Search results for 'Animalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  69
    Eric Yang (2015). Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.
    Standard animalists are committed to a stringent form of restricted composition, thereby denying the existence of brains, hands, and other proper parts of an organism . One reason for positing this near-nihilistic ontology comes from various challenges to animalism such as the Thinking Parts Argument, the Unity Argument, and the Argument from the Problem of the Many. In this paper, I show that these putatively distinct arguments are all instances of a more general problem, which I call the ‘Too (...)
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  2. Stephan Blatti, Animalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its (...)
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  3. Chris Daly & David Liggins (2013). Animalism and Deferentialism. Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.
    Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory neo-Lockean constitutionalism or Lockeanism for short. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to (...)
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  4. Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan (2010). Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.
    We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism —the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning : dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
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  5. Eric T. Olson (2004). Animalism and the Corpse Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74.
    The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case (...)
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  6. Patrick Toner (2011). Hylemorphic Animalism. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.
    Roughly, animalism is the doctrine that each of us is identical with an organism. This paper explains and defends a hylemorphic version of animalism. I show how hylemorphic animalism handles standard objections to animalism in compelling ways. I also show what the costs of endorsing hylemorphic animalism are. The paper's contention is that despite the costs, the view is worth taking seriously.
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  7. David Mackie (1999). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):369-376.
    In ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo‐Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo‐Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo‐Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and (...)
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  8.  80
    Roger Melin (2011). Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort. ARGUMENT 1 (1):69-85.
    In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism (...)
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  9. Harold W. Noonan (1998). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):302-318.
  10. Harold W. Noonan (2001). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.
  11.  66
    Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says (...)
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  12. Stephan Blatti (2012). A New Argument for Animalism. Analysis 72 (4):685-690.
    The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then (...)
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  13.  36
    Kevin W. Sharpe (2015). Animalism and Person Essentialism. Metaphysica 16 (1):53-72.
    Animalism is the view that human persons are human animals – biological organisms that belong to the species Homo sapiens. This paper concerns a family of modal objections to animalism based on the essentiality of personhood (persons and animals differ in their persistence conditions; psychological considerations are relevant for the persistence of persons, but not animals; persons, but not animals, are essentially psychological beings). Such arguments are typically used to support constitutionalism, animalism’s main neo-Lockean rival. The problem (...)
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  14. Stephan Blatti (2006). Animalism. In A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum
    This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.
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  15. Eric T. Olson (2009). An Argument for Animalism. In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the Beginning and End of Life: Readings on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Johns Hopkins University Press
    The view that we are human animals, " animalism ", is deeply unpopular. This paper explains what that claim says and why it is so contentious. It then argues that those who deny it face an awkward choice. They must either deny that there are any human animals, deny that human animals can think, or deny that we are the thinking things located where we are.
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  16.  46
    David B. Hershenov (2011). Soulless Organisms?: Hylomorphism Vs. Animalism. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):465-482.
    It is worthwhile comparing Hylomorphic and Animalistic accounts of personal identity since they both identify the human animal and the human person.The topics of comparison will be three: The first is accounting for our intuitions in cerebrum transplant and irreversible coma cases. Hylomorphism, unlike animalism, appears to capture “commonsense” beliefs here, preserves the maxim that identity matters, and does not run afoul of the Only x and y rule. The next topic of comparison reveals how the rival explanations of (...)
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  17.  29
    Alexander Geddes (2013). Think Twice, It's All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):371-380.
    According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases—cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity—are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne (2010) has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne's arguments are flawed, and that animalism is (...)
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  18. Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.
    The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...)
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  19.  30
    John Dupré (2014). Animalism and the Persistence of Human Organisms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):6-23.
    Humans are a kind of animal, and it is a natural and sensible idea that the way to understand what it is for a human person to persist over time is to reflect on what it is for an animal to persist. This paper accepts this strategy. However, especially in the light of a range of recent biological findings, the persistence of animals turns out to be much more problematic than is generally supposed. The main philosophical premise of the paper (...)
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  20.  28
    Paul F. Snowdon (2014). Animalism and the Lives of Human Animals. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):171-184.
    It is suggested that the best way to interpret animalism is as an identity thesis saying that each of us is identical to an animal. Since there are disagreements about the nature of animal persistence, this means that animalism itself not does not explicitly propose criteria of identity for persons. It implies the negative claim that features that have nothing to do with animal persistence have nothing to do with our persistence. Thinking of it as an identity thesis (...)
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  21. Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism and Personal Identity. In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press
    After motivating the general problem of personal identity and considering several possible accounts, this entry reviews a variety of arguments for and against the animalist criterion of personal identity.
     
