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  1. Anthony Willing (1999). Unheard of Objects of Knowledge: A Controversial Principle of Buridan's Epistemic Logic. Franciscan Studies 57 (1):203-224.
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  2. Anthony Willing (1991). Buridan's Divided Modal Syllogistic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32 (2):276-289.
  3. Anthony Willing (1985). Buridan and Ockham: The Logic of Knowing. Franciscan Studies 45 (1):47-56.
  4. Anthony Willing (1976). A Note on Rescher's 'Semantic Foundations for the Logic of Preference'. Theory and Decision 7 (3):221-229.
    In ‘Semantic Foundations for the Logic of Preference’ (Rescher, ed.,The Logic of Decision and Action, University Press, Pittsburgh, 1967), Nicholas Rescher claims that, on the semantics developed in that paper, a certain principle - call it ‘Q’ turns out to be ‘unacceptable’. I argue, however, that, given certain assumptions that Rescher invokes in that same paper,Q can in fact be shown to be a ‘preference-tautology’, and henceQ should be classified as ‘acceptable’ on Rescher's theory.
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  5. Anthony Willing (1974). Morton on Causal Laws. Dialogue 13 (03):577-578.
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