Search results for 'Anti-psychologism' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  21
    Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & John Clevenger (2013). Explanatory Anti-Psychologism Overturned by Lay and Scientific Case Classifications. Synthese 191 (5):1-23.
    Many philosophers of science follow Hempel in embracing both substantive and methodological anti-psychologism regarding the study of explanation. The former thesis denies that explanations are constituted by psychological events, and the latter denies that psychological research can contribute much to the philosophical investigation of the nature of explanation. Substantive anti-psychologism is commonly defended by citing cases, such as hyper-complex descriptions or vast computer simulations, which are reputedly generally agreed to constitute explanations but which defy human comprehension and, as (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  2.  17
    Lilian O’Brien (2015). Beyond Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):281-295.
    What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her action. Most contemporary philosophers assume that this amounts to explanation in terms of the reason for which the agent acted. They also assume that such explanations conform to a realist picture of explanation. What is disputed is whether the reason is a psychological state or a normative state of affairs . I argue that neither psychological states nor their contents suffice to make actions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  54
    Scott Edgar (2008). Paul Natorp and the Emergence of Anti-Psychologism in the Nineteenth Century. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):54-65.
    This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  41
    Consuelo Preti (2008). On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-Psychologism in Nineteenth-Century Psychology and G.E. Moore's Early Theory of Judgment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):176-185.
    I argue that the familiar picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and to some degree erroneous. Archival evidence suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, especially evident in his 1899 paper ‘The nature of judgment,’ comes from the literature in nineteenth-century empirical psychology rather than nineteenth-century neo-Hegelianism, as is widely believed. I argue that the conceptual influences of Moore’s paper are more likely to have had their (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  13
    Nicla Vassallo (1997). Analysis Versus Laws Boole's Explanatory Psychologism Versus His Explanatory Anti-Psychologism. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):151-163.
    This paper discusses George Boole?s two distinct approaches to the explanatory relationship between logical and psychological theory. It is argued that, whereas in his first book he attributes a substantive role to psychology in the foundation of logical theory, in his second work he abandons that position in favour of a linguistically conceived foundation. The early Boole espoused a type of psychologism and later came to adopt a type of anti-psychologism. To appreciate this invites a far-reaching reassessment of his (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  4
    Jonathan Waskan, Intelligibility and the CAPE: Combatting Anti-Psychologism About Explanation.
    Much of the philosophical discussion of explanations has centered around two broad conceptions of what sorts of ‘things’ explanations are – namely, the descriptive and ontic conceptions. Defenders of each argue that scientific psychology has at best little to contribute to the study of explanations. These anti-psychologistic arguments come in two main varieties, the metaphysical and the epistemic. Both varieties trace back to Hempel and recur in the more recent writings of prominent mechanists. The metaphysical arguments attempt to combat psychologism (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7.  17
    R. Lanier Anderson (2005). Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):287-323.
  8. R. Lanier Anderson (2005). Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):287 – 323.
  9.  8
    Frederik Stjernfelt (2013). The Generality of Signs: The Actual Relevance of Anti-Psychologism. Semiotica 2013 (194):77-109.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  30
    Lydia Patton (2011). Anti-Psychologism About Necessity: Friedrich Albert Lange on Objective Inference. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):139 - 152.
    In the nineteenth century, the separation of naturalist or psychological accounts of validity from normative validity came into question. In his 1877 Logical Studies (Logische Studien), Friedrich Albert Lange argues that the basis for necessary inference is demonstration, which takes place by spatially delimiting the extension of concepts using imagined or physical diagrams. These diagrams are signs or indications of concepts' extension, but do not represent their content. Only the inference as a whole captures the objective content of the proof. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  8
    John K. O.’Connor (2007). Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl. Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):14-22.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  6
    John K. O.’Connor (2007). Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl. Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):14-22.
  13.  2
    Guillaume Fréchette (2013). Kant, Brentano and Stumpf on Psychology and Anti-Psychologism. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 727-736.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. N. Vassallo (1997). Gottlob Frege and Alvin Goldman: Outlines of Some Forms of Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism. Filosofia 48 (3).
