Search results for 'Antireductionism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Alex Rosenberg (2005). How to Reconcile Physicalism and Antireductionism About Biology. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):43-68.score: 24.0
    Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests and limitations, non-molecular explanations may not be improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover, antireductionists themselves view their claim as a metaphysical or ontological one about the existence of facts molecular biology cannot identify, express, or explain. However, this (...)
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  2. Sungsu Kim (2009). Multiple Realizations, Diverse Implementations and Antireductionism. Theoria 75 (3):232-244.score: 21.0
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  3. Tudor Baetu (2012). Emergence, Therefore Antireductionism? A Critique of Emergent Antireductionism. Biology and Philosophy 27 (3):433-448.score: 18.0
    Emergent antireductionism in biological sciences states that even though all living cells and organisms are composed of molecules, molecular wholes are characterized by emergent properties that can only be understood from the perspective of cellular and organismal levels of composition. Thus, an emergence claim (molecular wholes are characterized by emergent properties) is thought to support a form of antireductionism (properties of higher-level molecular wholes can only be understood by taking into account concepts, theories and explanations dealing with higher-level (...)
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  4. John Bolender (1995). Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.score: 18.0
    Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is (...)
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  5. Alex Rosenberg (1997). Can Physicalist Antireductionism Compute the Embryo? Philosophy of Science 64 (4):371.score: 18.0
    It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with a minimal physicalism is through the adoption of controversial claims about causation and explanation which undercut the force of these two antireductionism (...)
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  6. Russell E. Vance (1996). Heroic Antireductionism and Genetics: A Tale of One Science. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):45.score: 18.0
    In this paper I provide a novel argument against the claim that classical genetics is being reduced to molecular genetics. Specifically, I demonstrate that reductionists must subscribe to the unargued and problematic thesis that molecular genetics is 'independent' of classical genetics. I also argue that several standard antireductionist positions can be faulted for unnecessarily conceding the Independence Thesis to the reductionists. In place of a 'tale of two sciences', I offer a 'heroic' stance that denies classical genetics is being reduced, (...)
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  7. Fritz Rohrlich (2004). Realism Despite Cognitive Antireductionism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):73 – 88.score: 18.0
    Building on previous work, I continue the arguments for scientific realism in the presence of a natural level structure of science. That structure results from a cognitive antireductionism that calls for the retention of mature theories even though they have been "superseded". The level structure is based on "scientific truth" characterized by a theory's validity domain and the confirming empirical data. Reductionism (including fundamentalism) fails cognitively because of qualitative differences in the ontology and semantics of successive theories. This cognitive (...)
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  8. K. I. M. Sungsu (2009). Multiple Realizations, Diverse Implementations and Antireductionism. Theoria 75 (3):232-244.score: 18.0
    It has been debated what implications multiple realizability has for reductionism. I claim that more explicit attention needs to be paid to the distinction between multiple realizations of kinds and diverse implementations of laws. In this paper, I distinguish two different theses on the relations between multiple realization and diverse implementation: one thesis states that multiple realizations imply diverse implementations and the other states the converse. I claim that although antireductionism might turn out to be false if the first (...)
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  9. C. Kenneth Waters (1990). Why the Antireductionist Consensus Won't Survive the Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics. Philosophy of Science Association 1:125-39.score: 15.0
    Philosophers now treat the relationship between classical genetics and molecular biology as a paradigm of nonreduction and this example is playing an increasingly prominent role in debates about the reducibility of theories in other sciences. This paper shows that the anti-reductionist consensus about genetics will not withstand serious scrutiny. In addition to defusing the main anti-reductionist objections, this critical analysis uncovers tell-tale signs of a significant reduction in progress. It also identifies philosophical issues relevant to gaining a better understanding of (...)