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  22. Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) (2016). Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press Uk.
    What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those (...)
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  23. Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.) (forthcoming). Essays on Animalism: Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Arguably the most significant development in the recent history of the personal identity debate has been the emergence of the view known as "animalism." This volume brings together original contributions on this topic written by both well-known and emerging philosophers. Contributors: Lynne Rudder Baker, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov, Jens Johansson, Mark Johnston, Rory Madden, Jeff McMahan & Tim Campbell, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, Mark Reid, Denis Robinson, David Shoemaker, Sydney Shoemaker, Paul Snowdon.
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  24. David B. Hershenov (forthcoming). Four-Dimensional Animalism. In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Essays on Animalism.
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  25.  80
    Jens Johansson (2007). What is Animalism? Ratio 20 (2):194–205.
  26. Dean Zimmerman (2008). Problems for Animalism. Abstracta 3 (3):23-31.
    My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that (...)
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  27.  20
    Carl Gillett (2014). Brains, Neuroscience, and Animalism: On the Implications of Thinking Brains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):41-52.
    The neuroscience revolution has led many scientists to posit “expansive” or “thinking” brains that instantiate rich psychological properties. As a result, some scientists now even claim you are identical to such a brain. However, Eric Olson has offered new arguments that thinking brains cannot exist due to their intuitively “abominable” implications. After situating the commitment to thinking brains in the wider scientific discussions in which they are posited, I then critically assess Olson's arguments against such entities. Although highlighting an important (...)
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  28. Eric T. Olson (2015). Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem. In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self. 21-40.
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  29.  13
    Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):63-69.
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  30.  25
    Paul F. Snowdon (2010). Animalism. The Philosophers' Magazine 50:104-105.
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  31.  10
    Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers. Prolegomena 11 (2):169-180.
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  32. Alexander Pruss, Animalism and Brains.
    I argue that it is possible for a human animal to survive the loss of all bodily parts other than the brain.
     
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  33.  7
    Harold W. Noonan (2001). Animalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.
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  34.  10
    Brian Garrett (2003). Some Thoughts on Animalism. In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 1--41.
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  35.  10
    Jason T. Eberl (2007). Dualist and Animalist Perspectives on Death: A Comparison with Aquinas. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7 (3):477-490.
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  36.  2
    Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism. SATS 14 (1).
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  37. David Mackie (1999). Animalism Vs. Lockeanism 49:369-76.
     
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  38. Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.) (forthcoming). Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press.
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  39.  40
    S. Clint Dowland (2016). Embodied Mind Sparsism. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.
    If we are physical things with parts, then accounts of what we are and accounts of when composition occurs have important implications for one another. Defenders of restricted composition tend to endorse a sparse ontology in taking an eliminativist stance toward composite objects that are not organisms, while claiming that we are organisms. However, these arguments do not entail that we are organisms, for they rely on the premise that we are organisms. Thus, sparsist reasoning need not be paired with (...)
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  40.  56
    Joshua L. Watson (2016). Thinking Animals and the Thinking Parts Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):323-340.
    There is a thinking animal in your chair and you are the only thinking thing in your chair; therefore, you are an animal. So goes the main argument for animalism, the Thinking Animal Argument. But notice that there are many other things that might do our thinking: heads, brains, upper halves, left-hand complements, right-hand complements, and any other object that has our brain as a part. The abundance of candidates for the things that do our thinking is known as (...)
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  41.  22
    Ingmar Persson (2016). Parfit on Personal Identity: Its Analysis and Importance. Theoria 82 (2):148-165.
    This article examines Derek Parfit's claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity with the right kind of cause. It argues that such psychological accounts of our identity fail, but that their main rivals, biological or animalist accounts do not fare better. Instead it proposes an error-theory to the effect that common sense takes us to be identical to our bodies on the erroneous assumption that our minds belong non-derivatively to them, whereas they in fact (...)
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  42.  12
    Andrea Sauchelli (forthcoming). The Animal, the Corpse, and the Remnant-Person. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal, (...)
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  43.  56
    Eric Yang (2013). Thinking Animals, Disagreement, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.
    According to Eric Olson, the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA) is the best reason to accept animalism, the view that we are identical to animals. A novel criticism has been advanced against TAA, suggesting that it implicitly employs a dubious epistemological principle. I will argue that other epistemological principles can do the trick of saving the TAA, principles that appeal to recent issues regarding disagreement with peers and experts. I conclude with some remarks about the consequence of accepting these modified (...)
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  44. Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Persons, Animals, and Identity. Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
    The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and (...)
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  45.  10
    Assya Pascalev, Mario Pascalev & James Giordano (2016). Head Transplants, Personal Identity and Neuroethics. Neuroethics 9 (1):15-22.
    The possibility of a human head transplant poses unprecedented philosophical and neuroethical questions. Principal among them are the personal identity of the resultant individual, her metaphysical and social status: Who will she be and how should the “new” person be treated - morally, legally and socially - given that she incorporates characteristics of two distinct, previously unrelated individuals, and possess both old and new physical, psychological, and social experiences that would not have been available without the transplant? We contend that (...)
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  46. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2013). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
    : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is a (...)
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  47. Peter Nichols (2010). Substance Concepts and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on (...)
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  48.  36
    Dave Ward (2011). Personal Identity, Agency and the Multiplicity Thesis. Minds and Machines 21 (4):497-515.
    I consider whether there is a plausible conception of personal identity that can accommodate the ‘Multiplicity Thesis’ (MT), the thesis that some ways of creating and deploying multiple distinct online personae can bring about the existence of multiple persons where before there was only one. I argue that an influential Kantian line of thought, according to which a person is a unified locus of rational agency, is well placed to accommodate the thesis. I set out such a line of thought (...)
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  49. Daniel Kolak (2008). Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity. Synthese 162 (3):341 - 372.
    Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of (...)
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  50.  32
    Eugene Mills (2013). Early Abortion and Personal Ontology. Acta Analytica 28 (1):19-30.
    We are beings endowed with “personal capacities”—the capacity for reason, for a concept of self, perhaps more. Among ontologically salient views about what else we are, I focus on the “Big Three.” According to animalism, we are animals that have psychological properties only contingently. According to psychologistic materialism, we are material beings; according to substance dualism, we are either immaterial beings or composites of immaterial and material ones; but according to both psychologistic materialism and substance dualism, we essentially have (...)
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