In standard treatments of probability, Pr (A|B) is defined as the ratio of Pr (A∩B) to Pr (B), provided that Pr (B) > 0. This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of Pr (A|B) arise in the mind via implicit calculation of Pr (A ∩ B)/Pr (B). We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted (...) by Pr (A ∩ B)/Pr (B). Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that Pr (A|B) arises from the ratio Pr (A ∩ B)/[Pr (A ∩ B) + Pr (A ∩ B)] fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events. (shrink)
Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)
When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...) a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so. (shrink)
Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...) that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument. (shrink)
Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.
Tom has mounting evidence that he has incurable cancer, but he also believes that he would be happier, regardless of the truth, were he to believe that he is healthy. W.K.Clifford, who famously claimed, “It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence,” would, depending upon the sufficiency of Tom’s evidence, direct him to believe that he has incurable cancer, no matter the results for his happiness. The legendary pragmatist William James, on the other hand, (...) might deem this one of those situations in which it is permissible to follow one’s passions, and therefore might advise Tom to trust in his health in the face of the evidence to the contrary. Which one is right: the evidentialist or the pragmatist? The core of my research to date has aimed at resolving this central debate in the ethics of belief. (shrink)
The Kantian strategy in ethics is to demonstrate that the acceptance of certain norms is inescapable for practical agents. I investigate whether there is an interpretation of this strategy that can answer or at least mollify the worry pressed by error theorists that our normative judgements are systematically false. The first section explores a tempting line of thought that leads to a constructivist interpretation of the Kantian strategy. I will argue, though, that a constructivist interpretation is of dubious coherence. In (...) the second section I describe an argument that attempts to show that, even absent a demonstration that it is a method for arriving at normative truths, the Kantian strategy is invulnerable to any completely general argument that all of our normative judgements are false. (shrink)
George, feeling stressed and anxious about the criminal investigation into his firm’s accounting practices, decides that it would do him good to get away and take a long, relaxing vacation in Bermuda. According to popular informed-desire accounts of a person’s good, if George would desire to take a vacation to Bermuda upon being made fully aware of what his experience of the vacation would be like and of all the consequences therein, then this course of action would benefit him. This (...) does not mean that George must actually be privy to whether his fully informed self would desire to travel to Bermuda, but whether he would, according to such an account, determines whether going to Bermuda would benefit George, whether he or anyone else is capable of knowing it. (shrink)
We argue that an expressivist interpretation of "The Will to Believe" provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely-read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are "only expressions of our passional life". Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently-defended expressivism. James (...) puts forward his ethics of belief as healthy or appropriate, rather than as correct. (shrink)
Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. Our (...) strategy is to argue that what are supposed to be claims that conflict with realism in fact do not. (shrink)
The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and between (...) cognitivism and non-cognitivism. In our experience, the differences with traditional metaethics go deep enough that it can feel as if two different paradigms are talking past each other. We attempt to bring clarity and focus to this rather inchoate debate by simultaneously articulating the general issues involved and engaging in a detailed case study of one of the prominent representatives of this discontent, Christine Korsgaard. We argue that Korsgaard fails to go beyond metaethics–indeed, fails even to provide a theory within metaethics. Our strategy for showing this is to argue that her claims are compatible with both cognitivism and non-cognitivism. We have argued elsewhere that her distinctive claims are compatible with realism. Here we focus on the crucial role that claims about agency and the will seem to play her in work and, according to our interpretation, in her attempts to go beyond mainstream metaethics. We show in detail that these claims are actually compatible with non-cognitivism. Though our discussion often focuses on her work in particular, it has clear implications for other attempts to obviate the debates of traditional metaethics. (shrink)
In his influential paper, 'Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?', Laudan contends that there has been no philosophical rationale for a logic of discovery since the emergence of consequentialism in the 19th century. It is the purpose of this paper to show that consequentialism does not involve the rejection of all types of logic of discovery. Laudan goes too far in his interpretation of the historical shift from generativism to consequentialism, and his claim that the context of pursuit belongs (...) to neither discovery nor justification is based on narrow interpretations of the contexts of discovery and justification. As a result, Laudan draws unwarranted conclusions concerning both the early and contemporary defenders of a logic of discovery. A methodological logic of discovery - which involves self-corrective methods of hypothesis generation that promote the long-term goals of science and which require consequential support for justification - is a type of logic of discovery that survives the shift to consequentialism. (shrink)