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  10. Alexander Rosenberg (2007). Reductionism (and Antireductionism) in Biology. In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press. 349--368.score: 15.0
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  11. Andres Luure (2001). Lessons From Uexkülls Antireductionism and Reductionism: A Pansemiotic View. Semiotica 2001 (134):311-322.score: 15.0
    Biosmiotics is trying to extend semiotic concepts to biological phenomena and demarcate the biological sphere from the non-biological sphere using the applicability or inapplicability of semiotics as the demarcation criterion. We could call it antireductionsit in the first part of its enterprise as the world of life is interpreted in quasi-human terms; and we coulld call it reductionist in the second part of its enterprise as, for example, causality is excluded from the semiotic sphere. This article promotes a view according (...)
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  12. Slobodan Perović (2008). Why Rosenberg and Kaplan's Attempt to Reconcile Physicalism and Antireductionism Concerning Biology is Unsatisfactory. Theoria 51 (1):7-18.score: 15.0
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  13. Tim Thornton (2004). Reductionism/Antireductionism. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 191.score: 15.0
  14. Christian Perring (2001). Biology and Antireductionism in Psychiatry. Hastings Center Report 31 (3):47-47.score: 15.0
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  15. Sanjukta Bhattacharyya (2011). Mircea Eliade on Myth and its Significance in Socio-Religious Culture From an “Antireductionist Orientation”. International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 2:77-88.score: 15.0
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  16. Raffaella Campaner (2010). Reductionist and Antireductionist Stances in the Health Sciences. In. In F. Stadler, D. Dieks, W. Gonzales, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. 205--218.score: 15.0
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  17. Dale Jacquette (2002). Searle's Antireductionism. Facta Philosophica 4:143-66.score: 15.0
     
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  18. Alex Rosenberg (1997). Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (4):445-470.score: 9.0
    This paper argues that the consensus physicalist antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent findings of molecular developmental biology. After describing Wolperts programmatic claims on its behalf, and recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify the relationship between evolutionary and developmental biology by reconciling two apparently conflicting accounts of bio-function – Wrights and Nagels (as elaborated by Cummins). Finally, the paper (...)
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  19. Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Understanding Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146.score: 6.0
    My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...)
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  20. Janez Bregant (2004). Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited. Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.score: 6.0
    The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...)
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  21. Manfred D. Laubichler & Günter P. Wagner (2001). How Molecular is Molecular Developmental Biology? A Reply to Alex Rosenberg's Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):53-68.score: 6.0
    This paper argues in defense of theanti-reductionist consensus in the philosophy ofbiology. More specifically, it takes issues with AlexRosenberg's recent challenge of this position. Weargue that the results of modern developmentalgenetics rather than eliminating the need forfunctional kinds in explanations of developmentactually reinforce their importance.
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  22. L. A. Paul (2010). Temporal Experience. Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.score: 3.0
    The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.
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  23. Robert C. Richardson (2009). Multiple Realization and Methodological Pluralism. Synthese 167 (3):473 - 492.score: 3.0
    Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a foundation of the “antireductionist consensus.” More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic grounds, as well as on more “metaphysical” grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for multiple realization. I take up the reorganization involved in language dysfunctions to (...)
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  24. Kourken Michaelian (2010). In Defence of Gullibility: The Epistemology of Testimony and the Psychology of Deception Detection. Synthese 176 (3):399-427.score: 3.0
    Research in the psychology of deception detection implies that Fricker, in making her case for reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, overestimates both the epistemic demerits of the antireductionist policy of trusting speakers blindly and the epistemic merits of the reductionist policy of monitoring speakers for trustworthiness: folk psychological prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, it turns out that monitoring is on a par (in terms both of the reliability of the process and of the sensitivity of the beliefs that it (...)
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  25. Christopher R. Green, The Epistemic Parity of Testimony, Memory, and Perception.score: 3.0
    Extensive literatures exist on the epistemology of testimony, memory, and perception, but for the most part these literatures do not systematically consider the extent of the analogies between the three epistemic sources. A number of the same problems reappear in all three literatures, however. Dealing simultaneously with all three sources and making a careful accounting of the analogies and disanalogies between them should therefore avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Other than limits on the scope of which memorially- and testimonially-based beliefs (...)
