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Profile: Anthony Rudd (St. Olaf College)
  1.  49
    Anthony J. Rudd (2005). Narrative, Expression and Mental Substance. Inquiry 48 (5):413-435.
    This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal relation to (...)
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  2. Anthony J. Rudd (1997). Two Types of Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):501-7.
    A contrast is drawn between two types of externalism, one based on ideas of Wittgenstein, the other on arguments from Putnam. Gregory McCulloch’s attempt to combine the two types is then examined and criticized. Putnamian externalism is ambiguous. It can be interpreted either as the empirical claim that we give priority to scientific as opposed to other forms of discourse, or as a metaphysical claim that our language attempts to conform to the structure of the world ‘in itself’. But the (...)
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    Anthony J. Rudd (1999). What It's Like and What's Really Wrong with Physicalism: A Wittgensteinian Perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):454-63.
    It is often argued that the existence of qualia -- private mental objects -- shows that physicalism is false. In this paper, I argue that to think in terms of qualia is a misleading way to develop what is in itself a valid intuition about the inability of physicalism to do justice to our conscious experience. I consider arguments by Dennett and Wittgenstein which indicate what is wrong with the notion of qualia, but which by so doing, help us to (...)
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  4.  24
    Anthony J. Rudd (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):53-69.
    This paper defends and develops an argument against epiphenomenalism, broadly construed. I argue first for a definition of epiphenomenalism which includes ‘non-reductive’ materialism as well as classical dualistic epiphenomenalism. I then present an argument that if epiphenomenalism were true it would be impossible to know about or even refer to our conscious states -- and therefore impossible even to formulate epiphenomenalism. David Chalmers has defended epiphenomenalism against such arguments; I consider this defence and attempt to show that it fails. I (...)
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