5 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Anthony Reeves (State University of New York at Binghamton)
  1. Anthony R. Reeves (2015). Standard Threats: How to Violate Basic Human Rights. Social Theory and Practice 41 (3):403-434.
    The paper addresses the nature of duties grounded in human rights. Rather than being protections against harm, per se, I contend that human rights largely shield against risk impositions to protected interests. “Risk imposition” is a normative idea requiring explication, but understanding dutiful action in its terms enables human rights to provide prospective policy guidance, hold institutions accountable, operate in non-ideal circumstances, embody impartiality among persons, and define the moral status of agencies in international relations. Slightly differently, I indicate a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  24
    Anthony R. Reeves (2015). Reasons of Law: Dworkin on the Legal Decision. Jurisprudence 7 (2):210-230.
    Ronald Dworkin once identified the basic question of jurisprudence as: ‘What, in general, is a good reason for a decision by a court of law?’ I argue that, over the course of his career, Dworkin gave an essentially sound answer to this question. In fact, he gave a correct answer to a broader question: ‘What is a good reason for a legal decision, generally?’ For judges, officials of executive and administrative agencies, lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and ordinary subjects acting in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Anthony R. Reeves (2010). Do Judges Have an Obligation to Enforce the Law?: Moral Responsibility and Judicial-Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 29 (2):159-187.
    Judicial obligation to enforce the law is typically regarded as both unproblematic and important: unproblematic because there is little reason to doubt that judges have a general, if prima facie, obligation to enforce law, and important because the obligation gives judges significant reason to limit their concern in adjudication to applying the law. I challenge both of these assumptions and argue that norms of political legitimacy, which may be extra-legal, are irretrievably at the basis of responsible judicial reasoning.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4.  35
    Anthony R. Reeves (2015). Practical Reason and Legality: Instrumental Political Authority Without Exclusion. Law and Philosophy 34 (3):257-298.
    In a morally non-ideal legal system, how can law bind its subjects? How can the fact of a norm’s legality make it the case that practical reason is bound by that norm? Moreover, in such circumstances, what is the extent and character of law’s bindingness? I defend here an answer to these questions. I present a non-ideal theory of legality’s ability to produce binding reasons for action. It is not a descriptive account of law and its claims, it is a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  4
    Nicole Hassoun & Anthony R. Reeves (2014). Due Process and Global Justice, by Larry May. Mind 123 (492):1208-1212.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography