6 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Angus Ross (University of East Anglia)
  1. Angus Ross (2008). Rationality and the Reactive Attitudes. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):45-58.
    In Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment”, the idea of the reactive attitudes is used to provide a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of moral responsibility and of the moral life generally. But Strawson also tells us that in reasoning with someone our attitude towards them must be reactive. Taking up that thought, I argue that Strawson has also provided us with a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of rationality. Drawing on a Wittgensteinian conception of the relation between thought and its expression, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Angus Ross (1998). The Concept of Society. In Edward Craig (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
  3. Angus Ross (1989). Why Content Must Be a Matter of Truth Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275.
    It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make an assertion with the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Angus Ross (1988). Davidson on Saying and Asserting. Ratio 1 (1):75-78.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Angus Ross (1986). Why Do We Believe What We Are Told? Ratio (1):69-88.
    It is argued that reliance on the testimony of others cannot be viewed as reliance on a kind of evidence. Speech being essentially voluntary, the speaker cannot see his own choice of words as evidence of their truth, and so cannot honestly offer them to others as such. Rather, in taking responsibility for the truth of what he says, the speaker offers a guarantee or assurance of its truth, and in believing him the hearer accepts this assurance. I argue that, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Angus Ross (1983). The Status of Altruism. Mind 92 (366):204-218.
    It is argued that to possess the concept of distress is to be able to apply the concept to others, and that this implies a qualified form of altruism, in the sense that to perceive another as being in distress is, other things being equal, to see them as in need of help and be moved to help them.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation