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Profile: Anna Mahtani (Oxford University)
Profile: Anna Mahtani (London School of Economics)
  1.  26
    Anna Mahtani, Deference, Respect and Intensionality.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle and the Group Reflection Principle. I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed (...)
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  2.  15
    Anna Mahtani (2016). Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour. Noûs 50 (2).
    Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the ‘two bets’ argument for sharp probabilities.
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  3.  10
    Anna Mahtani (forthcoming). Deference, Respect and Intensionality. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on (...)
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  4.  6
    Anna Mahtani, Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour.
    Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the 'two bets' argument for sharp probabilities.
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  5.  82
    Anna Mahtani (2012). Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments. Philosophical Review 121 (3):443-450.
    The Reflection Principle can be defended with a Diachronic Dutch Book Argument (DBA), but it is also defeated by numerous compelling counter-examples. It seems then that Diachronic DBAs can lead us astray. Should we reject them en masse—including Lewis’s Diachronic DBA for Conditionalization? Rachael Briggs’s “suppositional test” is supposed to differentiate between Diachronic DBAs that we can safely ignore (including the DBA for Reflection) and Diachronic DBAs that we should find compelling (including the DBA for Conditionalization). I argue that Brigg’s (...)
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  6. Anna Mahtani (2015). Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency. Noûs 49 (3):522-537.
    In this paper I present a new way of understanding Dutch Book Arguments: the idea is that an agent is shown to be incoherent iff he would accept as fair a set of bets that would result in a loss under any interpretation of the claims involved. This draws on a standard definition of logical inconsistency. On this new understanding, the Dutch Book Arguments for the probability axioms go through, but the Dutch Book Argument for Reflection fails. The question of (...)
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  7.  87
    Anna Mahtani (2008). Can Vagueness Cut Out at Any Order? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):499 – 508.
    Could a sentence be, say, 3rd order vague, but 4th order precise? In Williamson 1999 we find an argument that seems to show that this is impossible: every sentence is either 1st order precise, 2nd order precise, or infinitely vague. The argument for this claim is unpersuasive, however, and this paper explains why.
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  8. Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani (2013). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
    We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (...)
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  9. Anna Mahtani (2012). Imaginative Resistance Without Conflict. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):415-429.
    I examine a range of popular solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. According to each solution in this range, imaginative resistance occurs only when we are asked to imagine something that conflicts with what we believe. I show that imaginative resistance can occur without this sort of conflict, and so that every solution in the range under consideration fails. I end by suggesting a new explanation for imaginative resistance—the Import Solution—which succeeds where the other solutions considered fail.
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  10.  87
    Anna Mahtani (2008). Williamson on Inexact Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180.
    Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
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  11.  35
    Anna Mahtani (2004). The Instability of Vague Terms. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):570–576.
    Timothy Williamson's response to the question why we cannot know where the sharp boundaries marked by vague terms lie involves the claim that vague terms are unstable. Several theorists would not accept this claim, and it is tempting to think that this gives them a good objection to Williamson. By clarifying the structure of Williamson's response to the title question, I show that this objection is wrong-headed, and reveal a new line of attack.
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