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Profile: Anja Jauernig (University of Pittsburgh)
  1. Anja Jauernig (2013). Kant's Moral Metaphysics. Philosophical Review 122 (4):651-657.
  2. Anja Jauernig (2010). Disentangling Leibniz's Views on Relations and Extrinsic Denominations. Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2):pp. 171-205.
    Most commentators agree that Leibniz advocates some version of a doctrine of the ideality or reducibility of relations, but there is considerable disagreement about what exactly this doctrine means. I argue that Leibniz’s views on relations are more complex than has been previously appreciated, and that, despite some ‘reductionist’ strands in Leibniz’s position, it is seriously misleading to describe him as a reductionist about relations without adding some important qualifications. The complexity of Leibniz’s views on relations tends to be obscured (...)
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  3. Anja Jauernig (2009). Leibniz on Motion – Reply to Edward Slowik. The Leibniz Review 19:139-147.
    Response to critical comments by Edward Slowik on my article 'Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses' in The Leibniz Review 18 (2008).
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  4. Anja Jauernig (2008). Kant's Critique of the Leibnizian Philosophy : Contra the Leibnizians, but Pro Leibniz. In Daniel Garber & Béatrice Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns. Princeton University Press.
    It is argued that the popular story that portrays Kant’s philosophical development as a gradual emancipation from his Leibniz-Wolffian roots that culminated in a total rejection of the Leibnizian philosophy by 1781 is not accurate. Kant’s many objections against the Leibnizian philosophy in the critical period are not directed against Leibniz himself but against the Leibniz-Wolffians. Kant considers Leibniz’s philosophy to be very close to his own, calling the Critique of Pure Reason the “true apology” of Leibniz. It is claimed (...)
     
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  5. Anja Jauernig (2008). Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypotheses. The Leibniz Review 18:1-40.
    Contrary to popular belief, I argue that Leibniz is not hopelessly confused about motion: Leibniz is indeed both a relativist and an absolutist about motion, as suggested by the textual evidence, but, appearances to the contrary, this is not a problem; Leibniz’s infamous doctrine of the equivalence of hypotheses is well-supported and well-integrated within Leibniz’s physical theory; Leibniz’s assertion that the simplest hypothesis of several equivalent hypotheses can be held to be true can be explicated in such a way that (...)
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  6. Anja Jauernig (2008). The Modal Strength of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4:191.
     
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  7. Anja Jauernig (2007). Can a Philosophical Position Consist in a Stance? Or, How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time. In Bradley Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oup Oxford.
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  8. Anja Jauernig (2007). Must Empiricism Be a Stance, and Could It Be One? How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
    In his recent book, The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen forcefully raises the question of what a philosophical position can or should be. He mainly discusses this question with regard to empiricism but his discussion makes it clear that he takes his proposed answer to be generalizable: not only empiricism but philosophical positions in general should be understood as stances rather than dogmata. The first part of this essay is devoted to an examination of van Fraassen’s critique of ‘naïve’ or (...)
     
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