Search results for 'Anti-psychologism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & John Clevenger (2013). Explanatory Anti-Psychologism Overturned by Lay and Scientific Case Classifications. Synthese:1-23.score: 192.0
    Many philosophers of science follow Hempel in embracing both substantive and methodological anti-psychologism regarding the study of explanation. The former thesis denies that explanations are constituted by psychological events, and the latter denies that psychological research can contribute much to the philosophical investigation of the nature of explanation. Substantive anti-psychologism is commonly defended by citing cases, such as hyper-complex descriptions or vast computer simulations, which are reputedly generally agreed to constitute explanations but which defy human comprehension and, as (...)
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  2. Nicla Vassallo (1997). Analysis Versus Laws Boole's Explanatory Psychologism Versus His Explanatory Anti-Psychologism. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):151-163.score: 180.0
    This paper discusses George Boole?s two distinct approaches to the explanatory relationship between logical and psychological theory. It is argued that, whereas in his first book he attributes a substantive role to psychology in the foundation of logical theory, in his second work he abandons that position in favour of a linguistically conceived foundation. The early Boole espoused a type of psychologism and later came to adopt a type of anti-psychologism. To appreciate this invites a far-reaching reassessment of his (...)
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  3. Lanier R. Anderson (2005). Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):287 – 323.score: 150.0
  4. Scott Edgar (2008). Paul Natorp and the Emergence of Anti-Psychologism in the Nineteenth Century. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):54-65.score: 150.0
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  5. Lydia Patton (2011). Anti-Psychologism About Necessity: Friedrich Albert Lange on Objective Inference. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):139 - 152.score: 150.0
    In the nineteenth century, the separation of naturalist or psychological accounts of validity from normative validity came into question. In his 1877 Logical Studies (Logische Studien), Friedrich Albert Lange argues that the basis for necessary inference is demonstration, which takes place by spatially delimiting the extension of concepts using imagined or physical diagrams. These diagrams are signs or indications of concepts' extension, but do not represent their content. Only the inference as a whole captures the objective content of the proof. (...)
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  6. Consuelo Preti (2008). On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-Psychologism in Nineteenth-Century Psychology and G.E. Moore's Early Theory of Judgment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):176-185.score: 150.0
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  7. R. Lanier Anderson (2005). Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):287-323.score: 150.0
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  8. John K. O.’Connor (2007). Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl. Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):14-22.score: 150.0
  9. Frederik Stjernfelt (2013). The Generality of Signs: The Actual Relevance of Anti-Psychologism. Semiotica 2013 (194):77-109.score: 150.0
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  10. N. Vassallo (1997). Gottlob Frege and Alvin Goldman: Outlines of Some Forms of Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism. Filosofia 48 (3).score: 150.0
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  11. Matthias Wille (2011). L. Patton, Anti-Psychologism About Necessity: Friedrich Albert Lange on Objective Inference. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):537.score: 150.0
     
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  12. Karen Green (1986). Psychologism and Anti-Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):488 – 500.score: 120.0
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  13. Veli Mitova (forthcoming). Truthy Psychologism About Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 96.0
    What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and (...)
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  14. Klaus Puhl & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (1998). Is Every Mentalism a Kind of Psychologism? Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:213-237.score: 60.0
    First, we argue that Dummett, in his accusing Husserl of psychologism, does not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenological framework of Husserl's philosophy. This framework must be taken into account for understanding why Husserl is not a psychologist in the theory of meaning. Second, it is shown that the thoughts required by Evans' theory of understanding indexical utterances are not to be identified with mental events as understood by psychologism. We then emphasize what Husserl's and Evans' explanation of the mind (...)
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  15. David Godden & Nicholas Griffin (2009). Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186.score: 56.0
    This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, (...)
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  16. Majid Amini (2008). Logical Machines: Peirce on Psychologism. Disputatio 2 (24):1 - 14.score: 56.0
    This essay discusses Peirce�s appeal to logical machines as an argument against psychologism. It also contends that some of Peirce�s anti-psychologistic remarks on logic contain interesting premonitions arising from his perception of the asymmetry of proof complexity in monadic and relational logical calculi that were only given full formulation and explication in the early twentieth century through Church�s Theorem and Hilbert�s broad-ranging Entscheidungsproblem.
