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Profile: Anna-Maria Asunta Eder (University of Duisburg-Essen, University of Konstanz)
  1. Anna-Maria A. Eder (forthcoming). No Match Point for the Permissibility Account. Erkenntnis:1-17.
    In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of the (...)
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  2. Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder (2014). How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement. Synthese 191 (11):2359-2381.
    How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer (...)
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  3. Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder & Franz Huber (2013). Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):279-300.
  4. Anna-Maria A. Eder (2011). Decision Theory and Rationality. [REVIEW] International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):326-329.