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Anthony L. Brueckner [46]Anthony Leo Brueckner [1]
  1.  16
    John Martin Fischer & Anthony L. Brueckner (2014). Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to Johansson. Journal of Ethics 18 (1):1-9.
    We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).
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  2. Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
    Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.
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  3. Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Brains in a Vat. Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
    In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...)
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  4. Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Chalmers' Conceivability Argument for Dualism. Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
    In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism , is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.
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  5. Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  6. Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1986). Why is Death Bad? Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
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  7.  96
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.
  8. Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Transmission for Knowledge Not Established. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):193-195.
    In "Nozick on Scepticism", Graeme Forbes attempts to establish a Transmission Principle for knowledge which has been challenged by a number of anti-sceptical philosophers (such as Nozick). This principle (or something like it) seems to be required by Cartesian sceptical arguments, so if it could be refuted, this would apparently rid us of such scepticism. I do not believe that Nozick or anyone else has refuted the principle, yet I will argue that Forbes has certainly failed to establish it.
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  9. Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  10.  79
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
  11.  98
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Is Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  12.  92
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2002). Anti-Individualism and Analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.
  13. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). The Coherence of Scepticism About Self-Knowledge. Analysis 63 (1):41-48.
  14. Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism. Analysis 44 (3):134--40.
  15.  46
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1994). Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World. Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343.
    In "Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism,"' Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens argue that externalism with respect to mental content does not engender skepticism about knowledge of content. They go on to argue that even when externalism is freed from epistemological difficulties, the thesis cannot be used against Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world. I would like to raise some questions about these claims.
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  16. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Contents Just Aren't in the Head. Erkenntnis 58 (1):1-6.
    A. Horowitz has recently argued against semantic externalism. In this paper, I will show that his arguments are unsuccessful, owing to misconceptions regarding the nature of that semantic view.
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  17. Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1993). Death's Badness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):37-45.
     
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  18. Anthony L. Brueckner & E. Beroukhim (2003). McGinn on Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
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  19.  58
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Transcendental Arguments From Content Externalism. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press
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  20. Anthony L. Brueckner (1995). The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.
    This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism.
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  21.  40
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):109-114.
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  22.  75
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1991). The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again. Analysis (October) 199 (October):199-205.
  23. Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). Semantic Answers to Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.
  24.  34
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Two Recent Approaches to Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):251-71.
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  25.  39
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1997). Externalism and Memory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):1-12.
  26.  71
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1985). Losing Track of the Sceptic. Analysis 45 (2):103 - 104.
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  27.  76
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2000). Externalism and the a Prioricity of Self-Knowledge. Analysis 60 (1):132-136.
    Michael McKinsey has argued that content externalism has the absurd consequence that one can know a priori that water exists. Richard W. Miller responds that when a prioricity is properly understood, McKinsey's argument should not be seen as a _reductio of externalism. This paper disputes Miller's understanding of a prioricity.
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  28.  91
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2000). Ambiguity and Knowledge of Content. Analysis 60 (3):257-60.
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  29. Anthony L. Brueckner (2007). Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
     
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  30.  78
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown. Analysis 65 (285):86-88.
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  31.  81
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2004). Brewer on the McKinsey Problem. Analysis 64 (1):41-43.
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  32.  80
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.
    Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.
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  33.  59
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1988). Problems with Internalist Coherentism. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):153-160.
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  34.  73
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Skepticism and Externalism. Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71.
  35.  7
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Philosophical Relativity by Peter Unger. Journal of Philosophy 83 (9):509-517.
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  36. Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Charity and Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (4):264.
     
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  37.  49
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Defending Burge's Thought Experiment. Erkenntnis 55 (3):387-391.
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  38.  31
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Why Nozick is a Sceptic. Mind 93 (370):259-264.
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  39.  26
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1986). Humean Fictions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):655-664.
    In "Of Personal Identity,", Hume attempts to explain how one arrives at the fiction of a substantial self which retains its numerical identity through time. In "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses," Hume offers a similar explanation of the origin of another fiction - that of objects which enjoy a continued and distinct existence. In this paper, I will argue that his pair of parallel explanations does not jointly account for the pair of fictions to be explained.
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  40.  13
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1995). Trying to Get Outside Your Own Skin. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):79-111.
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  41.  20
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1987). Begging the Skeptic's Question. Philosophia 17 (4):523-529.
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  42.  20
    Anthony L. Brueckner (2004). McKinsey Redux? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter 2--377.
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  43.  9
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). The Failure of an a Priori Argument for Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):491-498.
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  44.  2
    Anthony L. Brueckner (1989). Harman's Naturalistic Study of Reasoning. Metaphilosophy 20 (3-4):356-370.
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  45. Anthony L. Brueckner (1998). Content Externalism and a Priori Knowledge. Protosociology 11:149-159.
    M. McKinsey has argued that the externalist theory of mental content implies that one can have a priori knowledge of propositions that are in fact only knowable a posteriori. So, according to McKinsey, the externalist theory must be mistaken. A. Gallois and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne have formalized this argument. In this paper, I discuss their formalization and their criticisms of it.
     
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  46. Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). Problems for a Recent Account of Introspective Knowledge. Facta Philosophica.