Search results for 'Anti-individualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Anthony Brueckner (2012). Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):145-151.score: 240.0
    In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,“ Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge's views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel's article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel's, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I (...)
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  2. Endre Begby (2011). Concepts and Abilities in Anti-Individualism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):555-575.score: 210.0
  3. Constantine Sandis (2008). Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 18 (1):145-146.score: 210.0
  4. Anthony L. Brueckner (1995). The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.score: 192.0
    This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism.
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  5. J. Brown (2001). Anti-Individualism and Agnosticism. Analysis 61 (3):213-24.score: 192.0
    McKinsey-style reductio arguments aim to show that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access, the claim that a subject can have a priori knowledge of her thought contents. I defend my version of the reductio against the objections of Falvey, and McLaughlin and Tye. However, I raise and discuss a more serious objection--that it may be difficult for a subject to know a priori that she is agnostic about a concept, given that agnosticism involves being unsure whether a concept applies (...)
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  6. Sanford Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge University Press.score: 192.0
    Sanford Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part 1 he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part 2 he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic (...)
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  7. Oron Shagrir (2002). Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities, and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-96.score: 192.0
    Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not (...)
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  8. Brendan J. Lalor (1997). It is What You Think: Intentional Potency and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.score: 192.0
    In this paper I argue against the worried view that intentional properties might be epiphenomenal. In naturalizing intentionality we ought to reject both the idea that causal powers of intentional states must supervene on local microstructures, and the idea that local supervenience justifies worries about intentional epiphenomenality since our states could counterfactually lack their intentional properties and yet have the same effects. I contend that what's wrong with even the good guys (e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Allen) is that they implicitly grant (...)
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  9. Mikkel Gerken (2007). A False Dilemma for Anti-Individualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):329-42.score: 180.0
    It is often presupposed that an anti-individualist about representational mental states must choose between two accounts of no-reference cases. One option is said to be an ‘illusion of thought’ version according to which the subject in a no-reference case fails to think a first-order thought but rather has the illusion of having one. The other is a ‘descriptive’ version according to which one thinks an empty thought via a description. While this presupposition is not uncommon, it rarely surfaces in an (...)
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  10. Laura Schroeter (2008). Why Be an Anti-Individualist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.score: 180.0
    Anti-individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject's environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti-individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti-individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent's commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment. Since anti-individualism is an (...)
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  11. Asa Wikforss, Review of Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. [REVIEW]score: 180.0
    During the last decade Jessica Brown has been one of the main participants in the on-going debate over the compatibility of anti-individualism and self-knowledge. It is therefore of great interest that she is now publishing a book examining the various epistemological consequences of anti-individualism. The book is divided into three sections. The first discusses the question of whether a subject can have privileged access to her own thoughts, even if the content of her thoughts is construed anti-individualistically. This (...)
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  12. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.score: 180.0
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists (...)
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  13. Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification. Nos 41 (2):178�203.score: 180.0
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), (...)
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  14. Frank Barel (2014). The Solution to the Consequence Problem According to Anti‐Individualism. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):20-33.score: 180.0
    : For quite some time now there has been an ongoing debate whether authoritative self-knowledge is compatible with anti-individualism.1 One influential line of argument against compatibilism is due to Paul Boghossian (1998). I argue that Boghossian misconstrues what the anti-individualist really is committed to. This defence of compatibilism is elaborated by showing how the Twin Earth thought experiment is meant to speak in favour of anti-individualism. Partly this will show that Boghossian is wrong in his denial that empirical (...)
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  15. Lynne Rudder Baker (2005). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge – Jessica Brown. [REVIEW] Times Literary Supplement 5336:26.score: 180.0
    Traditionally, Anglophone philosophers have assumed that the identity of a thought is determined wholly by the subject's intrinsic states--e.g., her brain states. In the 1970's, this traditional view (lately called 'individualism' or ‘internalism’) was challenged by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, who argued that the contents of one’s beliefs, desires, intentions are partly determined by one's physical, social and/or linguistic environment. The question is not whether the environment causes one to think what one does. Rather, the question is one of (...)
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  16. Jane Heal (2013). Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and Second Person Authority. Mind 122 (486):fzt052.score: 180.0
    We are social primates, for whom language-mediated co-operative thinking (‘co-cognition’) is a central element of our shared life. Psychological concepts may be illuminated by appreciating their role in enriching and improving such co-cognition — a role which is importantly different from that of enabling detailed prediction and control of thoughts and behaviour. This account of the nature of psychological concepts (‘co-cognitivism’) has social anti-individualism about thought content as a natural corollary. The combination of co-cognitivism and anti-individualism further suggests (...)
