Search results for 'Anomalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nicholas Shea (2003). Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.score: 18.0
    In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence (...)
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  2. Gerhard Preyer (2000). Primary Reasons: From Radical Interpretation to a Pure Anomalism of the Mental. Protosociology 14:158-179.score: 15.0
     
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  3. Oron Shagrir (2011). Supervenience and Anomalism Are Compatible. Dialectica 65 (2):241-266.score: 12.0
    I explore a Davidsonian proposal for the reconciliation of two theses. One is the supervenience of the mental on the physical, the other is the anomalism of the mental. The gist of the proposal is that supervenience and anomalism are theses about interpretation. Starting with supervenience, the claim is that it should not be understood in terms of deeper metaphysical relations, but as a constraint on the relations between the applications of physical and mental predicates. Regarding anomalism, (...)
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  4. E. C. Tiffany (2001). The Rational Character of Belief and the Argument for Mental Anomalism. Philosophical Studies 103 (3):258-314.score: 12.0
    If mental anomalism is to be interpreted as a thesisunique to psychology, the anomalousness must begrounded in some feature unique to the mental,presumably its rational nature. While the ground forsuch arguments from normativity has been notoriouslyslippery terrain, there are two recently influentialstrategies which make the argument precise. The firstis to deny the possibility of psychophysical bridgelaws because of the different constitutive essences ofmental and physical laws, and the second is to arguethat mental anomalism follows from the uncodifiabilityof rationality. (...)
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  5. Rew A. Godow (1979). Davidson and the Anomalism of the Mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):163-174.score: 12.0
    In two of his more recent papers, Donald davidson has argued for the "a priori" truth of what he calls "the principle of the anomalism of the mental." my concern in this paper is with examining that principle and davidson's defense of it. After clarifying the principle, I discuss three considerations which davidson gives in its defense and argue that they are not persuasive. Then I argue that although the principle of the anomalism of the mental cannot be (...)
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  6. Mark Rowlands (1990). Anomalism, Supervenience, and Davidson on Content-Individuation. Philosophia 20 (3):295-310.score: 12.0
    Supervenience is compatible with anomalism: biconditional laws are ruled out by the disjunctive base, and the wideness of mental states rules out one-way psychophysical laws, as there's no single property in the base.
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  7. Sarah Patterson (1996). The Anomalism of Psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:37-52.score: 12.0
    According to Davidson, his Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, which states that there are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted or explained, supports the claim that psychology is anomalous among the sciences. The paper argues that this latter claim is based on a conception of psychological explanation as the subsumption of behavioral events under laws, and presents an alternative conception of psychological explanation as the analysis of cognitive capacities.
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  8. Oron Shagrir (2009). Anomalism and Supervenience: A Critical Survey. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 237-272.score: 9.0
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  9. William Child (1993). Anomalism, Uncodifiability, and Psychophysical Relations. Philosophical Review 102 (2):215-245.score: 9.0
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  10. F. H. Colson (1919). The Analogist and Anomalist Controversy. Classical Quarterly 13 (1):24-36.score: 9.0
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  11. C. Z. Elgin (1980). Indeterminacy, Underdetermination, and the Anomalism of the Mental. Synthese 45 (2):233 - 255.score: 9.0
    Davidson's token-Token identity theory is based on the indeterminacy of translation. I argue that psychological theories, Like other theories, Are underdetermined by the evidence, And that their reduction, Like other reductions, Is subject to the indeterminacy of translation. This does not invalidate reduction, But it does raise epistemic difficulties. Accepting a claim as law-Like involves uncertainty and risk. There are ideological reasons for thinking that psychophysical reduction involves risks we should not take.
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  12. Josep Maria Bech (2008). Social Determinants of Thought: Neither Anomalism nor Funcionalization. Convivium 21:175-196.score: 9.0
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  13. Steven F. Savitt (1979). Davidson's Psycho-Physical Anomalism. Nature and System 1 (September):203-213.score: 9.0
     
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  14. Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.score: 6.0
    I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current approach to this issue based on recent work by Valerie Hardcastle and Clyde Hardin. Although their account of the source of the explanatory gap and our potential to close it is attractive, I argue that it is too speculative and philosophically problematic. I then argue that the explanatory gap should not concern physicalists because (...)
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  15. Julie Yoo, Mental Causation. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 6.0
    This is an encyclopedia entry on accounts of mental causation, starting from Descartes to the present.
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  16. Michael V. Antony (2003). Davidson's Argument for Monism. Synthese 135 (1):1-12.score: 3.0
    Two criticisms of Davidson's argument for monism are presented. The first is that there is no obvious way for the anomalism of the mental to do any work in his argument. Certain implicit premises, on the other hand, entail monism independently of the anomalism of the mental, but they are question-begging. The second criticism is that even if Davidson's argument is sound, the variety of monism that emerges is extremely weak at best. I show that by constructing ontologically (...)
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  17. Julie Yoo, The Other Explanatory Gap.score: 3.0
    One of the driving questions in philosophy of mind is whether a person can be understood in purely physical terms. In this presentation, I wish to continue the project initiated by Donald Davidson, whose subtle position on this question has left many more perplexed than enlightened. The main reason for this perplexity is Davidson’s rather obscure pronouncements about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional (...)
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  18. Richard Montgomery (1990). The Reductionist Ideal in Cognitive Psychology. Synthese 85 (November):279-314.score: 3.0
    I offer support for the view that physicalist theories of cognition don't reduce to neurophysiological theories. On my view, the mind-brain relationship is to be explained in terms of evolutionary forces, some of which tug in the direction of a reductionistic mind-brain relationship, and some of which which tug in the opposite direction. This theory of forces makes possible an anti-reductionist account of the cognitive mind-brain relationship which avoids psychophysical anomalism. This theory thus also responds to the complaint which (...)
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  19. Jaegwon Kim (1989). Honderich on Mental Events and Psychoneural Laws. Inquiry 32 (March):29-48.score: 3.0
    The paper discusses Ted Honderich's ?Hypothesis of Psychoneural Correlation?, one of the three fundamental ?hypotheses? of his Theory of Determinism. This doctrine holds that there is a pervasive system of psychoneural laws connecting every mental event with a neural correlate. Various questions are raised and discussed concerning the formulation of the thesis, Honderich's concepts of ?mental? and ?physical?, and the possible grounds for accepting the thesis. Finally, Honderich's response to Donald Davidson's well?known arguments for psychophysical anomalism is discussed.
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  20. Tim Crane (1992). Mental Causation and Mental Reality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (425):185-202.score: 3.0
    Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be.
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  21. J. T. Whyte (1990). The Psycho-Physical Laws of Intentionality. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):295 – 304.score: 3.0
    Abstract Intentional mental states have causes and effects. Davidson has shown that this fact alone does not entail the existence of psycho?physical laws, but his anomalism makes the connection between the content and causation of intentional states utterly mysterious. By defining intentional states in terms of their causes and effects, functionalism promises to explain this connection. If intentional states have their causes and effects in virtue of their contents, then there must be intrinsic states (of the people who have (...)
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