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  1. Annalisa Coliva, Self-Knowledge (but Not: "Know Thyself").
  2. Annalisa Coliva, The Paradox of Moore's Proof Of.
    Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for (...)
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  3. Annalisa Coliva, Which “Key to All Mythologies”* About the Self?—A Note on Where the Illusions of Transcendence Come From and How to Resist Them.
    It is a striking feature of philosophical reflection on the self that it often ends up being revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that it is identical to a living human being with, intrinsically, physical and psychological properties. As is well known, Descartes identified the self with a mental entity, Hume denied the existence of such an entity and Kant reduced it to a transcendental ego—to a mere condition of possibility for experience and thought. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein followed (...)—or, at any rate, the Kant made available to him through reading Schopenhauer—then, later, denied the existence of such an entity and proposed the no-reference view about at least some uses of “I”. Finally, Anscombe radicalized Wittgenstein’s views and claimed that no use of “I” is ever referential. It must be acknowledged that, despite the oddity of these views, philosophers have always arrived at their respective positions on the nature of the self through rational reflection: being impressed with some feature allegedly special to the use of “I” (either in speech or in thought) they have felt compelled to account for it by postulating a realm of super-entities (or non-entities) which could explain such seeming peculiarities. Confronted with this tradition of revisionary accounts of the self, at least some contemporary theorists are now approaching the issue with a diagnostic eye, trying to identify the features that have led philosophers to embrace such positions, with the aim of offering a better understanding of them that could “give philosophy peace”. That is to say, that could make them compatible with the commonsensical view that selves are identical to living human beings and that “I”, either in speech or in thought, is a genuinely referential expression. So, for instance, Christopher Peacocke opens his influential and thought provoking “Self-knowledge and illusions of transcendence”1 with the following remarks.. (shrink)
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  4. Annalisa Coliva (2014). Rules, Reason and Self-KnowledgeBy Julia Tanney. Analysis 74 (2):353-355.
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  5. Annalisa Coliva (2013). Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. Philosophia 41 (1):1-12.
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  6. Annalisa Coliva (2013). Replies. Philosophia 41 (1):81-96.
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  7. Annalisa Coliva & Delia Belleri (2013). Some Observations on François Recanati's Mental Files. Disputatio 5 (36).
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  8. Annalisa Coliva & Paolo Leonardi (2013). Origins of Objectivity di Tyler Burge. Iride 26 (1):183-200.
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  9. Annalisa Coliva & Paolo Leonardi (2013). Tyler Burge's Origins of Objectivity. Iride 26 (1):183-200.
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  10. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.) (2013). Mind, Language and Action: Contributions to the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  11. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Critical Notice of Origins of Objectivity, by Tyler Burge. Disputatio.
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  12. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Human Diagrammatic Reasoning and Seeing-As. Synthese 186 (1):121-148.
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all.
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  13. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Moore's Proof, Liberals, and Conservatives : Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way? In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is worth (...)
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  14. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Perceiving Reasons? Iride 25 (1):119-134.
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  15. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Scetticismo: Dubbio, Paradosso E Conoscenza. Laterza.
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  16. Annalisa Coliva (ed.) (2012). The Self and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    These thought-provoking essays provide such an analysis and greatly deepen our understanding of these central aspects of our mentality.
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  17. Annalisa Coliva (2012). Varieties of Failure (of Warrant Transmission: What Else?!). Synthese 189 (2):235-254.
    In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore’s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: (...)
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  18. Annalisa Coliva & Sebastiano Moruzzi (2012). Truth Relativists Can't Trump Moral Progress. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):48-57.
  19. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Guest Editors' Preface. Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):5-6.
    This is the guest editors' preface to the Discipline Filosofiche special issue on Knowledge and Justification.
     
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  20. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Introduction. Synthese 189 (2):221-234.
    This Introduction to the special issue on “Skepticism and Justification” provides a background to the nine articles collected here and a detailed summary of each, which highlights their interconnections and relevance to the debate at the heart of the issue.
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  21. Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.) (2012). Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as (...)
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  22. Annalisa Coliva (2010). Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. Palgrave Macmillan.
  23. Annalisa Coliva (2010). Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.
    In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic (...)
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  24. Annalisa Coliva (2010). Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist? Philosophical Investigations 33 (1):1-23.
    The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal (...)
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  25. Annalisa Coliva (2009). Notes on Italian Philosophy, Peer-Reviews and “la Corruttela”. Philosophia 38 (1):29-39.
    The paper offers a critical review of Roberto Farneti’s paper a minor philosophy. The state of the art of philosophical scholarship in Italy , recently published in Philosophia. It is argued that overall the status and interest of philosophy as practiced nowadays in Italy is less disappointing than Farneti makes out. It is also maintained that submitting papers to peer-refereed international journals can help cure the moral and sociological disease that besets the Italian academia, but that, as such, it is (...)
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  26. Annalisa Coliva (2009). Self-Knowledge and Commitments. Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive (...)
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  27. Annalisa Coliva (2008). Peacocke's Self-Knowledge. Ratio 21 (1):13–27.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
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  28. Annalisa Coliva (2008). The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.
    Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for (...)
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  29. Annalisa Coliva (ed.) (2007). Filosofia Analitica: Temi E Problemi. Carocci.
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  30. Annalisa Coliva (2006). Error Through Misidentification: Some Varieties. Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):407-425.
  31. Annalisa Coliva (2006). Il Puzzle della Prova del mondo esterno di Moore. Epistemologia 29 (1):61-78.
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  32. Annalisa Coliva (2004). I concetti: Teorie ed esercizi. Carocci.
  33. Annalisa Coliva (2004). Proof of an External World: Transmission Failure, Begging the Question or Dialectical Ineffectiveness? Moore, Wright and Pryor. In Annalisa Coliva & Eva Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il Poligrafo. 411--29.
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  34. Annalisa Coliva & Eva Picardi (eds.) (2004). Wittgenstein Today. Il poligrafo.
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  35. Annalisa Coliva (2003). The Argument From the Finer-Grained Content of Colour Experiences: A Redefinition of its Role Within the Debate Between McDowell and Non-Conceptual Theorists. Dialectica 57 (1):57-70.
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  36. Annalisa Coliva (2003). The First Person: Error Through Misidentification, the Split Between Speaker's and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416-431.
  37. Annalisa Coliva (2003). The First Person. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416 - 431.
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  38. Annalisa Coliva (2002). On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):41-46.
  39. Annalisa Coliva (2002). Reply to John Campbell. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):41-46.
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  40. Annalisa Coliva (2002). Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). Thus, if Campbell (...)
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