We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional arousal in response to (...) moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set. (shrink)

In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so that (...) they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

Emotional contagion is a phenomenon that has attracted much interest in recent times. However, the main approach on offer, the mimicry theory, fails to properly account for its many facets. In particular, we focus on two shortcomings: the elicitation of emotional contagion is not context-independent, and there can be cases of emotional contagion without motor mimicry. We contend that a general theory of emotion elicitation is better suited to account for these features, because of its multi-level appraisal component. From this (...) standpoint, emotional contagion is viewed as a particular kind of emotional response that involves the same components and processes of emotional responses in general. (shrink)

This book is a unique exploration of the idea of the "second person" in human interaction, the idea that face-to-face interactions involve a distinctive form of reciprocal mental state attributions that mediates their dynamical unfolding. Challenging the view of mental attribution as a sort of "theory of mind", Pérez and Gomila argue that the second person perspective of mental understanding is the conceptually, ontogenetically, and phylogenetically basic way of understanding mentality. Second person interaction provides the opportunity for the acquisition of (...) concepts of mental states of increasing complexity. The book reviews the growing interest in a variety of second person phenomena, both in development and in adulthood, presenting research that shows how participants in human interaction attribute psychological states of a referentially transparent kind to each other. This review documents the spontaneous preference for face-to-face interaction, from eye contact to joint attention, from forms of vitality to communicative intentions, from interaction detection to joint action, and from synchrony to interpersonal coordination. Also looking at the implications and applications of the second person perspective within fields as diverse as art and morality, this book is fascinating reading for students and academics in social and cognitive psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

The “systematicity argument” has been used to argue for a classical cognitive architecture (Fodor in The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, London, 1975, Why there still has to be a language of thought? In Psychosemantics, appendix. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 135–154, 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn in Cognition 28:3–71, 1988; Aizawa in The systematicity arguments. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 2003). From the premises that cognition is systematic and that the best/only explanation of systematicity is compositional structure, it concludes that cognition is (...) to be explained in terms of symbols (in a language of thought) and formal rules. The debate, with connectionism, has mostly centered on the second premise-whether an explanation of systematicity requires compositional structure, which neural networks do not to exhibit (for example, Hadley and Hayward, in Minds and Machines, 7:1–37). In this paper, I will take issue with the first premise. Several arguments will be deployed that show that cognition is not systematic in general; that, in fact, systematicity seems to be related to language. I will argue that it is just verbal minds that are systematic, and they are so because of the structuring role of language in cognition. A dual-process theory of cognition will be defended as the best explanation of the facts. (shrink)

En este trabajo invito a considerar la existencia de la perspectiva de segunda persona de la atribución mental, como una perspectiva diferenciada de las de primera y tercera persona. Su ámbito específico sería el de las atribuciones espontáneas y recíprocas en situaciones de interacción cara a cara, por lo que supondría su naturaleza expresiva. Al tratarse de la perspectiva ontogenéticamente primaria, ofrece una vía para superar las dificultades complementarias de los enfoques teóricos y empáticos dominantes.

A cross-cultural analysis of trust and cooperation networks in Northern Ghana (NGHA) and Oaxaca (OAX) was carried out by means of ego networks and interviews. These regions were chosen because both are inhabited by several ethnic groups, thus providing a good opportunity to test the cultural group selection hypothesis. Against the predictions of this approach, we found that in both regions cooperation is grounded in personal trust groups, and that social cohesion depends on these emotional bonds. Moreover, in agreement with (...) Fiske's notion of “evolved proclivities”, we also found two distinct kinds of trust networks, one for each region, which vary in terms of the degree of ethnic interrelation. This pattern suggests that social cohesion increases when environmental resources are scarce. (shrink)

The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: “... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress.” – the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the ‘challenges’ was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out our neck (...) and formulate the challenges for artificial cognitive systems. These challenges are articulated in terms of a definition of what a cognitive system is: a system that learns from experience and uses its acquired knowledge (both declarative and practical) in a flexible manner to achieve its own goals. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Prinz’s Kantian arguments in “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?”. They purport to show that empathy is not necessary for morality because it is not part of the capacities required for moral competence and it can bias moral judgment. First, we show that even conceding Prinz his notions of empathy and moral competence, empathy still plays a role in moral competence. Second, we argue that moral competence is not limited to moral judgment. Third, we reject Prinz’s (...) notion of empathy because it is too restrictive, in requiring emotional matching. We conclude that once morality and empathy are properly understood, empathy’s role in morality is vindicated. Morality is not reduced to a form of rational judgment, but it necessarily presupposes pro-social preferences and motivation and sensitivity to inter-subjective demands. (shrink)