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Matthias Wille (2011). L. Patton, Anti-Psychologism About Necessity: Friedrich Albert Lange on Objective Inference. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):537.
  16.  22
    Karen Green (1986). Psychologism and Anti-Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):488 – 500.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  21
    Veli Mitova (2015). Truthy Psychologism About Evidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.
    What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  21
    Klaus Puhl & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (1998). Is Every Mentalism a Kind of Psychologism? Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:213-237.
    First, we argue that Dummett, in his accusing Husserl of psychologism, does not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenological framework of Husserl's philosophy. This framework must be taken into account for understanding why Husserl is not a psychologist in the theory of meaning. Second, it is shown that the thoughts required by Evans' theory of understanding indexical utterances are not to be identified with mental events as understood by psychologism. We then emphasize what Husserl's and Evans' explanation of the mind (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  4
    Klaus Puhl & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (1998). Is Every Mentalism a Kind of Psychologism?: Michael Dummett's Critique of Edmund Husserl and Gareth Evans. Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:213-237.
    First, we argue that Dummett, in his accusing Husserl of psychologism, does not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenological framework of Husserl's philosophy. This framework must be taken into account for understanding why Husserl is not a psychologist in the theory of meaning. Second, it is shown that the thoughts required by Evans' theory of understanding indexical utterances are not to be identified with mental events as understood by psychologism. We then emphasize what Husserl's and Evans' explanation of the mind (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  8
    Joseph Ulatowski (2008). Review of Robert Hanna's Rationality and Logic. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):148-152.
    In this brief article, I review the main argument's of Robert Hanna's <em>Rationality and Logic</em>.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  22
    David Godden & Nicholas Griffin (2009). Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186.
    This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  28
    Karen Green (1999). Was Wittgenstein Frege's Heir? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):289-308.
    This paper argues that Dummett’s interpretation of the relationship between Frege’s anti-psychologism and Wittgenstein’s doctrine that meaning is use results in a misreading of Frege. It points out that anti-mentalism is a form of anti-psychologism, but that mentalism is not the only version of psycholgism. Thus, while Frege and Wittgenstein are united in their opposition to mentalism, they are not equally opposed to psychologism, and from Frege’s point of view, the doctrine that meaning is use could also imply (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  8
    Carlo Ierna (2012). Husserl's Psychology of Arithmetic. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 8 (1):97-120.
    In 1913, in a draft for a new Preface for the second edition of the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl reveals to his readers that "The source of all my studies and the first source of my epistemological difficul­ties lies in my first works on the philosophy of arithmetic and mathematics in general", i.e. his Habilitationsschrift and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: "I carefully studied the consciousness constituting the amount, first the collec­tive consciousness (consciousness of quantity, of multiplicity) in its simplest and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  4
    Mathieu Marion (2009). L'anti-psychologisme de Bradley : idéalité de la signification, jugement et universaux. Philosophiques 36 (1):53-82.
    L’opinion est souvent exprimée que Bradley fut un des tout premiers critiques du psychologisme. Dans cet article, j’examine cette thèse en me penchant principalement sur ses Principles of Logic . Je définis le psychologisme au sens étroit comme une thèse portant sur les fondements de la logique, et le psychologisme au sens large comme une thèse plus générale en théorie de la connaissance pour montrer que Bradley a rejeté les deux, même s’il n’avait pas grand chose à dire sur la (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  89
    Nicholas J. J. Smith (2009). Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference Not Consequence. Philosophy Compass 4 (4):639-665.
    One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted , that is, which are being used to express judgements . There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. Øystein Linnebo (2003). Frege's Conception of Logic: From Kant to Grundgesetze. Manuscrito 26 (2):235-252.
    I shall make two main claims. My first main claim is that Frege started out with a view of logic that is closer to Kant’s than is generally recognized, but that he gradually came to reject this Kantian view, or at least totally to transform it. My second main claim concerns Frege’s reasons for distancing himself from the Kantian conception of logic. It is natural to speculate that this change in Frege’s view of logic may have been spurred by a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27.  87
    Scott Edgar (2010). The Explanatory Structure of the Transcendental Deduction and a Cognitive Interpretation of the First Critique. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):285-314.
