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Anthony E. Newman [3]Anthony Newman [2]
  1. Anthony Newman (2006). The Burning Barn Fallacy in Defenses of Externalism About Mental Content. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:37-57.
    Externalism says that many ordinary mental contents are constituted by relations to things outside the mental subject’s head. An infl uential objection says that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense belief in mental causation, because such extrinsic relations cannot play the important causal role in producing behavior that we ordinarily think mental content plays.An extremely common response is that it is simply obvious, from examples of ordinary causal processes, that extrinsic relations can play the desired causal role. In this paper (...)
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  2. Anthony E. Newman (2005). Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail). Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153 - 169.
    Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, socio-linguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or (...)
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  3. Anthony Newman (2004). The Good, the Bad, and the Irrational: Three Views About Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):95-106.
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  4. Anthony E. Newman (2002). Causal Efficacy and Externalist Mental Content. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Internalism about mental content is the view that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates as well. This dissertation develops and defends the idea that only a strong version of internalism is compatible with our commonsense commitment to mental causation. ;Chapter one defends a novel necessary condition on a property's being causally efficacious---viz., that any property F that is efficacious with respect to event E cannot be instantiated in virtue of any property G that is itself ceteris paribus sufficient for E---and (...)
     
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  5. Anthony E. Newman (1996). Introspection, Sense-Data, and the Traditional Concept of Perception.
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