See also:
Profile: Anna Bergqvist (University of Reading)
Profile: Anna Bergqvist (Manchester Metropolitan University)
Profile: Anna Bergqvist
  1.  63
    Anna Bergqvist (2010). Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):1-14.
    In his influential paper, ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, Frank Sibley outlines what is taken to be a generalist view (shared with Beardsley) such that there are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, and his account of the behaviour of such reasons, which differs from Beardsley's. In this paper my aim is to illuminate Sibley's position by employing a distinction that has arisen in meta-ethics in response to recent work by Jonathan Dancy in particular. Contemporary research involves two related yet (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  31
    Anna Bergqvist (2009). Semantic Particularism and Linguistic Competence. Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):343-361.
    In this paper I examine a contemporary debate about the general notion of linguistic rules and the place of context in determining meaning, which has arisen in the wake of a challenge that the conceptual framework of moral particularism has brought to the table. My aim is to show that particularism in the theory of meaning yields an attractive model of linguistic competence that stands as a genuine alternative to other use-oriented but still generalist accounts that allow room for context-sensitivity (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  3.  18
    Anna Bergqvist (2013). Thick Concepts and Context Dependence. Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):221-232.
    In this paper I develop my account of moral particularism, focussing on the nature of thick moral concepts. My aim is to show how the particularist can consistently uphold an non-reductive cognitivist ‘dual role’ view of thick moral concepts, even though she holds that the qualities ascribed by such concepts can vary in their moral relevance – so that to judge that something is generous or an act of integrity need not entail that the object of evaluative appraisal is good (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography