Search results for 'Animalism' (try it on Scholar)

84 found
Sort by:
  1. Eric T. Olson (2004). Animalism and the Corpse Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74.score: 24.0
    The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Patrick Toner (2011). Hylemorphic Animalism. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.score: 24.0
    Roughly, animalism is the doctrine that each of us is identical with an organism. This paper explains and defends a hylemorphic version of animalism. I show how hylemorphic animalism handles standard objections to animalism in compelling ways. I also show what the costs of endorsing hylemorphic animalism are. The paper's contention is that despite the costs, the view is worth taking seriously.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David Mackie (1999). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):369-376.score: 24.0
    In ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo‐Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo‐Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo‐Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Stephan Blatti, Animalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jeff McMahan (2010). Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.score: 24.0
    We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Chris Daly & David Liggins (2013). Animalism and Deferentialism. Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.score: 24.0
    Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory neo-Lockean constitutionalism or Lockeanism for short. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Roger Melin (2011). Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort. ARGUMENT 1 (1):69-85.score: 24.0
    In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Eric Yang (forthcoming). Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-18.score: 24.0
    Standard animalists are committed to a stringent form of restricted composition, thereby denying the existence of brains, hands, and other proper parts of an organism (they also deny the existence of inanimate, composite objects). One reason for positing this near-nihilistic ontology comes from various challenges to animalism such as the Thinking Parts Argument, the Unity Argument, and the Argument from the Problem of the Many. In this paper, I show that these putatively distinct arguments are all instances of a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan (2010). Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.score: 24.0
    We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Harold W. Noonan (1998). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):302-318.score: 21.0
  11. Harold W. Noonan (2001). Animalism Versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):83-90.score: 21.0
  12. Eric Olson (2009). An Argument for Animalism. In John P. Lizza (ed.), Defining the Beginning and End of Life: Readings on Personal Identity and Bioethics. Johns Hopkins University Press.score: 18.0
    The view that we are human animals, "animalism", is deeply unpopular. This paper explains what that claim says and why it is so contentious. It then argues that those who deny it face an awkward choice. They must either deny that there are any human animals, deny that human animals can think, or deny that we are the thinking things located where we are.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Stephan Blatti (2006). Animalism. In A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle & N. Goulder (eds.), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy. Thoemmes Continuum.score: 18.0
    This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Eric T. Olson, Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem.score: 18.0
    Animalism is the view that you and I are animals. That is, we are animals in the straightforward sense of having the property of being an animal, or in that each of us is identical to an animal-not merely in the derivative sense of having animal bodies, or of being "constituted by" animals. And by 'animal' I mean an organism of the animal kingdom." Sensible though it may appear, animalism is highly contentious. The most common objection is that (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.) (forthcoming). Essays on Animalism: Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Arguably the most significant development in the recent history of the personal identity debate has been the emergence of the view known as "animalism." This volume brings together original contributions on this topic written by both well-known and emerging philosophers. Contributors: Lynne Rudder Baker, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov, Jens Johansson, Mark Johnston, Rory Madden, Jeff McMahan & Tim Campbell, Eric Olson, Derek Parfit, Mark Reid, Denis Robinson, David Shoemaker, Sydney Shoemaker, Paul Snowdon.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.score: 18.0
    The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Stephan Blatti (2012). A New Argument for Animalism. Analysis 72 (4):685-690.score: 18.0
    The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Alexander Geddes (2013). Think Twice, It's All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):371-380.score: 18.0
    According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases—cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity—are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne (2010) has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne's arguments are flawed, and that animalism is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Paul Snowdon (2014). Animalism and the Lives of Human Animals. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):171-184.score: 18.0
    It is suggested that the best way to interpret animalism is as an identity thesis saying that each of us is identical to an animal. Since there are disagreements about the nature of animal persistence, this means that animalism itself not does not explicitly propose criteria of identity for persons. It implies the negative claim that features that have nothing to do with animal persistence have nothing to do with our persistence. Thinking of it as an identity thesis (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. John Dupré (2014). Animalism and the Persistence of Human Organisms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):6-23.score: 18.0
    Humans are a kind of animal, and it is a natural and sensible idea that the way to understand what it is for a human person to persist over time is to reflect on what it is for an animal to persist. This paper accepts this strategy. However, especially in the light of a range of recent biological findings, the persistence of animals turns out to be much more problematic than is generally supposed. The main philosophical premise of the paper (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism and Personal Identity. In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.score: 18.0
    After motivating the general problem of personal identity and considering several possible accounts, this entry reviews a variety of arguments for and against the animalist criterion of personal identity.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Dean Zimmerman (2008). Problems for Animalism. Abstracta 3 (3):23-31.score: 15.0
    My comments have two parts. I begin by laying out the argument that seems to me to be at the core of Olson’s thinking about human persons; and I suggest a problem with his reasons for accepting one of its premises. The premise is warranted by its platitudinous or commonsensical status; but Olson’s arguments lead him to conclusions that undermine the family of platitudes to which it belongs. Then I’ll raise a question about how Olson should construe the vagueness that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Alexander Pruss, Animalism and Brains.score: 15.0
    I argue that it is possible for a human animal to survive the loss of all bodily parts other than the brain.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jens Johansson (2007). What is Animalism? Ratio 20 (2):194–205.score: 15.0
  25. Carl Gillett (2014). Brains, Neuroscience, and Animalism: On the Implications of Thinking Brains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):41-52.score: 15.0
