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  1. Anthony P. Atkinson & Hannah E. Smithson (2013). Distinct Contributions to Facial Emotion Perception of Foveated Versus Nonfoveated Facial Features. Emotion Review 5 (1):30-35.
    Foveated stimuli receive visual processing that is quantitatively and qualitatively different from nonfoveated stimuli. At normal interpersonal distances, people move their eyes around another’s face so that certain features receive foveal processing; on any given fixation, other features therefore project extrafoveally. Yet little is known about the processing of extrafoveally presented facial features, how informative those extrafoveally presented features are for face perception (e.g., for assessing another’s emotion), or what processes extract task-relevant (e.g., emotion-related) cues from facial features that first (...)
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  2. Anthony P. Atkinson & Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). Introduction to the Special Section on “Emotions and Feelings in Psychiatric Illness”. Emotion Review 4 (2):119-121.
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  3. John C. Thoresen, Quoc C. Vuong & Anthony P. Atkinson (2012). First Impressions: Gait Cues Drive Reliable Trait Judgements. Cognition 124 (3):261-271.
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  4. Andrea S. Heberlein & Anthony P. Atkinson (2009). Neuroscientific Evidence for Simulation and Shared Substrates in Emotion Recognition: Beyond Faces. Emotion Review 1 (2):162-177.
    According to simulation or shared-substrates models of emotion recognition, our ability to recognize the emotions expressed by other individuals relies, at least in part, on processes that internally simulate the same emotional state in ourselves. The term “emotional expressions” is nearly synonymous, in many people's minds, with facial expressions of emotion. However, vocal prosody and whole-body cues also convey emotional information. What is the relationship between these various channels of emotional communication? We first briefly review simulation models of emotion recognition, (...)
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  5. Anthony P. Atkinson, Mary L. Tunstall & Winand H. Dittrich (2007). Evidence for Distinct Contributions of Form and Motion Information to the Recognition of Emotions From Body Gestures. Cognition 104 (1):59-72.
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  6. Wataru Sato, Sakiko Yoshikawa, Edouard Machery, Paul E. Dux, Irina M. Harris, Anthony P. Atkinson, Mary L. Tunstall, Winand H. Dittrich, Francesco Pavani & Giovanni Galfano (2007). Brief Article. Cognition 104 (1).
     
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  7. Anthony P. Atkinson (2005). Open Peer Commentary. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2005):50-116.
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  8. Anthony P. Atkinson & Ralph Adolphs (2005). Visual Emotion Perception : Mechanisms and Processes. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press. 150.
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  9. Anthony P. Atkinson, I. S. Baker, Susan J. Blackmore, William Braud, Jean E. Burns, R. H. S. Carpenter, Christopher J. S. Clarke, Ralph D. Ellis, David Fontana, Christopher C. French, D. Radin, M. Schlitz, Stefan Schmidt & Max Velmans (2005). Open Peer Commentary on 'the Sense of Being Stared At' Parts 1 &. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):50-116.
  10. Anthony P. Atkinson & M. Wheeler (2004). The Grain of Domains: The Evolutionary-Psychological Case Against Domain-General Cognition. Mind and Language 19 (2):147-76.
    Prominent evolutionary psychologists have argued that our innate psychological endowment consists of numerous domainspecific cognitive resources, rather than a few domaingeneral ones. In the light of some conceptual clarification, we examine the central inprinciple arguments that evolutionary psychologists mount against domaingeneral cognition. We conclude (a) that the fundamental logic of Darwinism, as advanced within evolutionary psychology, does not entail that the innate mind consists exclusively, or even massively, of domainspecific features, and (b) that a mixed innate cognitive economy of domainspecific (...)
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  11. Anthony P. Atkinson & M. Wheeler (2003). Evolutionary Psychology's Grain Problem and the Cognitive Neuroscience of Reasoning. In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press. 61--99.
  12. Anthony P. Atkinson (2001). Pathological Beliefs, Damaged Brains. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):225-229.
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  13. Anthony P. Atkinson (2001). Emotion-Specific Clues to the Neural Substrate of Empathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):22-23.
    Research only alluded to by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) indicates the disproportionate involvement of some brain regions in the perception and experience of certain emotions. This suggests that the neural substrate of primitive emotional contagion has some emotion-specific aspects, even if cognitively sophisticated forms of empathy do not. Goals for future research include determining the ways in which empathy is emotion-specific and dependent on overt or covert perception.
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  14. M. Wheeler & Anthony P. Atkinson (2001). Domains, Brains and Evolution. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. 239-266.
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  15. Anthony P. Atkinson, Michael S. C. Thomas & Axel Cleeremans (2000). Consciousness: Mapping the Theoretical Landscape. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (10):372-382.
    What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the (...)
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  16. Michael S. C. Thomas & Anthony P. Atkinson (1999). Quantities of Qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):169-170.
    We address two points in this commentary. First, we question the extent to which O'Brien & Opie have established that the classical approach is unable to support a viable vehicle theory of consciousness. Second, assuming that connectionism does have the resources to support a vehicle theory, we explore how the activity of the units of a PDP network might sum together to form phenomenal experience (PE).
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  17. Anthony P. Atkinson (1998). Systems, Subsystems and Persons: The Explanatory Scope of Cognitive Psychology. Acta Analytica 20 (20):43-60.
  18. Anthony P. Atkinson, Wholes and Their Parts in Cognitive Psychology: Systems, Subsystems and Persons.
    Decompositional analysis is the process of constructing explanations of the characteristics of whole systems in terms of characteristics of parts of those whole systems. Cognitive psychology is an endeavour that develops explanations of the capacities of the human organism in terms of descriptions of the brain's functionally defined information-processing components. This paper details the nature of this explanatory strategy, known as functional analysis. Functional analysis is contrasted with two other varieties of decompositional analysis, namely, structural analysis and capacity analysis. After (...)
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  19. Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness Without Conflation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
    Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
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  20. Gillian Rhodes, Susan Brake & Anthony P. Atkinson (1993). What's Lost in Inverted Faces? Cognition 47 (1):25-57.
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