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  17. Karen Green (1999). Was Wittgenstein Frege's Heir? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):289-308.score: 42.0
    This paper argues that Dummett’s interpretation of the relationship between Frege’s anti-psychologism and Wittgenstein’s doctrine that meaning is use results in a misreading of Frege. It points out that anti-mentalism is a form of anti-psychologism, but that mentalism is not the only version of psycholgism. Thus, while Frege and Wittgenstein are united in their opposition to mentalism, they are not equally opposed to psychologism, and from Frege’s point of view, the doctrine that meaning is use could also imply (...)
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  18. Carlo Ierna (2012). Husserl's Psychology of Arithmetic. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 8 (1):97-120.score: 42.0
    In 1913, in a draft for a new Preface for the second edition of the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl reveals to his readers that "The source of all my studies and the first source of my epistemological difficul­ties lies in my first works on the philosophy of arithmetic and mathematics in general", i.e. his Habilitationsschrift and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: "I carefully studied the consciousness constituting the amount, first the collec­tive consciousness (consciousness of quantity, of multiplicity) in its simplest and (...)
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  19. Øystein Linnebo (2003). Frege's Conception of Logic: From Kant to Grundgesetze. Manuscrito 26 (2):235-252.score: 30.0
    I shall make two main claims. My first main claim is that Frege started out with a view of logic that is closer to Kant’s than is generally recognized, but that he gradually came to reject this Kantian view, or at least totally to transform it. My second main claim concerns Frege’s reasons for distancing himself from the Kantian conception of logic. It is natural to speculate that this change in Frege’s view of logic may have been spurred by a (...)
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  20. Scott Edgar (2010). The Explanatory Structure of the Transcendental Deduction and a Cognitive Interpretation of the First Critique. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):285-314.score: 30.0
    Consider two competing interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: the epistemic and cognitive interpretations. The epistemic interpretation presents the first Critique as a work of epistemology, but what is more, it sees Kant as an early proponent of anti-psychologism—the view that descriptions of how the mind works are irrelevant for epistemology.2 Even if Kant does not always manage to purge certain psychological-sounding idioms from his writing, the epistemic interpretation has it, he is perfectly clear that he means his (...)
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  21. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2009). Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference Not Consequence. Philosophy Compass 4 (4):639-665.score: 30.0
    One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted , that is, which are being used to express judgements . There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role of the (...)
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  22. Elisabetta Sacchi (2006). Fregean Propositions and Their Graspability. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):73-94.score: 30.0
    According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant (...)
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  23. Michel ter Hark (2007). Popper, Otto Selz and Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (1):60-78.score: 30.0
    In this article it is argued that Popper's well-known deductive and falsificationistic epistemology is historically rooted in German psychology, notably the work of Otto Selz. Drawing on Popper's early and still unpublished psychological manuscripts it is shown how Otto Selz's psychology of thinking with its emphasis on the guiding role of schematic anticipations gave the impetus to Popper's theory of problem solving, his theory of the Searchlight, and its attendant rejection of empiricism, the so-called Bucket theory of knowledge. In the (...)
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  24. Stathos Psillos, Philosophy of Science.score: 30.0
    Philosophy of science emerged as a distinctive part of philosophy in the twentieth century. It set its own agenda, the systematic study of the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of science, and acquired its own professional structure, departments and journals. Its defining moment was the meeting (and the clash) of two courses of events: the breakdown of the Kantian philosophical tradition and the crisis in the sciences and mathematics in the beginning of the century. The emergence of the new Frege-Russell logic, (...)
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  25. John Krige (1978). A Critique of Popper's Conception of the Relationship Between Logic, Psychology, and a Critical Epistemology. Inquiry 21 (1-4):313 – 335.score: 30.0
    Popper's three?world doctrine differs significantly from an earlier position which insisted on a dualism of facts and norms. This dualism, combined with a hostility to that version of psychologism which holds that logical principles are descriptive psychological laws, initially led him to espouse the view that we are free to reject rules of inference as norms shaping our reasoning. However, in some formulations of his recently developed pluralistic epistemology, Popper appears to deny this freedom to the individual. Feyerabend has condemned (...)
