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  1. Anita M. Superson (2012). Slote , Michael . Moral Sentimentalism .New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 163. $65.00 (Cloth). Ethics 122 (2):448-453.
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  2. Anita M. Superson & Sharon L. Crasnow (eds.) (2012). Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    This collection showcases the work of 18 analytical feminists from a variety of traditional areas of philosophy. It highlights successful uses of concepts and approaches from traditional philosophy, and illustrates the contributions that feminist approaches have made and could make to the analysis of issues in key areas of traditional philosophy, while also demonstrating that traditional philosophy ignores feminist insights and feminist critiques of traditional philosophy at its own peril.
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  3. Anita M. Superson (2009). The Moral Skeptic. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- The self-interest based contractarian response to the skeptic -- A feminist ethics response to the skeptic -- Deformed desires -- Self-interest versus morality -- The amoralist -- The motive skeptic -- The interdependency thesis.
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  4. Anita M. Superson (2007). Teaching in the New Climate of Conservatism: Introduction. Teaching Philosophy 30 (2):139-148.
    This paper summarizes the main points of the papers in the volume which demonstrate some of the ways that academic freedom is at odds with recent conservative attacks on the professoriate; argues that some of the conservative attacks from students on faculty are at base a failure to acknowledge their equal personhood, but treat them as inferior beings and thus elicit harmful psychological reactions similar to those found in victims of racist slurs; and examines possible solutions, including distancing on the (...)
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  5. Anita M. Superson (2007). Teaching in the New Climate of Conservatism. Teaching Philosophy 30 (2):139-148.
    This paper summarizes the main points of the papers in the volume which demonstrate some of the ways that academic freedom is at odds with recent conservative attacks on the professoriate; argues that some of the conservative attacks from students on faculty are at base a failure to acknowledge their equal personhood, but treat them as inferior beings and thus elicit harmful psychological reactions similar to those found in victims of racist slurs; and examines possible solutions, including distancing on the (...)
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  6. Anita M. Superson (2005). Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests. Hypatia 20 (4):109-126.
    : The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional "informed desire" tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.
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  7. Anita M. Superson (2005). The Rationality of Dispositions and the Rationality of Actions: The Interdependency Thesis. Dialogue 44 (3):439-468.
    I defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent’s reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses (relying on the Kantian notion that all persons are equal in humanity), her desires, disposition, and choice to be a moral person as reflected in the maxim she adopts. (...)
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  8. Anita M. Superson & Samantha J. Brennan (2005). Feminist Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. Hypatia 20 (4):1-9.
  9. Anita M. Superson (2001). Amorous Relationships Between Faculty and Students. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):419-440.
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  10. Anita M. Superson (2000). Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics Margaret Urban Walker New York: Routledge, 1998, Xiii + 251 P. Dialogue 39 (01):208-.
  11. Anita M. Superson (1998). Feminist Ethics: Defeating the Why-Be-Moral Skeptic. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):59-86.
  12. Anita M. Superson (1997). Sexual Harassment. In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), Ethics in Practice. Basil Blackwell.
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  13. Anita M. Superson (1996). David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 16 (2):135-140.
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  14. Anita M. Superson (1996). Gender Basics: Feminist Perspectives on Women and Men Anne Minas Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993, Xiv + 545 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 35 (02):412-.
  15. Anita M. Superson (1996). Moral Luck and Partialist Theories. Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):213-227.
    I argue that partialist theories that require us to give special weight to the desires, needs, and interests of ourselves or our social group, are national. I depend this impartialist principle: if the only difference between two persons to some property, where having the property to dependent on luck, morality's demanding that we disfavor either person because the person has this property, to national.
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  16. Anita M. Superson (1996). Scepticism About Moral Motives. Dialogue 35 (01):15-.
    Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number—Kant and Aristotle come to mind—are concerned in (...)
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  17. Anita M. Superson (1993). A Feminist Definition of Sexual Harassment. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (1):46-64.
  18. Anita M. Superson (1993). Right-Wing Women: Causes, Choices, and Blaming the Victim. Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (3):40-61.
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  19. Anita M. Superson (1991). Thomas Pogge's Rawlsian Revival. Dialogue 30 (1-2):109-.
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  20. Anita M. Superson (1990). The Self-Interest Based Contractarian Response to the Why-Be-Moral Skeptic. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):427-447.
    I examine the self-interest based contractarian's attempt to answer the question, "Why be moral?" In order to defeat the skeptic who accepts reasons of self-interest only, contractarians must show that the best theory of practical reasons includes moral reasons. They must show that it is rational to act morally even when doing so conflicts with self-interest. ;I examine theories offered by Hobbes, Baier, and Grice, and show they fail to defeat skepticism. Hobbes' theory gives no special weight to moral reasons (...)
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  21. Anita M. Superson (1983). The Employer-Employee Relationship and the Right to Know. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 3 (1):45-58.
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