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  26. Barry Maguire (2013). Defending David Lewis's Modal Reduction. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):129-147.score: 3.0
    David Lewis claims that his theory of modality successfully reduces modal items to nonmodal items. This essay will clarify this claim and argue that it is true. This is largely an exercise within ‘Ludovician Polycosmology’: I hope to show that a certain intuitive resistance to the reduction and a set of related objections misunderstand the nature of the Ludovician project. But these results are of broad interest since they show that would-be reductionists have more formidable argumentative resources than is often (...)
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  27. Paul Schweizer (2001). Realization, Reduction and Psychological Autonomy. Synthese 126 (3):383-405.score: 3.0
    It is often thought that the computational paradigm provides a supporting case for the theoretical autonomy of the science of mind. However, I argue that computation is in fact incompatible with this alleged aspect of intentional explanation, and hence the foundational assumptions of orthodox cognitive science are mutually unstable. The most plausible way to relieve these foundational tensions is to relinquish the idea that the psychological level enjoys some special form of theoretical sovereignty. So, in contrast to well known antireductionist (...)
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  28. Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner (2005). Sensibility Theory and Conservative Complancency. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):544–555.score: 3.0
    In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is (...)
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  29. Neven Sesardic, From Genes to Incest Taboos.score: 3.0
    Today the idea that an evolutionary approach may be fruitful for research in the social sciences is being passionately defended by some and no less passionately contested by others. The resistance to Darwinism comes mainly in two distinct varieties. The first type of criticism is based on empirical or methodological objections against the current attempts to use evolutionary considerations to throw some light on social science explananda. The other line of opposition, however, is much harder to pin down and discuss (...)
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  30. C. Kenneth Waters, Beyond Theoretical Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed Biological Practice.score: 3.0
    Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA led to developments that transformed many biological sciences. But what were the relevant developments and how did they transform biology? Much of the philosophical discussion concerning this question can be organized around two opposing views: theoretical reductionism and layer-cake antireductionism. Theoretical reductionist and their anti-reductionist foes hold two assumptions in common. First, both hold that biological knowledge is structured like a layer cake, with some biological sciences, such as molecular biology (...)
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  31. Alan C. Love (2008). Explaining Evolutionary Innovations and Novelties: Criteria of Explanatory Adequacy and Epistemological Prerequisites. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):874-886.score: 3.0
    It is a common complaint that antireductionist arguments are primarily negative. Here I describe an alternative nonreductionist epistemology based on considerations taken from multidisciplinary research in biology. The core of this framework consists in seeing investigation as coordinated around sets of problems (problem agendas) that have associated criteria of explanatory adequacy. These ideas are developed in a case study, the explanation of evolutionary innovations and novelties, which demonstrates the applicability and fruitfulness of this nonreductionist epistemological perspective. This account also bears (...)
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  32. Julie Zahle (2003). The Individualism-Holism Debate on Intertheoretic Reduction and the Argument From Multiple Realization. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):77-99.score: 3.0
    The argument from multiple realization is currently considered the argument against intertheoretic reduction. Both Little and Kincaid have applied the argument to the individualism-holism debate in support of the antireductionist holist position. The author shows that the tenability of the argument, as applied to the individualism-holism debate, hinges on the descriptive constraints imposed on the individualist position. On a plausible formulation of the individualist position, the argument does not establish that the intertheoretic reduction of social theories is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, (...)
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  33. William Jaworski (2004). Hylomorphism and the Mind-Body Problem. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:178-192.score: 3.0
    The dualist-materialist dichotomy can be understood in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims: materialism, mental realism, and antireductionism.At one time, functionalism seemed capable of resolving the apparent inconsistency, but recent work in the philosophy of mind suggests it cannot. Functionalism’sfailure invites exploration into alternative strategies for resolution, one of which is suggested by Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The latter rejects PostulationalRealism, a semantic model for psychological discourse endorsed by regnant forms of dualism and materialism, as well as by functionalism. (...)
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  34. Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.score: 3.0
    It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of (...)
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  35. Bryon Cunningham (2001). Capturing Qualia: Higher-Order Concepts and Connectionism. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):29-41.score: 3.0
    Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classifications of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scientific explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or subjective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, complex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental states from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanations. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, these (...)