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  26. Culum Brown (2005). Cerebral Lateralisation, “Social Constraints,” and Coordinated Anti-Predator Responses. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):591-592.score: 30.0
    Lateralisation is traditionally viewed by neuroscientists and comparative psychologists from the perspective of the individual; however, for many animals lateralisation evolved in the context of group living. Here I discuss the implications of individual lateralisation within the context of the group from an evolutionary ecology perspective, with particular reference to coordinated anti-predator behaviour.
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  27. Keith A. Wilson (2014). Review of Charles Travis, Perception: Essays After Frege. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (April).score: 30.0
    Charles Travis’s new collection on perception brings together eleven of his previously published essays on this topic, some of which are substantially revised, plus one new essay. The intentionally ambiguous subtitle hints at the author’s endorsement of Fregean anti-psychologism, though influences from Wittgenstein and Austin are equally apparent. The work centres around two major questions in the philosophy of mind and perception. First, Travis argues against the view that perceptual experience, as distinct from perceptual judgement or belief, is representational, (...)
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  28. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2004). Grice in the Wake of Peirce. Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (2):295-316.score: 30.0
    I argue that many of the pragmatic notions that are commonly attributed to 1-1. P. Grice, or are reported to be inspired by his work on pragmatics, such as assertion, conventional implicature, cooperation, common ground, common knowledge, presuppositions and conversational strategies, have their origins in C. S. Peirce's theory of signs and his pragmatic logic and philosophy. Both Grice and Peirce rooted their theories in normative rationality, anti-psychologism and the relevance of assertions. With respect to the post-Gricean era of (...)
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  29. Gianfranco Soldati (2014). Thomas Szanto: Bewusstsein, Intentionalität Und Mentale Repräsentation. Husserl Und Die Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Husserl Studies 30 (3):269-276.score: 30.0
    By the time of the Prolegomena (1900), Husserl took phenomenology to be a philosophical method that stands in opposition to naturalism, of which psychologism was supposed to be a particularly pernicious instance. Husserl was not the only philosopher at the turn of the century to oppose psychologism. Among his fellow campaigners one finds Frege, who played a decisive role in the development of so-called analytic philosophy, and Dilthey, who stands at the roots of contemporary hermeneutics. When it comes to issues (...)
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  30. Nicholas J. J. Smith, To Appear in Philosophy Compass.score: 30.0
    One of the most striking differences between Frege’s Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted, that is, which are being used to express judgements. There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role of the judgement stroke (...)
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  31. Wayne M. Martin (1999). Husserl's Relapse? Concerning a Fregean Challenge to Phenomenology. Inquiry 42 (3 & 4):343 – 369.score: 26.0
    An influential interpretation of phenomenology construes Husserl's project as an attempt to generalize the Fregean notion of sense- an attempt to extend Frege's analysis of the structure of meaningful expressions to a more general account of the structure of meaning in experience . Michael Dummett has articulated a broadly Fregean critique of this Husserlian program, arguing that the project is misguided and retrograde-a relapse into the psychologism and idealism that Frege sought to avoid. A defense of Husserl is offered, based (...)
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  32. Alain Boyer (1999). Le tout et ses individus ou d'une querelle à l'autre. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (4):435 - 465.score: 26.0
    On oppose traditionnellement deux approches méthodologiques en sciences sociales : le holisme et l'individualisme. Il est tentant d'identifier cette opposition à celle du structuralisme et de l'atomisme. Ainsi, dans Les institutions du sens, Vincent Descombes propose de récuser l'individualisme méthodologique et de lui substituer une approche « holiste structuraliste », susceptible de permettre d'échapper aux mirages des « entités collectives » aussi bien qu'aux aportes de l'atomisme logique et du psychologisme, en mettant en avant la notion d'institution et celle d'esprit (...)
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  33. Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.score: 24.0
    Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities they would (...)
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  34. Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.score: 24.0
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...)
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  35. Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose (2009). The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.score: 24.0
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics and (...)
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  36. Ned Block (2005). Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 102:259-272.score: 24.0
    This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and (...)