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...) the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)

In this paper I try to establish the relevance of Peirce's Semeiotics to the conceptual foundations of Cognitive Science. Given Cognitive Science's commitment to the Representational Theory of Mind, I try to clarify the nature of mental representation from the standpoint of Peirce's general theory of signs. As it turns out, mental representations, because of their special role as interpretants of non-mental signs, present especial problems for their interpretation, whose solution Peirce anticipated in a way very close to that developed (...) in Cognitive Science. (shrink)

“Dance” has been associated with many psychophysiological and medical health effects. However, varying definitions of what constitute “dance” have led to a rather heterogenous body of evidence about such potential effects, leaving the picture piecemeal at best. It remains unclear what exact parameters may be driving positive effects. We believe that this heterogeneity of evidence is partly due to a lack of a clear definition of dance for such empirical purposes. A differentiation is needed between (a) the effects on the (...) individual when the activity of “dancing” is enjoyedas a dancerwithindifferent dance domains(e.g.,professional/”high-art”type of dance,eroticdance,religiousdance,clubdancing,Dance Movement Therapy(DMT), and what is commonly known ashobby, recreationalorsocialdance), and (b) the effects on the individual within these different domains, as a dancer of thedifferent dance styles(solo dance, partnering dance, group dance; and all the different styles within these). Another separate category of dance engagement is, not as a dancer, but as a spectator of all of the above. “Watching dance” as part of an audience has its own set of psychophysiological and neurocognitive effects on the individual, and depends on the context where dance is witnessed. With the help of dance professionals, we first outline some different dance domains and dance styles, and outline aspects that differentiate them, and that may, therefore, cause differential empirical findings when compared regardless (e.g., amount of interpersonal contact, physical exertion, context, cognitive demand, type of movements, complexity of technique and ratio of choreography/improvisation). Then, we outline commonalities between all dance styles. We identify six basic components that are part of any dance practice, as part of a continuum, and review and discuss available research for each of them concerning the possible health and wellbeing effects of each of these components, and how they may relate to the psychophysiological and health effects that are reported for “dancing”: (1) rhythm and music, (2) sociality, (3) technique and fitness, (4) connection and connectedness (self-intimation), (5) flow and mindfulness, (6) aesthetic emotions and imagination. Future research efforts might take into account the important differences between types of dance activities, as well as the six components, for a more targeted assessment of how “dancing” affects the human body. (shrink)

Abordamos aquí los diferentes comentarios críticos sobre las ideas centrales del libro Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction. En primer lugar, aclaramos algunos aspectos de la propuesta: la relación entre las interacciones de la segunda persona y las expresiones corporales de los estados psicológicos atribuidos y el papel que éstas tienen en la adquisición de los conceptos psicológicos más básicos. A continuación precisamos el sentido en que las atribuciones de la segunda persona son prácticas y transparentes. Por (...) último, destacamos el papel ubicuo de la normatividad en las interacciones de la segunda persona, enfatizando las asimetrías que existen en estas relaciones y mostramos por qué sostenemos que no hay interacciones desprovistas de normatividad a las que ésta posteriormente se les añade. (shrink)

We discuss the discovery of technologies involving knotted netting, such as textiles, basketry, and cordage, in the Upper Paleolithic. This evidence, in our view, suggests a new way of connecting toolmaking and syntactic structure in human evolution, because these technologies already exhibit an which we take to constitute the key transition to human cognition.

In attempting to integrate the authors' proposed model with results from analogous human event-related potential (ERP) research, we found difficulties with: (1) its apparent disregard for supraordinate representations at posterior multimodal association cortices, (2) its failure to address contextual task effects, and (3) its strict architectural dichotomy between memory storage and control functions.

While a standard procedure in mental health internment facilities, physical restraint, as an extreme form of coercion in mental health, has been claimed to be abolished. Three sorts of arguments have been provided: an argument from dignity, and argument from informed consent, and a consequentialism argument. In this chapter we discuss these arguments and conclude that these arguments are not decisive to completely ban such forms of coercion. Restraint, in particular, may be justified in exceptional circumstances, where an imminent risk (...) for the personal integrity of anybody involved, including the person with the mental health problem. However, this sort of case is infrequent, while restraint is often the first option. This conclusion also suggests that much can be done to prevent reaching such extreme circumstances where coercion may be the only option. The discussion also clarifies how coercion should be carried out, when justified, making it supervised and as short as possible. (shrink)