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  36. Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (2008). Memory Consolidation, Multiple Realizations, and Modest Reductions. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):501-513.score: 3.0
    This article investigates several consequences of a recent trend in philosophy of mind to shift the relata of realization from mental state–physical state to function‐mechanism. It is shown, by applying both frameworks to the neuroscientific case study of memory consolidation, that, although this shift can be used to avoid the immediate antireductionist consequences of the traditional argument from multiple realizability, what is gained is a far more modest form of reductionism than recent philosophical accounts have intimated and neuroscientists themselves have (...)
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  37. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2009). Schaffner's Model of Theory Reduction: Critique and Reconstruction. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):119-142.score: 3.0
    Schaffner’s model of theory reduction has played an important role in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. Here, the model is found to be problematic because of an internal tension. Indeed, standard antireductionist external criticisms concerning reduction functions and laws in biology do not provide a full picture of the limits of Schaffner’s model. However, despite the internal tension, his model usefully highlights the importance of regulative ideals associated with the search for derivational, and embedding, deductive relations among mathematical (...)
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  38. Greg Frost-Arnold (2004). How to Be an Anti-Reductionist About Developmental Biology: Response to Laubichler and Wagner. Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):75-91.score: 3.0
    Alexander Rosenberg recently claimed (1997) that developmental biology is currently being reduced to molecular biology. cite several concrete biological examples that are intended to impugn Rosenberg's claim. I first argue that although Laubichler and Wagner's examples would refute a very strong reductionism, a more moderate reductionism would escape their attacks. Next, taking my cue from the antireductionist's perennial stress on the importance of spatial organization, I describe one form an empirical finding that refutes this moderate reductionism would take. Finally, I (...)
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  39. Karola Stotz, How (Not) to Be a Reductionist in a Complex Universe.score: 3.0
    This paper understands reductionism as a relation between explanations, not theories. It argues that knowledge of the micro-level behavior of the components of systems is necessary, but only combined with a full specification of the contingent context sufficient for a full explanation of systems phenomena. The paper takes seriously fundamental principles independent and transcendent of the laws of quantum mechanics that govern most of real-world phenomena. It will conclude in showing how the recent postgenomic revolution, taking seriously the physical principle (...)
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  40. Fritz Rohrlich (1989). The Logic of Reduction: The Case of Gravitation. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 19 (10):1151-1170.score: 3.0
    The reduction from Einstein's to Newton's gravitation theories (and intermediate steps) is used to exemplify reduction in physical theories. Both dimensionless and dimensional reduction are presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are pointed out. It is concluded that neither a completely reductionist nor a completely antireductionist view can be maintained. Only the mathematical structure is strictly reducible. The interpretation (the model, the central concepts) of the superseded theory T′ can at best only partially be derived directly from the (...)
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  41. Philip Gasper (1992). Reduction and Instrumentalism in Genetics. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):655-670.score: 3.0
    In his important paper "1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences" (1984), Philip Kitcher defends biological antireductionism, arguing that the division of biology into subfields such as classical and molecular genetics is "not simply... a temporary feature of our science stemming from our cognitive imperfections but [is] the reflection of levels of organization in nature" (p. 371). In a recent discussion of Kitcher's views, Alexander Rosenberg has argued, first, that Kitcher has shown that the reduction of classical (...)
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  42. Alex Rosenberg (2001). Reductionism in a Historical Science. Philosophy of Science 68 (2):135-163.score: 3.0
    Reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, a claim about explanations, and a research program. The metaphysical thesis reductionists advance (and antireductionists accept) is that all facts, including all biological facts, are fixed by the physical and chemical facts; there are no non-physical events, states, or processes, and so biological events, states and processes are “nothing but” physical ones. The research program can be framed as a methodological prescription which follows from the claim about explanations. Antireductionism does not dispute reductionism’s metaphysical (...)