    Consider two competing interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: the epistemic and cognitive interpretations. The epistemic interpretation presents the first Critique as a work of epistemology, but what is more, it sees Kant as an early proponent of anti-psychologism—the view that descriptions of how the mind works are irrelevant for epistemology.2 Even if Kant does not always manage to purge certain psychological-sounding idioms from his writing, the epistemic interpretation has it, he is perfectly clear that he means (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  8
    Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2004). Grice in the Wake of Peirce. Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (2):295-316.
    I argue that many of the pragmatic notions that are commonly attributed to 1-1. P. Grice, or are reported to be inspired by his work on pragmatics, such as assertion, conventional implicature, cooperation, common ground, common knowledge, presuppositions and conversational strategies, have their origins in C. S. Peirce's theory of signs and his pragmatic logic and philosophy. Both Grice and Peirce rooted their theories in normative rationality, anti-psychologism and the relevance of assertions. With respect to the post-Gricean era of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  29.  3
    Helmut Pape (2015). Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dici-Signs by Frederik Stjernfelt. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (1):108-120.
    Frederik Stjernfelt’s book Natural Propositions is much more than just a study arguing for the actuality of Peirce’s notion of dicisign. Not unlike his 2007 treatise Diagrammatology, FS does many things at the same time, not all of them closely related to the project of a functional, naturalistic interpretation of Peirce’s concept of dicisigns and the relation of human cognition and animal, even microbiological processes to one another. The result is an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and criticizes theories (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  64
    Michel ter Hark (2007). Popper, Otto Selz and Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (1):60-78.
    In this article it is argued that Popper's well-known deductive and falsificationistic epistemology is historically rooted in German psychology, notably the work of Otto Selz. Drawing on Popper's early and still unpublished psychological manuscripts it is shown how Otto Selz's psychology of thinking with its emphasis on the guiding role of schematic anticipations gave the impetus to Popper's theory of problem solving, his theory of the Searchlight, and its attendant rejection of empiricism, the so-called Bucket theory of knowledge. In the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  17
    Keith A. Wilson (2014). Review of Charles Travis, Perception: Essays After Frege. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (April).
    Charles Travis’s new collection on perception brings together eleven of his previously published essays on this topic, some of which are substantially revised, plus one new essay. The intentionally ambiguous subtitle hints at the author’s endorsement of Fregean anti-psychologism, though influences from Wittgenstein and Austin are equally apparent. The work centres around two major questions in the philosophy of mind and perception. First, Travis argues against the view that perceptual experience, as distinct from perceptual judgement or belief, is representational, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  1
    Maria Cherba & Frédéric Tremblay (forthcoming). Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations. Volume I. Prolegomena to Pure Logic, Translation From the German Authorized by the Author by E. A. Berstein, Edition and Preface by Semyon L. Frank. Editions ‘Obrazovanie’, St. Petersburg, 1909, 224 P. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies:1-2.
    This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s review of the first Russian translation of volume one of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, which was translated by E. A. Berstein and published in 1909 by a Petersburgian editor. The review appeared in the Muscovite philosophical journal Pyccкaя мыcль in 1909. In this short text, Lossky expresses his agreement with Husserl’s early anti-psychologism in logic. He also manifests his stance against logical and axiological relativism and naturalism. As an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  32
    Elisabetta Sacchi (2006). Fregean Propositions and Their Graspability. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):73-94.
    According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  32
    Stathos Psillos, Philosophy of Science.
    Philosophy of science emerged as a distinctive part of philosophy in the twentieth century. It set its own agenda, the systematic study of the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of science, and acquired its own professional structure, departments and journals. Its defining moment was the meeting (and the clash) of two courses of events: the breakdown of the Kantian philosophical tradition and the crisis in the sciences and mathematics in the beginning of the century. The emergence of the new Frege-Russell logic, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  6
    Gianfranco Soldati (2014). Thomas Szanto: Bewusstsein, Intentionalität Und Mentale Repräsentation. Husserl Und Die Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Husserl Studies 30 (3):269-276.
