with an easily distinguishable modern material. This long review of "The Fragmentation of Reason; Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation" (MIT, 1990) by Stephen P Stich reconstructs, while preserving their original shapes, the conceptions of reason, truth, and rationality that Stich attempts to shatter. The review agrees with Stich's Chapter 3 which is itself highly critical of some philosophical views about evolution (...)
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  48.  10
    Anthony J. Sanford (2002). Context, Attention and Depth of Processing During Interpretation. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):188–206.
    The contribution that a word makes to the meaning and interpretation of a sentence depends upon access to its meaning, and to general knowledge associated with the word. Evidence is presented to support the argument that accessing lexical meaning, as with general knowledge, is a graded affair. We argue that the contribution a word makes depends upon its relevance to the context, and to focus and related variables. Extensions of the argument are made to other aspects of language processing.
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  49.  13
    Jonathan J. Sanford (2009). Confronting Aristotle's Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):107-109.
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  50. John A. Sanford (1981). Evil: The Shadow Side of Reality. Crossroad.
     
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