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Anthony Peressini [11]Anthony F. Peressini [1]
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  1. Anthony Peressini (2013). Blurring Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience: Folk Versus Philosophical Phenomenality. Philosophical Psychology:1-28.
  2. Anthony Peressini (2013). Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophical Critique. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):180-206.
    Giulio Tononi (2008) has offered his integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) as a “provisional manifesto.” I critically examine how the approach fares. I point out some (relatively) internal concerns with the theory and then more broadly philosophical ones; finally I assess the prospects for IITC as a fundamental theory of consciousness. I argue that the IITC’s scientific promise does carry over to a significant extent to broader philosophical theorizing about qualia and consciousness, though not as directly as Tononi suggests, (...)
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  3. Anthony Peressini (2008). Confirmational Holism and its Mathematical (W)Holes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):102-111.
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  4. Anthony Peressini (2003). Critical Studies/Book Reviews. Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):208-223.
  5. Anthony Peressini (2003). Proof, Reliability, and Mathematical Knowledge. Theoria 69 (3):211-232.
    With respect to the confirmation of mathematical propositions, proof possesses an epistemological authority unmatched by other means of confirmation. This paper is an investigation into why this is the case. I make use of an analysis drawn from an early reliability perspective on knowledge to help make sense of mathematical proofs singular epistemological status.
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  6. Anthony Peressini (1999). Applying Pure Mathematics. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):13.
    Much of the current thought concerning mathematical ontology and epistemology follows Quine and Putnam in looking to the indispensable application of mathematics in science. A standard assumption of the indispensability approach is some version of confirmational holism, i.e., that only "sufficiently large" sets of beliefs "face the tribunal of experience." In this paper I develop and defend a distinction between a pure mathematical theory and a mathematized scientific theory in which it is applied. This distinction allows for the possibility that (...)
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  7. Anthony Peressini (1999). Confirming Mathematical Theories: An Ontologically Agnostic Stance. Synthese 118 (2):257-277.
    The Quine/Putnam indispensability approach to the confirmation of mathematical theories in recent times has been the subject of significant criticism. In this paper I explore an alternative to the Quine/Putnam indispensability approach. I begin with a van Fraassen-like distinction between accepting the adequacy of a mathematical theory and believing in the truth of a mathematical theory. Finally, I consider the problem of moving from the adequacy of a mathematical theory to its truth. I argue that the prospects for justifying this (...)
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  8. Anthony Peressini (1998). Naturalism, Evolution, and Self-Defeat. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):41-51.
  9. Anthony Peressini (1997). Psychological Explanation and Behavior Broadly Conceived. Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):137 - 159.
    I argue that a broad conception of behavior makes considerable headway toward an account of <span class='Hi'>psychological</span> <span class='Hi'>explanation</span> that preserves the intuitive correctness of belief/desire (folk) <span class='Hi'>psychological</span> explanations and whose explanatory utility is not undercut by neurophysiological explanations. The rough idea behind a broad conception of behavior is that the basic units of behavior, which constitute the primary explananda of psychology, are themselves essentially goal-directed. As such, behavior supervenes on more than the (local) physical properties of the bodily (...)
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  10. Anthony Peressini (1997). Troubles with Indispensability: Applying Pure Mathematics in Physical Theoryt. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):210-227.
    Much of the current thought concerning mathematical ontology in volves in some way the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. The indispensability approach needs to be more thoroughly specified, however, before substantive progress can be made in assessing it. To this end I examine in some detail the ways in which pure mathematics is applied to physical theory; such considerations give rise to three specific issues with which the indispensability approach must come to grips.
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  11. Anthony F. Peressini (1997). Cumulative Versus Noncumulative Ramified Types. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (3):385-397.
    In this paper I examine the nature of Russell's ramified type theory resolution of paradoxes. In particular, I consider the effect of construing the types in Church's cumulative sense, that is, the range of a variable of a given type includes the range of every variable of directly lower type. Contrary to what seems to be generally assumed, I show that the decision to make the levels cumulative and allow this to be reflected in the semantics is not neutral with (...)
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  12. Anthony Peressini (1993). Generalizing Evolutionary Altruism. Philosophy of Science 60 (4):568-586.
    Although accounts of evolutionary altruism which leave the question of whether altruism can evolve in nature open to empirical confirmation/refutation have been worked out for special (two-trait) cases, no real effort has been made to work out such accounts for general (N-trait) cases. It is tempting to take this lack of attention as evidence for an inextricably conventional element, which precludes such accounts from being of practical scientific value. I argue that such accounts do generalize in a natural way. As (...)
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