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Profile: Anil Gomes (Oxford University)
  1. Anil Gomes, Characterizing Disjunctivism.
     
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  2. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  3. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis:1-11.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  4. Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott (forthcoming). Epicurean Aspects of Mental State Attributions. Philosophical Psychology:1-11.
    In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman and Wegner (2011) present three experiments which they take to show that people judge patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) to have less mental capacity than the dead. They explain this result by claiming that people have implicit dualist or afterlife beliefs. This essay critically evaluates their experimental findings and their proposed explanation. We argue first that the experiments do not support the conclusion that people intuitively think PVS patients have less mentality than (...)
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  5. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  6. Ian Blecher, Anil Gomes, Joel Thiago Klien, Alexei N. Krouglov, Samuel Loncar & Colin Marshall (2013). Jahresinhalt Kant-Studien. Kant-Studien 104 (4):563-566.
  7. Anil Gomes (2013). Iris Murdoch on Art, Ethics, and Attention. British Journal of Aesthetics 53 (3):321-337.
    Can the experience of great art play a role in our coming to understand the ethical framework of another person? In this article I draw out three themes from Iris Murdoch’s ‘The Sovereignty of Good’ in order to show the role that communal attention to works of art can play in our ethical lives. I situate this role in the context of Murdoch’s wider philosophical views.
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  8. Anil Gomes (2013). Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience. Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300.
    We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
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  9. Anil Gomes (2011). Is There a Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
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  10. Anil Gomes (2011). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry 54 (3):277-292.
    John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
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  11. Anil Gomes (2010). Is Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit for Purpose? Kantian Review 15 (2):118-137.
    James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests (...)
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  12. Anil Gomes (2009). Goldie on the Virtues of Art. British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (1):75-81.
    Peter Goldie has argued for a virtue theory of art, analogous to a virtue theory of ethics, one in which the skills and dispositions involved in the production and appreciation of art are virtues and not simply mere skills. In this note I highlight a link between the appreciation of art and its production, and explore the implications of such a link for a virtue theory of art.
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  13. Anil Gomes (2009). Other Minds and Perceived Identity. Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.
    Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
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