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Profile: Anthony Reeves (State University of New York at Binghamton)
  1. Anthony R. Reeves (2015). Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion. Law and Philosophy 34 (3):257-298.
    In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...)
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  2. Anthony R. Reeves (2015). Standard Threats: How to Violate Basic Human Rights. Social Theory and Practice 41 (3):403-434.
    The paper addresses the nature of duties grounded in human rights. Rather than being protections against harm, per se, I contend that human rights largely shield against risk impositions to protected interests. “Risk imposition” is a normative idea requiring explication, but understanding dutiful action in its terms enables human rights to provide prospective policy guidance, hold institutions accountable, operate in non-ideal circumstances, embody impartiality among persons, and define the moral status of agencies in international relations. Slightly differently, I indicate a (...)
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  3. Nicole Hassoun & Anthony R. Reeves (2014). Due Process and Global Justice, by Larry May. Mind 123 (492):1208-1212.
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  4. Anthony R. Reeves (2010). Do Judges Have an Obligation to Enforce the Law?: Moral Responsibility and Judicial-Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 29 (2):159-187.
    Judicial obligation to enforce the law is typically regarded as both unproblematic and important: unproblematic because there is little reason to doubt that judges have a general, if prima facie, obligation to enforce law, and important because the obligation gives judges significant reason to limit their concern in adjudication to applying the law. I challenge both of these assumptions and argue that norms of political legitimacy, which may be extra-legal, are irretrievably at the basis of responsible judicial reasoning.
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