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Anthony S. Gillies [20]Anthony Gillies [4]
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Profile: Anthony Gillies (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
  1. Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2008). CIA Leaks. Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.
    Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, CIA). Here we argue against such "relativist" semantics. We begin with a sketch of the motivation for such theories and a generic formulation of them. Then we catalogue (...)
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  2. Anthony S. Gillies (2009). On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If ). Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and (...)
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  3.  69
    Anthony S. Gillies (2007). Counterfactual Scorekeeping. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):329 - 360.
    Counterfactuals are typically thought--given the force of Sobel sequences--to be variably strict conditionals. I go the other way. Sobel sequences and (what I call) Hegel sequences push us to a strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals: counterfactuals amount to some necessity modal scoped over a plain material conditional, just which modal being a function of context. To make this worth saying I need to say just how counterfactuals and context interact. No easy feat, but I have something to say on the (...)
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  4.  67
    Anthony S. Gillies (2004). Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics. Noûs 38 (4):585–616.
  5.  82
    Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2007). An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2. Oxford 32-62.
    way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences. Take, for instance, an epistemic might-claim like..
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  6.  45
    Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2010). Must . . . Stay . . . Strong! Natural Language Semantics 18 (4):351-383.
    It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite (...)
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  7. ortNoopFintelvon Fintel, Kai & Anthony S. Gillies (2008). CIA Leaks. Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.
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  8.  90
    Anthony S. Gillies (2001). A New Solution to Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):237-250.
    Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency'' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update Semantics) buys (...)
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  9.  38
    Anthony S. Gillies (2004). New Foundations for Epistemic Change. Synthese 138 (1):1 - 48.
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  10.  26
    Anthony S. Gillies (2006). What Might Be the Case After a Change in View. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (2):117 - 145.
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  11.  92
    John L. Pollock & Anthony S. Gillies (2000). Belief Revision and Epistemology. Synthese 122 (1-2):69-92.
    Postulational approaches attempt to understand the dynamics of belief revision by appealing to no more than the set of beliefs held by an agent and the logical relations between them. It is argued there that such an approach cannot work. A proper account of belief revision must also appeal to the arguments supporting beliefs, and recognize that those arguments can be defeasible. If we begin with a mature epistemological theory that accommodates this, it can be seen that the belief revision (...)
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  12.  54
    Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies (2009). `Might' Made Right. In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press
    The simplest story about modals—might, must, possibly, necessary, have to, can, ought to, presumably, likelier, and the rest—is also the canon: modals are context-dependent quantifiers over a domain of possibilities. Different flavors of modality correspond to quantification over different domains of possibilities. Logical modalities quantify over all the possibilities there are, physical modalities over possibilities compatible with the..
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  13.  88
    Eric Dietrich & Anthony S. Gillies (2001). Consciousness and the Limits of Our Imaginations. Synthese 126 (3):361-381.
    Chalmers' anti-materialist arguments are an interesting twist on a well-known argument form, and his naturalistic dualism is exciting to contemplate. Nevertheless, we think we can save materialism from the Chalmerian attack. This is what we do in the present paper.
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  14. John Pollock & Anthony Gillies (2000). ``Belief Revision and Epistemology&Quot. Synthese 122:69--92.
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  15.  71
    Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies, The Subjectivity of Conditionals in a New Light.
    Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on a Mississippi riverboat. It is now up to Pete to call or fold. My henchman Zack sees Stone’s hand, which is quite good, and signals its content to Pete. My henchman Jack sees both hands, and sees that Pete’s hand is rather low, so that Stone’s is the winning hand. At this point, the room is cleared. A few minutes later, Zack slips me a note which says “If Pete called, he (...)
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  16.  54
    Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies, Hedging Your Ifs and Vice Versa.
    “Any theory of conditionals has consequences for less-than-certain judgements. Something is proposed of the form: If A, B is true iff A*B. If a clear-headed person, free from confusions of a logical, linguistic or referential sort, can be nearly sure that A*B yet far from sure that if A, B, or vice versa, then this is strong evidence against the proposal.” (Edgington 1995/2007).
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  17. Anthony Gillies, Shifty Epistemology.
     
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  18.  37
    Nicholas Asher & Anthony Gillies (2003). Common Ground, Corrections, and Coordination. Argumentation 17 (4):481-512.
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  19.  16
    Anthony Gillies & Eric Dietrich (1998). Cognitive Carpentry. International Studies in Philosophy 30 (2):151-153.
  20.  16
    Anthony S. Gillies (1997). Three Cheers for Aristotle, Non-Contradiction, and Classical Negation. Modern Schoolman 75 (1):23-34.
  21.  7
    Anthony S. Gillies & Mary Rigdon (2001). Theory-Testing Experiments in the Economics Laboratory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):410-411.
    Features of experimental design impose auxiliary hypotheses on experimenters. Hertwig & Ortmann rightly argue that the ways some variables are implemented in psychology cloud results, whereas the different implementations in economics provide for more robust results. However, not all design variables support this general conclusion. The repetition of trials may confuse results depending on what theory is being tested. We explore this in the case of simple bargaining games.
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  22. Anthony S. Gillies (2008). Kai von Fintel. Philosophical Review 117 (1).
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  23. Anthony S. Gillies (2001). Rational Belief Change. Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    We must change our beliefs, and change them in particular ways, in response to new information. But not all changes are created equal: some are rational changes, some not. The Problem of Epistemic Change is the problem of specifying the rational constraints on how the epistemic state of an agent ought to change in the face of new information. This dissertation is about the philosophical and logical investigation of rational belief change. I start by arguing that the familiar foundations---coherence distinction (...)
     
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  24. Anthony S. Gillies (2006). What Might Be the Case After a Change in View. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (2):117-145.
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