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  43. J. Schwartz (1991). Reduction, Elimination, and the Mental. Philosophy of Science 58 (June):203-20.score: 3.0
    The antireductionist arguments of many philosophers (e.g., Baker, Fodor and Davidson) are motivated by a worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental. This worry derives from a misunderstanding of the empiricist account of reduction, which, although it does not underwrite "cognitive suicide", should be rejected for its positivist baggage. Philosophy of psychology needs more detailed attention to issues in natural science which serve as analogies for reduction of the mental. I consider a range of central cases, (...)
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  44. Kenneth F. Schaffner (1998). Genes, Behavior, and Developmental Emergentism: One Process, Indivisible? Philosophy of Science 65 (2):209-252.score: 3.0
    The question of the influence of genes on behavior raises difficult philosophical and social issues. In this paper I delineate what I call the Developmentalist Challenge (DC) to assertions of genetic influence on behavior, and then examine the DC through an indepth analysis of the behavioral genetics of the nematode, C. elegans, with some briefer references to work on Drosophila. I argue that eight "rules" relating genes and behavior through environmentally-influenced and tangled neural nets capture the results of developmental and (...)
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  45. W. McGinley (2012). Reduction in Sociology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):370-398.score: 3.0
    In grappling with the micro-macro problem in sociology, philosophers of the field are finding it increasingly useful to associate micro-sociology with theory reduction. In this article I argue that the association is ungrounded and undesirable. Although of a reductive "disposition," micro-sociological theories instantiate something more like "reductive explanation," whereby the causal roles of social wholes are explained in terms of their psychological parts. In this form, micro-sociological theories may actually have a better shot at closing the sociology–psychology explanatory gap, and (...)
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  46. Thomas W. Polger, Some Metaphysical Anxieties of Reductionism.score: 3.0
    By now it is cliché to observe that so-called reductionism is not one mammoth doctrine. There are, as it were, many reductionisms. Needless to say, there are at least as many antireductionisms. Despite the fact that neither reductionisms nor their counterparts are single and unified doctrines there do seem to be some family resemblances. One, it seems to me, is that both reductionisms and antireductionisms are acute responses to certain metaphysical worries. Some of these worries are metaphysical in nature, (...)
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  47. Matthew R. Dasti (2008). Testimony, Belief Transfer, and Causal Irrelevance: Reflections From India's Nyaya School. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (4):281-299.score: 3.0
    Recent studies of Nyäya’s account of testimony have illustrated its anticipation of contemporary testimonial antireductionism, the position that testimony cannot be reduced to a more fundamental means of knowledge like inference or perception. This paper discusses another relevant but less discussed anticipation of current debate, involving the status of speaker belief in testimonial exchange. Is a speaker’s veridical apprehension of the content of his utterance a necessary condition on testimonial exchange? This was a source of much disputation among Indian (...)
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  48. Maurice K. D. Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong (2004). Could the Neural ABC Explain the Mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):311-312.score: 3.0
    Gold & Stoljar are right in rejecting the radical neuron doctrine, but we argue that their distinction between determination and explanation is not principled enough to support their conclusion. We claim that the notions of multiple supervenience and screening-off offer a more precise construal of the dissociation between explanation and determination that lies at the heart of the antireductionist position.
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  49. Nikolaos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.) (2007). Facets of Sociality. Ontos.score: 3.0
    The aim of this volume is to explore new approaches to the problem of the constitution of the various aspects of sociality and to confront these with received ideas. Many of the contributions are devoted to a rather holistic and antireductionist conception of social objects, groups, joint actions, and collective knowledge. The topics that are dealt with are: (a) the question of the ontological status of social objects and their relation to physical objects; (b) collective agency; and (c) the question (...)
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  50. Stéphanie Ruphy (2005). Why Metaphysical Abstinence Should Prevail in the Debate on Reductionism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.score: 3.0
    My main aim in this paper is to show that influential antireductionist arguments such as Fodor's, Kitcher's, and Dupré's state stronger conclusions than they actually succeed in establishing. By putting to the fore the role of metaphysical presuppositions in these arguments, I argue that they are convincing only as 'temporally qualified argument', and not as 'generally valid ones'. I also challenge the validity of the strategy consisting in drawing metaphysical lessons from the failure of reductionist programmes. What most of these (...)
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