Ênio José da Costa Brito apresenta Uma leitura da escravidão pela ótica dos desafios do antiescravismo . Trata-se de minuciosa nota bibliográfica sobre a obra de Seymour Drescher: DRESCHER, Seymour. Abolição: Uma história da Escravidão e do Antiescravismo. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2011, 736p. ISBN 978-85-393-0184-3.
O objetivo deste artigo é a análise das críticas de Hannah Arendt à concepção dos direitos humanos, introduzida pelo pensamento dos filósofos contratualistas e efetivada, politicamente, pelas revoluções americanas e francesas no final do século XVIII. Contudo, este objetivo não seria plenamente alcançado sem a avaliação da proposta de Arendt para a superação de suas próprias críticas: a reconstrução dos direitos humanos através do reconhecimento que cada indivíduo tem direito a ter direitos, independente das fronteiras do Estado-nação. Arendt vai buscar (...) na moral universalista e cosmopolita kantiana o conceito de humanidade e dá a ele as dimensões ontológicas e políticas necessárias para se construir um espaço público internacional, onde o direito a ter direito seja decorrente do mero pertencimento à humanidade, não se dissolvendo nos limites de cada Estado-nação. The purpose of this article is the analysis of the criticisms of Hannah Arendt's conception of human rights, introduced by the thought of the contractual philosophers and made effective, politically, by American and French revolutions in the late eighteenth century. However, this aim would not be fully achieved without the review of Arendt's proposal to overcome her own criticisms: the reconstruction of human rights by recognizing that every individual has the right to have rights, regardless of borders of the Nation-State. Arendt tries to discover in the universal and cosmopolitan moral of Kant the concept of humanity and gives him the ontological and political dimensions needed to build an international public space where the right to have rights is due to the mere belonging to the humanity, not dissolving itself in the limits of each Nation-State. (shrink)
There is a growing interest in understanding consumer ethical actions in relation to their dealings with firms. This paper examines whether there are differences between Northern and Southern European Union (EU) consumers'' perceptions of ethical consumer behaviour using Muncy and Vitell''s (1992) Consumer Ethics Scale (CES). The study samples 962 university students across four Northern EU countries (Germany, Denmark, Scotland, The Netherlands) and four Southern EU countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). Some differences are identified between the two samples, which might (...) question the ability of organisations to consider the EU as one homogeneous market. (shrink)
Os Rosários dos Angolas realiza um estudo da Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosário dos Pretos das Portas do Carmo( Bahia) A novidade do estudo está nos subsidios coletados na Africa, Portugal e Brasil , no resgate da presença banto na Bahia e na abertura para um dialogo das cosmovisões banto e cristã. REGINALDO, Lucilene. Os Rosários dos Angolas : Irmandades de africanos e crioulos na Bahia setecentista. São Paulo: Alameda, 2011. 416p. ISBN 978-85-7939-082-1.
Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide (...) questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task. (shrink)
The general thesis I want to defend in this paper is the following: the knowledge by acquaintance with an indeterminate object is not sufficient to guarantee the naming of this object because the acquaintance with it is not sufficient to guarantee neither its identification nor its future reidentification. If I am right in defending this thesis, then it should be accepted that the reference made by demonstrcttives depends on primitive elements with predicative function. Now, if this point about demonstratives (which (...) Russell called logical proper names) could be established with some plausibility, important supports for the rigid designation's thesis about proper names would be lost. In this case, a moderate descriptivistic theory of proper names could be vindicated. I am interested on this last consequence of my argumentatian but I will not develop it here. What I intend to do is to reconstruct the Russell's theory of names, specially his theory of the logical proper names, to discuss the distinction between naming and describing and than to argue against the referential privilege of demonstratives. (shrink)
O propósito deste artigo é explicitar o modo como Gadamer reformula a hermenêutica diltheiana (desenvolvida sobre o conceito moderno de vida utilizado como fundamento da noção de auto-consciência histórica), ao formular um novo modo de compreender a razão e a existência humanas, tomando como ponto de partida a experiência concreta da finitude da vida humana.