Popper is well known for rejecting a logic of discovery, but he is only justified in rejecting the same type of logic of discovery that is denied by consequentialism. His own account of hypothesis generation, based on a natural selection analogy, involves an error-eliminative logic of discovery and the differences he admits between biological and conceptual evolution suggest an error-corrective logic of discovery. These types of logics of discovery are based on principles of plausibility that are used in the generation (...) as opposed to the preliminary evaluation of hypotheses. The normative relevance of these principles is grounded in the distinction between strategic and definitory rules. (shrink)
Healthcare in the United States is most often described and experienced as an immense, convoluted industry with a sum greater than its parts. However, it is important to remember that these parts are distinct, autonomous individuals and entities with their own beliefs, customs, and viewpoints. Moral issues surface abundantly in healthcare due to its interconnectedness with human life with enhanced proximity during life’s beginning and end. Therefore, these individual beliefs are prone to clashing as seen in three key relationships: between (...) patient and provider, between providers, and between industry and providers. While this is both to be expected and respected, it is important to remember that all individuals and entities involved in healthcare do have one major duty in common – the welfare of the patient. Unfortunately, legislature at both the state and federal levels and organizational policies have been too willing to endanger the welfare of patients for the sake of balancing the individual consciences involved. (shrink)
South Asia is one of the most densely populated regions of the world, where despite a slow growth, agriculture remains the backbone of rural economy as it employs one half to over 90 percent of the labor force. Both extensive and intensive policy measures for agriculture development to feed the massive population of the region have resulted in land degradation and desertification, water scarcity, pollution from agrochemicals, and loss of agricultural biodiversity. The social and ethical aspects portray even a grimmer (...) picture of the region with growing poverty mainly, amongst small farmers, food scarcity, and overall poor quality of life. This article reviews the historical perspective of agriculture development in the region and gives a panoramic view of the policy initiatives and their environmental as well as social and ethical spin-offs. The aim is to explore the environmental and ethical dimensions of the agricultural development in South Asia and recommend a holistic approach in formulating plans and programs to combat environmental degradation, hunger, and poverty resulting from unsustainable agricultural practices. (shrink)
The anthropological approach to mental competence is very interesting. I shall reason that the issue of mental competence and the determination best interests in the decision making process has been integrated together in this anthropological approach. I use the relatively recent Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) for England and Wales (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005) to illustrate this line of reasoning. I have deliberately chosen the phrase decision-making capacity (DMC) in this commentary to separate it from the concept of determination (...) of best interests. I am writing from the perspective of an old-age psychiatrist who frequently has to assess DMC and make decisions on behalf of those who lack .. (shrink)
My feature article highlighted some of the concerns leading to anomalies between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and subsequent introduction of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) into the MCA in England and Wales. Thornton provides an elegant and detailed philosophical account of various aspects of the assessment of decision-making capacity. One cannot argue against his line of reasoning. The problem clinicians have is to implement legislation that dictates the definition of decision-making capacity. In day-to-day clinical work, it is not (...) possible to use philosophical arguments in the determination of decision-making capacity because legislation requires it to be conducted in a very specific .. (shrink)
The mental capacity Act 2005 (MCA; Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005) was partially implemented on April 1, 2007, and fully implemented on October 1, 2007, in England and Wales. The MCA provides a statutory framework for people who lack decision-making capacity (DMC) or who have capacity and want to plan for the future when they may lack DMC. Health care and social care providers need to be familiar with the MCA and the associated legal structures and processes. The MCA is (...) supported by a Code of Practice (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2007), which was developed after extensive consultation and includes case examples. Those involved in the assessment of DMC and the application of the MCA should .. (shrink)
This essay exposes how recent attempts at lethal injection reform have involved unethical and illegal research on prisoners. States are varying the doses and types of drugs used, developing methods designed for non-medical professionals to administer medical procedures, and gathering data or making provisions for the gathering of data to learn from executions gone wrong. When individual prisoners are executed under these conditions, states are conducting research on them. Conducting research or experimentation on prisoners in the process of reform is (...) problematic because it violates ethical frameworks and state laws. The Supreme Court has recently taken up the challenge of elucidating the standard for determining the constitutionality of lethal injection. If the Court suggests an approach to lethal injection reform that is akin to some of the more thoughtful and cautious approaches other courts have proposed, the Court's decision may also contravene state laws or ethical precepts regarding research with prisoners. Thus, this paper provides important limitations on the kinds of reform that may be permissible and outlines the open questions that must be addressed before it can be determined whether the risks and uncertainties involved in lethal injection can be remedied. (shrink)
