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  1. Annika Wallin & Johannes Persson, Why Internal Validity is Not Prior to External Validity.
    Without a doubt the concepts captures two features of research scientists are aware of in their daily practice. Researchers aim to make correct inferences both about that which is actually studied (internal validity), for instance in an experiment, and about what the results ‘generalize to’ (external validity). Whether or not the language of internal and external validity is used in their disciplines, the tension between these two kinds of inference is often experienced.
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  2. Annika Wallin, A Peace Treaty for the Rationality Wars? External Validity and its Relation to Normative and Descriptive Theories of Rationality.
    If we know that certain ways of making decisions are associated with real-life success, is this then how we should decide? In this paper the relationship between normative and descriptive theories of decision-making is examined. First, it is shown that the history of the decision sciences ensures that it is impossible to separate descriptive theories from normative ones. Second, recent psychological research implies new ways of arguing from the descriptive to the normative. The paper ends with an evaluation of how (...)
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  3. Annika Wallin (2011). Is Egocentric Bias Evidence for Simulation Theory? Synthese 178 (3):503 - 514.
    Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor's genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones' own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors' own beliefs, (...)
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  4. Nils-Eric Sahlin, Annika Wallin & Johannes Persson (2010). Decision Science: From Ramsey to Dual Process Theories. Synthese 172 (1):129 - 143.
    The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, (...)
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  5. Annika Wallin (2007). Explanation and Environment. In. In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer. 163--175.
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  6. Ralph Hertwig & Annika Wallin (2004). Out of the Theoretical Cul-de-Sac. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):342-343.
    A key premise of the heuristics-and-biases program is that heuristics are “quite useful.” Let us now pay more than lip service to this premise, and analyse the environmental structures that make heuristics more or less useful. Let us also strike from the long list of biases those phenomena that are not biases and explore to what degree those that remain are adaptive or can be understood as by-products of adaptive mechanisms.
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  7. Annika Wallin & Peter Gärdenfors (2000). Smart People Who Make Simple Heuristics Work. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):765-765.
    To evaluate the success of simple heuristics we need to know more about how a relevant heuristic is chosen and how we learn which cues are relevant. These meta-abilities are at the core of ecological rationality, rather than the individual heuristics.
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