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  17. Antti Saaristo (2007). On the Possibility of Naturalised Anti-Individualism in Social Ontology. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:115-121.score: 180.0
    In this paper I argue, contrary to the modern paradigm of rational choice theory in sociological theorising, that Dürkheim was correct to think that collectivistic notions are required if there is to be sui generis social science. However, Durkheim's anti-individualism must be naturalised to be compatible with modern monistic ontology. I argue that the required naturalisation is offered by the notion of humans as strongly social animals in general and the notion of collective intentionality in particular. I argue that (...)
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  18. Jessica Brown (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. MIT Press.score: 180.0
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  19. T. Hv ríbek (2007). Anti-Individualism, Materialism, Naturalism. Organon F 14 (3):283-302.score: 180.0
    This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and {\textemdash} rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution {\textemdash} to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution. However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it (...)
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  20. Susana Nuccetelli (1999). What Anti-Individualist Cannot Know A Priori. Analysis 59 (1):48-51.score: 162.0
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  21. Michael McKinsey (1991). Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 51 (January):9-16.score: 162.0
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  22. Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.score: 162.0
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  23. J. Brown (1995). The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56.score: 162.0
    In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. I use (...)
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  24. Kent Bach & Reinaldo Elugardo (2003). Conceptual Minimalism and Anti-Individualism: A Reply to Goldberg. Noûs 37 (1):151-160.score: 162.0
  25. Tyler Burge (2003). Davidson and Forms of Anti-Individualism: Reply to Hahn. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.score: 162.0
  26. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142.score: 162.0
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  27. Gregory Bochner (2014). The Anti-Individualist Revolution in the Philosophy of Language. Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (2):91-120.score: 162.0
    The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker’s narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting (...)
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  28. Michael McKinsey (1994). Accepting the Consequences of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 54 (2):124-8.score: 162.0
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  29. Anthony L. Brueckner (2002). Anti-Individualism and Analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.score: 162.0
  30. Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (2003). Anti-Individualism and Basic Self-Knowledge. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.score: 162.0
  31. Ted Honderich (1993). The Union Theory and Anti-Individualism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.score: 162.0
     
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  32. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Anti-Individualism and Psychological Explanation. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 162.0
  33. Joseph Owens (2003). Anti-Individualism, Indexicality, and Character. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.score: 162.0
     
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  34. Barry G. Stroud (2003). Anti-Individualism and Scepticism. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.score: 162.0
  35. Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2012). Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):84-103.score: 156.0
    According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically (...)
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  36. Tyler Burge (2003). Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):682–690.score: 150.0
  37. Susana Nuccetelli (1999). What Anti-Individualist Cannot Know A Priori. Analysis 59 (59):59-69.score: 150.0
    Note first that knowledge of one's own thought-contents would not count as a priori according to the usual criteria for knowledge of this kind. Surely, then, incompatibilists are using this term to refer to some other, stipulatively defined, epistemic property. But could this be, as suggested by McKinsey { 1 99 1: 9), the property of being knowable 'just by thinking' or 'from the armchair'? Certainly not if these were metaphors for knowledge attainable on the basis of reason alone, since (...)
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  38. Daniel Whiting (2007). Fregean Sense and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Books 48 (3):233-240.score: 150.0
    The definitive version of this article is published in Philosophical Books 48.3 July 2007 pp. 233-240 by Blackwell Publishing, and is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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  39. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Review of Sanford C. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).score: 150.0
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  40. Sanford Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):515–518.score: 150.0
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  41. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2009). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification * By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (3):582-585.score: 150.0
  42. Sarah Sawyer (2005). Review of Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (1).score: 150.0
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  43. Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1999). Anti-Individualism and Cognitive Semantics. DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in Der Philosophie 15.score: 150.0
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  44. Anand Jayprakash Vaidya (2013). Nyāya Perceptual Theory: Disjunctivism or Anti-Individualism? Philosophy East and West 63 (4):562-585.score: 150.0
    Misperception is part of the human condition. Consider a classic case of coming to confirm that one has had a misperception. On a stroll through the woods you see, in the distance, what seems to be a person. As you draw near, what looked like a person now appears to be a wooden post with a hat on it. On arrival you touch the post to confirm that it is not a person. From a pre-theoretical perspective, what has happened? On (...)
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  45. Hugo Meynell (2009). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. By Sanford C. Goldberg. Heythrop Journal 50 (3):557-558.score: 150.0
  46. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Review of Anti-Individualism : Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification, by Goldberg, S. C. [REVIEW]score: 150.0
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  47. Tomáš Hříbek (2007). Anti-Individualism, Materialism, Naturalism. Organon F 14 (3):283-302.score: 150.0
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  48. Scott Kimbrough (1998). Anti-Individualism and Fregeanism. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):470-482.score: 150.0
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  49. Steven Lukes (2013). Social Theory: An Anti-Individualist Story. [REVIEW] Theory and Society 42 (6):653-657.score: 150.0
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  50. Jussi Haukioja (2005). Jessica Brown, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 25 (1):12-14.score: 150.0
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