Este trabajo analiza los intentos llevados a cabo por Jeremy Bentham y John Stuart Mill para hacer converger algunos de los principales modelos de fundamentación moral: las éticas de la felicidad, como la aristotélica, o la propia ética utilitarista, las éticas del deber de raíz kantiana y las éticas de los derechos.Si conseguimos “reducir”, en primer lugar, las éticas de los derechos al modelo de la ética del deber, podremos simplificar mucho la cuestión y limitarnos a contrastar este último modelo (...) con las éticas de la felicidad, que a su vez deberían converger en la propia ética de la utilidad. No obstante, y aun reconociendo su gran interés, una convergencia completa entre modelos alternativos se revela como imposible. A pesar de los esfuerzos, sobre todo de John Stuart Mill, no es posible una unificación completa de los planteamientos utilitaristas con los de Aristóteles y Kant. La continuación de la empresa utilitarista de lucha por la unificación teórica en el ámbito del problema de la fundamentación moral encuentra un buen ejemplo actual en la obra de Esperanza Guisán. (shrink)
This article proposes to examine the relation between art and the experience of alterity through the typology of modes of existence which Deleuze extracts from literature and cinema. Through the figures of slavery, automatism, petrification, and exhaustion which characterize this typology, it suggests that these experiences of alterity define "minor" modes of existence and thought which are opposed to that volitional autonomy which, for Kant, defines our maturity (majorité). The hypothesis examined here is that the notion of the minor marks (...) a turning point from which the emancipatory vocation of the Enlightenment is replaced by an idea of resistance – understood here, according to Deleuze and Lyotard, as an ethical category designating an experience of the alterity constitutive of the self. From this common point, the article finally seeks to identify what separates the ethics of Deleuze from that of Lyotard, analyzing how Deleuze's typology fits neither a logic of freedom nor that of the gift, making itself unavailable for morality. (shrink)
The epistemological tradition set up by Plato has been permanently reading as a way of doing philosophy in which the dualisms: reality versus illusion, on the one hand, and individual versus the social, on the other, would present not only in an explicit and incommensurable opposition to modern co..
v. 1. pt. 1. Rationalisme, empirisme et crise des croyances au XVIIe siècle -- v. 1. pt. 2. Le procès du Christianisme dans la pensée du XVIIIe siècle -- v. 1. pt. 3. La philosophie de la religion chrétienne chez Kant et les postkantiens -- v. 1. pt. 4. La critique du Christianisme au XIXe siècle -- v. 2. pt 5. Philosophie chrétienne, philosophie du Christianisme au XIXe siècle -- v. 2. pt. 6. Vingtième XVIIe siècle. Index.
Rawls says that public reason is the reason of the citizens of a democratic state and takes the Supreme Court in the USA as the exemplar of public reason. It differs from non public reason, which is used e.g., in universities and academic institutions. Rawls contrasts with Kant, which opposes the public reason of the scholar—or the philosopher—, who speaks before the world, to the private reason of state or church officials. The later, once they accept an authority, cannot think (...) by themselves (selbst denken). A closer examination shows that Rawls is not so far from Kant as it seems, because he takes the constitutional judges not as they are, but as they should be. However Rawls still apparently refuses Kant’s unity of reason. Further investigation of the relations between ethical reason, democratic reason and legal reason is needed. Democratic reason is tantamount both to public reason and to legal reason in a modern constitutional state. It is a requirement of ethics but still not identical with ethical reason, since it is possible to accept democratic reason and to argue against it from an ethical point of view. There is just one good way of reasoning, in spite of the constraints that the sources of law and the rules of procedure impose on legal reasoning, compared with ethics. Such constraints are based on the democratic principle, which is again based on ethical reason, which at last both grounds and limits the constraints that law imposes on reason. (shrink)