This paper will show how the three principles of the Socratic teaching method—midwifery, recollection, and cross-examination—are utilized in the treatment of learning diseases, that is, attitudes that interfere with effective learning. The Socratic teaching method differs from the traditional lecture model of teaching, but it does not sacrifice the therapeutic for the informative task of teaching. Rather, by indirectly imparting content and uncovering implicit content through careful questioning, it provides a careful balance between the informative and therapeutic aspects of teaching. (...) Insights from client-centered and cognitive therapy can enhance the effectiveness of the Socratic teaching method. (shrink)
Many guidelines for international research require that studies be responsive to host community health needs or health priorities. Although responsiveness possesses great intuitive and rhetorical appeal, existing conceptions are confusing and difficult to apply. Not only are there few examples of what research the responsiveness requirement permits and what it rejects, but its application can lead to contradictory results. Because of the practical difficulties in applying responsiveness and the danger that misapplying responsiveness could harm the interests of developing countries, we (...) argue that responsiveness should be refocused in three ways: in terms of (1) who enforces it, (2) under what standard, and (3) in what cases. We conclude that responsiveness should be applied by host country officials at the policy level with the exercise of judgment when externally funded research threatens to displace scarce local resources. (shrink)
A series of imitation games involving 3-participant (simultaneous comparison of two hidden entities) and 2-participant (direct interrogation of a hidden entity) were conducted at Bletchley Park on the 100th anniversary of Alan Turing’s birth: 23 June 2012. From the ongoing analysis of over 150 games involving (expert and non-expert, males and females, adults and child) judges, machines and hidden humans (foils for the machines), we present six particular conversations that took place between human judges and a hidden entity that produced (...) unexpected results. From this sample we focus on features of Turing’s machine intelligence test that the mathematician/code breaker did not consider in his examination for machine thinking: the subjective nature of attributing intelligence to another mind. (shrink)
There is evidence of continued food insecurity and malnutrition in Pakistan despite significant progress made in terms of food production in recent years. According to “Vision 2030” of the Planning Commission of Pakistan, about half of the population in the country suffers from absolute to moderate malnutrition, with the most vulnerable being children, women, and elderly among the lowest income group. The Government of Pakistan has been taking a series of policy initiatives and strategic measures to combat food insecurity issues. (...) These range from increasing production to food imports, implementation of poverty reduction strategies, nutritional improvement programs, as well as provision of social safety nets. The article aims to instill some fresh thinking into the debate regarding the challenges of food security. It underscores the limitations of hitherto policy response, and suggests crucial measures to improve the present grim scenario. Policy makers, planners, practitioners, and academicians in countries with comparable socio-political and economic setup can view this discussion as a case study and may apply the findings in their domain accordingly. (shrink)
The U.S. federal regulations require investigators conducting nonbeneficial research to obtain the assent of children who are capable of providing it. Unfortunately, there has been no analysis of which children are capable of assent or even what abilities ground the capacity to give assent. Why should investigators be required to obtain the positive agreement of some children, but not others, before enrolling them in research that does not offer a compensating potential for direct benefit? We argue that the scope of (...) children's research decision making should be based on the principles of respect for autonomy and nonmaleficence. These principles imply that the threshold for assent should be fixed at 14 years of age, and a dissent requirement should be adopted for all children in the context of nonbeneficial research. (shrink)
The U.S. Federal regulations allow institutional review boards (IRBs) to approve non-beneficial pediatric research when the risks are a minor increase over minimal, provided that the research is likely to develop generalizable knowledge about the subjects' disorder or condition. This “subjects' condition” requirement is quite controversial; commentators have argued for a variety of interpretations. Despite this considerable disagreement in the literature, there have not been any attempts to apply principles of legal interpretation to determine how the subjects' condition requirement should (...) be understood. (shrink)
Response to Floridi et al, 2008/2009. Based on insufficient evidence, and inadequate research, Floridi and his students report inaccuracies and draw false conclusions in their Minds and Machines evaluation, which this paper aims to clarify. Acting as invited judges, Floridi et al. participated in nine, of the ninety-six, Turing tests staged in the finals of the 18th Loebner Prize for Artificial Intelligence in October 2008. From the transcripts it appears that they used power over solidarity as an interrogation technique. As (...) a result, they were fooled on several occasions into believing that a machine was a human and that a human was a machine. Worse still, they did not realise their mistake. This resulted in a combined correct identification rate of less than 56%. In their paper they assumed that they had made correct identifications when they in fact had been incorrect. (shrink)