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  37. Dan Zahavi, Naturalized Phenomenology.score: 24.0
    It is always risky to make sweeping statements about the development of philosophy, but if one were nevertheless asked to describe 20th century philosophy in broad strokes, one noteworthy feature might be the following: Whereas important figures at the beginning of the century, figures such as Frege and Husserl, were very explicit in their rejection of naturalism (both are known for their rejection of the attempt to naturalize the laws of logic, i.e., for their criticism of psychologism), the situation has (...)
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  38. K. Brad Wray (2013). Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.score: 24.0
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  39. Hanoch Ben-Yami (2005). Behaviorism and Psychologism: Why Block's Argument Against Behaviorism is Unsound. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):179-186.score: 24.0
    Ned Block ((1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5-43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block (...)
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  40. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2010). Spinoza's Anti-Humanism. In Smith Justin & Fraenkel Carlos (eds.), The Rationalists. Springer/Synthese.score: 24.0
    A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity of (...)
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  41. Imogen Dickie (2010). Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.score: 24.0
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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  42. David Pitt (2009). Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117 - 138.score: 24.0
    In the past few years, a number of philosophers (notably, Siewert, C. (The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Horgan and Tienson (Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 520–533); Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: (1) there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; (2) different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and (3) thoughts with the same phenomenology have (...)
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  43. Robert Pippin (2014). Self-Interpreting Selves: Comments on Alexander Nehamas's Nietzsche: Life as Literature. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 45 (2):118-133.score: 24.0
    When Alexander Nehamas’s pathbreaking, elegantly conceived and executed book, Nietzsche: Life as Literature,1 first appeared in 1985, the reception of Nietzsche in the Anglo-American philosophical community was still in its initial, hesitant stages, even after the relative success of Walter Kaufmann’s much earlier, 1950 book, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ,2 and its postwar “decontamination” of Nietzsche after his appropriation by the Nazis.3 Arthur Danto’s 1964 book, Nietzsche as Philosopher,4 was also an important if somewhat isolated event, and there finally began to (...)
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  44. Martin Kusch (1995). Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge.score: 24.0
    In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place. Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until the two fields eventually matured (...)
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  45. W. J. Mander (2013). On Arguing for the Existence of God as a Synthesis Between Realism and Anti-Realism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):99-115.score: 24.0
    This article examines a somewhat neglected argument for the existence of God which appeals to the divine perspective as a way of reconciling the conflicting claims of realism and anti-realism. Six representative examples are set out (Berkeley, Ferrier, T. H. Green, Josiah Royce, Gordon Clark and Michael Dummett), reasons are considered why this argument has received less attention than it might, and a brief sketch given of the most promising way in which it might be developed.
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  46. Jan Willem Wieland (2010). Anti-Positionalism's Regress. Axiomathes 20 (4):479-493.score: 24.0
    This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s preceding a, and the identity of facts like a’s preceding b and b’s succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is Anti-Positionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, Anti-Positionalism falls prey to (...)
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  47. Nora Hämäläinen (2009). Is Moral Theory Harmful in Practice?—Relocating Anti-Theory in Contemporary Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):539 - 553.score: 24.0
    In this paper I discuss the viability of the claim that at least some forms of moral theory are harmful for sound moral thought and practice. This claim was put forward by e.g. Elisabeth Anscombe ( 1981 ( 1958 )) and by Annette Baier, Peter Winch, D.Z Phillips and Bernard Williams in the 1970’s–1980’s. To this day aspects of it have found resonance in both post-Wittgensteinian and virtue ethical quarters. The criticism has on one hand contributed to a substantial change (...)
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  48. Feng Ye (2010). What Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics Must Offer. Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.score: 24.0
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs (...)
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  49. Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.score: 24.0
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality is, I think, best understood as an attempt to undermine our allegiance to these two purported constitutive claims about action. If we must think that psychological states figure in the explanation of action then, according to Dancy, we should suppose that those psychological states are beliefs rather than desire-belief pairs. Dancy thus prefers pure cognitivism to Humeanism. But in fact he thinks that we have no business accepting any form of psychologism in the first place; no (...)
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