According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment I); (...) (b) specifically, participants think that a conditional with an impossible antecedent or consequent is false (Experiment 2); (c) if the domain of the conditionals in the illusory problems are expanded to show that their antecedents and consequents are possible, the participants find it easy to reach the correct conclusions (Experiment 3). According to our results, the illusory inferences based on conditional premises, differently from those based on disjunctive premises, are caused by a difference between the understanding of natural language factual conditionals and the truth table of the factual implication; the principle of truth is not necessary to explain them. (shrink)
The polemical term “interaction-free measurement” (IFM) is analyzed in its interpretative nature. Two seminal works proposing the term are revisited and their underlying interpretations are assessed. The role played by nonlocal quantum correlations (entanglement) is formally discussed and some controversial conceptions in the original treatments are identified. As a result the term IFM is shown to be consistent neither with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics nor with the lessons provided by the EPR debate.
It is almost a truism that nature is social, but by what means is nature made social at the level of the interactional encounter? While the transformation of society/nature relationships is often approached through the problematic of distance, and at the scale of macro-historical transformation, this article uses a conflict between American birdwatchers and ornithologists over scientific “collecting” (literally, the killing of birds) to examine the processes through which individuals come to know nature, and come to know it so differently. (...) With John Dewey’s (1958 ) “experience” as the unit of analysis, I trace changes in each group’s experience with birds over the past century; the phenomenology of the resulting encounters; and the understanding that emerges from each in order to understand (1) how, empirically, these two very different loves of birds are formed, and (2) knowledge of nature as an affective sensibility shaped by experiences of closeness. (shrink)
J. Angelo Corlett: The errors of atheism Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11153-010-9285-y Authors C. Robert Mesle, Graceland University, 1 University Ave., Lamoni, IA 50140, USA Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047.
O renomado poeta, escritor, teatrólogo e estudioso dos autores clássicos, Angelo Tonelli apresenta uma coletânea, no original, traduzida e comentada, dos fragmentos de Heráclito, o pensador de Éfeso (ca. 540-475 a.C.). A grande novidade da obra de Tonelli consiste na recuperação, em termos hermenêuticos, do contexto oriental do pensamento de Heráclito. Já na introdução, Tonelli retoma as dicotomias Oriente/Ocidente, mistérios órficos-dionisíacos/espírito apolíneo, contemplação/ação, para mostrar como o pensador de Éfeso procurou superar tais oposições. Começa seu estudo com as tabuinhas (...) encontradas em Ólbia, cuja datação é incerta, mas que propõe serem anteriores a Heráclito e que, portanto, sugerem uma origem nos mistérios para a sabedoria de Heráclito. (shrink)