    The neuroscience revolution has led many scientists to posit “expansive” or “thinking” brains that instantiate rich psychological properties. As a result, some scientists now even claim you are identical to such a brain. However, Eric Olson has offered new arguments that thinking brains cannot exist due to their intuitively “abominable” implications. After situating the commitment to thinking brains in the wider scientific discussions in which they are posited, I then critically assess Olson's arguments against such entities. Although highlighting an important (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). Properly Functioning Brains and Personal Identity: An Argument for Neural Animalism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):63-69.score: 15.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jason T. Eberl (2007). Dualist and Animalist Perspectives on Death: A Comparison with Aquinas. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7 (3):477-490.score: 15.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Paul Snowdon (2010). Animalism. The Philosophers' Magazine 50:104-105.score: 15.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Another Argument for Animalism: The Argument From Causal Powers. Prolegomena 11 (2):169-180.score: 15.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Brian Garrett (2003). Some Thoughts on Animalism. In K. Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. 1--41.score: 15.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. David Mackie (1999). Animalism Vs. Lockeanism 49:369-76.score: 15.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Persons, Animals, and Identity. Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.score: 9.0
    The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Peter Nichols (2010). Substance Concepts and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.score: 9.0
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal , on (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Daniel Kolak (2008). Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity. Synthese 162 (3):341 - 372.score: 9.0
    Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2013). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.score: 9.0
    : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Eric Yang (2013). Thinking Animals, Disagreement, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.score: 9.0
    According to Eric Olson, the Thinking Animal Argument (TAA) is the best reason to accept animalism, the view that we are identical to animals. A novel criticism has been advanced against TAA, suggesting that it implicitly employs a dubious epistemological principle. I will argue that other epistemological principles can do the trick of saving the TAA, principles that appeal to recent issues regarding disagreement with peers and experts. I conclude with some remarks about the consequence of accepting these modified (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Dave Ward (2011). Personal Identity, Agency and the Multiplicity Thesis. Minds and Machines 21 (4):497-515.score: 9.0
    I consider whether there is a plausible conception of personal identity that can accommodate the ‘Multiplicity Thesis’ (MT), the thesis that some ways of creating and deploying multiple distinct online personae can bring about the existence of multiple persons where before there was only one. I argue that an influential Kantian line of thought, according to which a person is a unified locus of rational agency, is well placed to accommodate the thesis. I set out such a line of thought (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Eugene Mills (2013). Early Abortion and Personal Ontology. Acta Analytica 28 (1):19-30.score: 9.0
    We are beings endowed with “personal capacities”—the capacity for reason, for a concept of self, perhaps more. Among ontologically salient views about what else we are, I focus on the “Big Three.” According to animalism, we are animals that have psychological properties only contingently. According to psychologistic materialism, we are material beings; according to substance dualism, we are either immaterial beings or composites of immaterial and material ones; but according to both psychologistic materialism and substance dualism, we essentially have (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.score: 6.0
    How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its "own" divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). The Difference That Self-Consciousness Makes. In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons: Metaphysical Research, Volume 1. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.score: 6.0
    With all the attention given to the study of consciousness recently, the topic of self-consciousness has been relatively neglected. “It is of course [phenomenal] consciousness rather than...self-conscious that has seemed such a scientific mystery,” a prominent philosopher comments.1 Phenomenal consciousness concerns the aspect of a state that feels a certain way: roses smell like this; garlic tastes like that; middle C sounds like this, and so on. Although phenomenal consciousness is surely a fruitful area of scientific investigation, I hope to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Marya Schechtman (2010). Personhood and the Practical. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):271-283.score: 6.0
    Traditionally, it has been assumed that metaphysical and practical questions about personhood and personal identity are inherently linked. Neo-Lockean views that draw such a link have been problematic, leading to an opposing view that metaphysical and ethical questions about persons should be sharply distinguished. This paper argues that consideration of this issue suffers from an overly narrow conception of the practical concerns associated with persons that focuses on higher-order capacities and fails to appreciate basic practical concerns more directly connected to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Jens Johansson (2009). Am I a Series? Theoria 75 (3):196-205.score: 6.0
    Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Rob Lovering (2013). The Substance View: A Critique. Bioethics 27 (5):263-270.score: 6.0
    According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Denis Robinson (2007). Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press. 3-32.score: 6.0
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Eric T. Olson (1998). Human Atoms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):396-406.score: 6.0
    In this paper I shall explore a novel alternative to these familiar views. In his recent book Sub ects of Ex erience, E. J. Lowe argues, as many others have done before, that you and I are not animals. It follows from this, he says, that we must be simple substances without parts. That may sound like Cartesian dualism. But Lowe is no Cartesian. He argues from premises that many present-day materialists accept. And he claims that our being mereologically simple (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. C. S. Sutton (2014). The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):619-639.score: 6.0
    Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Klaus Petrus (ed.) (2003). On Human Persons (Metaphysical Research, Volume 1). Ontos Verlag.score: 6.0
    METAPHYSICAL RESEARCH Herausgegeben von 1 Edited hv Uwe Meixner • Johanna Seibt Barry Smith • Daniel von Wachter Band I 1 Volume I ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Melissa Moschella (2014). Rethinking the Moral Permissibility of Gamete Donation. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 35 (6):421-440.score: 6.0
    The dominant philosophical view of gamete donation as morally permissible rests on two premises: parental obligations are triggered primarily by playing a causal role in procreation, not by genetic ties, and those obligations are transferable—that is, they are obligations to make adequate provision for the child’s needs, not necessarily to raise the child oneself. Thus while gamete donors are indeed agent causes of the children that their donation helps to bring into existence, most think that donors’ obligations are discharged insofar (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Scott Campbell (2006). The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.score: 3.0
    It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 84