    By the time of the Prolegomena , Husserl took phenomenology to be a philosophical method that stands in opposition to naturalism, of which psychologism was supposed to be a particularly pernicious instance. Husserl was not the only philosopher at the turn of the century to oppose psychologism. Among his fellow campaigners one finds Frege, who played a decisive role in the development of so-called analytic philosophy, and Dilthey, who stands at the roots of contemporary hermeneutics. When it comes to issues (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  11
    John Krige (1978). A Critique of Popper's Conception of the Relationship Between Logic, Psychology, and a Critical Epistemology. Inquiry 21 (1-4):313 – 335.
    Popper's three?world doctrine differs significantly from an earlier position which insisted on a dualism of facts and norms. This dualism, combined with a hostility to that version of psychologism which holds that logical principles are descriptive psychological laws, initially led him to espouse the view that we are free to reject rules of inference as norms shaping our reasoning. However, in some formulations of his recently developed pluralistic epistemology, Popper appears to deny this freedom to the individual. Feyerabend has condemned (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  6
    Dale Jacquette (1998). Intentionality on the Installment Plan. Philosophy 73 (283):63-79.
    1. What's in a Name?Can philosophy of language do without the concept of intentionality? To approach this important question it may be useful to begin with the minimal explanatory requirements for a theory of reference that tries to explain the naming of objects as the simplest linguistic act. The limitations of trying to understand meaning without intentionality are therefore best illustrated by considering what is generally acknowledged to be the most thorough-going attempt to dispense altogether with intentional concepts in Frege's (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
    Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities they would (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   65 citations  
  39. K. Brad Wray (2013). Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  40. Ned Block (2005). Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 102:259-272.
    This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  41.  19
    Steve Fuller (2009). The Sociology of Intellectual Life: The Career of the Mind in and Around the Academy. Sage.
    1. The Place of Intellectual Life: The University -- The University as an Institutional Solution to the Problem of Knowledge -- The Alienability of Knowledge in Our So-called Knowledge Society -- The Knowledge Society as Capitalism of the Third Order -- Will the University Survive the Era of Knowledge Management? -- Postmodernism as an Anti-university Movement -- Regaining the University's Critical Edge by Historicizing the Curriculum -- Affirmative Action as a Strategy for Redressing the Balance Between Research and Teaching -- (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  42.  12
    Duško Prelević (2015). Zombies Slap Back: Why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work. Disputatio 7 (40):25–43.
    In his ‘anti-zombie argument’, Keith Frankish turns the tables on ‘zombists’, forcing them to find an independent argument against the conceivability of anti-zombies. I argue that zombists can shoulder the burden, for there is an important asymmetry between the conceivability of zombies and the conceivability of anti-zombies, which is reflected in the embedding of a totality-clause under the conceivability operator. This makes the anti-zombie argument susceptible to what I call the ‘Modified Incompleteness’, according to which we cannot conceive of scenarios. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  44.  10
    Otávio Bueno (forthcoming). An Anti-Realist Account of the Application of Mathematics. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the application (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  65
    Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap.
    (August 2015 final pre-publication version!) In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  91
    Martin Kusch (1995). Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge.
    In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place. Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until the two fields eventually matured (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  47.  7
    Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat. Synthese:1-13.
    This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  95
    Pierre Steiner (2014). Enacting Anti-Representationalism. The Scope and the Limits of Enactive Critiques of Representationalism. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):43-86.
    I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti- (...). These limitations are here taken as opportunities for reflecting on the fate of enactivism in its relations with representationalism and anti-representationalism. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2010). Spinoza's Anti-Humanism. In Smith Justin & Fraenkel Carlos (eds.), The Rationalists. Springer/Synthese
    A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity of (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. David Pitt (2009). Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117-138.
    In the past few years, a number of philosophers ; Horgan and Tienson ; Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and thoughts with the same phenomenology have the same intentional content. The last of these three claims is open to at least two different interpretations. It might mean that the phenomenology of a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000