En Sentir, desear, creer: Una aproximación filosófica a los conceptos psicológicos, Diana Pérez se plantea una empresa ambiciosa, análoga a la de Ryle en The Concept of Mind: dar cuenta de manera integral de la ontología, la epistemología, la semántica y, en parte, la psicología de los conceptos de los diversos estados y procesos psicológicos. La aportación principal consiste en una perspectiva genealógica, basada en el modo en que se atribuyen tales conceptos, desde una posición realista. Para ello, se desarrolla (...) como contribución más original la idea de una perspectiva de segunda persona, la perspectiva de la interacción intersubjetiva, como el modo en que uno se introduce en el ámbito de lo mental. En conjunto, una aportación muy relevante. In Sentir, desear, creer: Una aproximación filosófica a los conceptos psicológicos, Diana Pérez sets for herself an ambitious task, analogous to Ryle's in The Concept of Mind: that of offering a unified account of the ontology, epistemology, semantics and, partly, psychology of mental concepts. Its main contribution lies in a genealogical perspective, grounded in the development of mental concept attribution, from a realist standpoint. To this extent, its most original contribution is the idea of a second-person perspective, that of intersubjective interaction, as the way through which one gets involved in the mental realm. In sum, a highly relevant contribution. (shrink)

After stressing the shortcomings of Darwinian accounts of self-consciousness and knowledge - i.e. in terms of their survival value - Anthony O'Hear presents Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses on cosmic evolution as an alternative approach that avoids those shortcomings. Although O'Hear does not straightforwardly defend Peirce's views, his argument suggests that only some teleological account of self-consciousness and knowledge is reasonable. The argument, though correct, is not enough to establish the metaphysical point O'Hear defends. Before developing his metaphysical ideas, Peirce's rejection of (...) natural selection as an explanation for every phenomenon brought him to consider the more appropriate question of how natural selection could give rise to a different kind of evolution. This involved outlining an evolutionary account of the origin of self-consciousness and of the mechanisms of belief fixation. The point is not one about Peirce, of course, but about the relationship between, on the one hand, biological and, on the other, psychological and cultural phenomena. (shrink)

En esta introducción al número monográfico, se presentan las líneas centrales del pensamiento de Peter Carruthers, su particular versión del cognitivismo funcionalista, que parte de una curiosa inversión de un lugar común: los animales piensan pero no sienten. Esta inversión deriva del papel central que Carruthers atribuye al lenguaje en la propia arquitectura mental, a pesar de partir de una versión de la modularidad masiva: como base para la conciencia y el pensamiento de nivel superior, flexible y creativo. Finalmente, también (...) se sitúan las diversas contribuciones al volumen dentro de estos ejes centrales. In this introduction to the special issue, the central ideas in Peter Carruther's thought are presented: his particular version of functionalist cognitivism, which inverts the common place that animals feel but not think, to claim that they do think but do not feel. The key to this inversion is the central role Carruthers assigns to language in the architecture of the mind, in spite of his defense of a version of the massive modularity hypothesis: as a ground for qualitative consciousness and for flexible thought. Finally, the different contributions to the special issue are placed in terms of such central axes. (shrink)

We argue that Anderson's (MRH) needs further development in several directions. First, a thoroughgoing criticism of the several alternatives is required. Second, the course between the Scylla of full holism and the Charybdis of structural-functional modularism must be plotted more distinctly. Third, methodologies better suited to reveal brain circuits must be brought in. Finally, the constraints that naturalistic settings provide should be considered.

Se presentan las ideas centrales y la estructura del libro de Diana I. Pérez y Antoni Gomila Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction (Routledge, 2021).

A general shortcoming of the localist, decompositional, approach to neuroscientific explanation that the target article exemplifies, is that it is incomplete unless supplemented with an account of how the hypothesized subsystems integrate in the normal case. Besides, a number of studies that show that object recognition is proprioception dependent and that cutaneous information affects motor performance make the existence of the proposed subsystems doubtful.

Es sabido desde Kuhn que la consolidación académica de los campos del conocimiento va acompañada de dos tipos de creaciones escritas: las obras paradigmáticas y los manuales. Si las primeras sirven para justificar la creación de una nueva área, los segundos pretenden más bien delimitar su especificidad, su "terreno de juego", sus métodos y estilos, su ortodoxia. Quizá sea la mejor prueba de la vitalidad y el desarrollo del campo de la Filosofía del Lenguaje la publicación en un relativamente breve (...) lapso de tiempo de diversos manuales, a los que hay que añadir la obra que vamos a reseñar ahora. Como si constituyeran la mejor prueba de un sentimiento de insatisfacción con respecto a los materiales disponibles hasta el momento, dado el auge de la disciplina en la última década. Sin embargo, también hay que ser consciente de que la industria editorial difícilmente publica ensayos filosóficos; la única manera de publicar un libro de filosofía es camuflarlo como manual o bien dirigirlo a un público general. (shrink)