This experiment investigated the effect of format (line vs. bar), viewers’ familiarity with variables, and viewers’ graphicacy (graphical literacy) skills on the comprehension of multivariate (three variable) data presented in graphs. Fifty-five undergraduates provided written descriptions of data for a set of 14 line or bar graphs, half of which depicted variables familiar to the population and half of which depicted variables unfamiliar to the population. Participants then took a test of graphicacy skills. As predicted, the format influenced viewers’ interpretations (...) of data. Specifically, viewers were more likely to describe x–y interactions when viewing line graphs than when viewing bar graphs, and they were more likely to describe main effects and “z–y” (the variable in the legend) interactions when viewing bar graphs than when viewing line graphs. Familiarity of data presented and individuals’ graphicacy skills interacted with the influence of graph format. Specifically, viewers were most likely to generate inferences only when they had high graphicacy skills, the data were familiar and thus the information inferred was expected, and the format supported those inferences. Implications for multivariate data display are discussed. (shrink)
Congenitally infertile woman such as those with Turner syndrome or Mayer Rokitansky-Kuster-Hauser syndrome have available the technologies of oocyte harvestation, cryropreservation, in-vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy in order to have genetically related offspring. Since congenital infertility results in a variety of experiences that impacts on nearly every aspect of a person’s life, in the future it is possible that these women might desire a congenitally infertile child through the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis so as to share this common bond. (...) While infertility results in a relatively normal quality of life, it is morally wrong to necessitate the future use of infertility services with its variable success rate on a child. Also, whereas the woman has fundamental reproductive autonomy, she lacks the substantive autonomy regarding the specific characteristics of her child. Finally, the infertile community does exhibit a strong presence, but it lacks characteristics that define it as a culture. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's two tests for machine intelligence: the parallel-paired, three-participants game presented in his 1950 paper, and the “jury-service” one-to-one measure described two years later in a radio broadcast. Both versions were instantiated in practical Turing tests during the 18th Loebner Prize for artificial intelligence hosted at the University of Reading, UK, in October 2008. This involved jury-service tests in the preliminary phase and parallel-paired in the final phase.
This paper presents an analysis of three major contests for machine intelligence. We conclude that a new era for Turing’s test requires a fillip in the guise of a committed sponsor, not unlike DARPA, funders of the successful 2007 Urban Challenge.
What drives organisations to engage in socially responsible purchasing initiatives? To investigate this important question, this article uses a case-study approach to examine the context within which supplier diversity programmes have emerged in both the U.S. and U.K. The analysis identifies legislative and policy developments, economic imperatives, stakeholder pressures and ethical influences as forces shaping organisational responses. It reveals important contextual differences between U.K. and U.S. experience and offers an empirical and theoretical explanation of corporate behaviour.
Many of the millions of women in the developed world who experience infertility have difficulty coping with its psychological and social consequences, as well as attaining a resolution to these potentially devastating effects. Nevertheless, these women enjoy a relative benefit vis-à-vis infertile women in the developing world insofar as they live in a society that does not force them out of their own houses, curse at them in the streets, or condemn them to a life of poverty and destitution due (...) to their infertility. For example, a woman in the United States with a history of anovulation may not only be able to both seek compassionate and competent medical care for her infertility, but may also find emotional and .. (shrink)
In this paper I shall be looking at the state of science before and after the 17th century especially with regard to the question of the nature of scientific knowledge, specifically scientific paradigms. I will argue that some of the major differences between modern science and pre-modern science are due to (i) methodological changes, (ii) the rise of paradigmatic monism in modern science as opposed to paradigmatic pluralism in pre-modern science, (iii) the integration of science with technology after the 17th (...) century. These changes, I maintain, also redefine the role of scientific knowledge in society and culture, and bring in its wake certain problems and challenges, which in turn elicit different types of responses. Pre-modern science, I argue, are admirably suited to play a cultural and religious role, partly because of a lack of a pragmatic criterion of knowledge, and the emphasis on rational coherence. This makes enchantment of nature through science, possible. However, with the further evolution of science, especially the introduction of the experimental method and the emphasis on empiricism in the 17th century, scientific knowledge now has to conform to different criteria of knowledge -pragmatic in partleading to 'paradigmatic monism' and the consequent loss of enchantment in our conception of nature. The rise of the new science beginning in the 17th century thus brings in its wake a new set of epistemological and cultural challenges which were met with in different ways. I will then comment on the different types of responses made against the rise of the new science. (shrink)
In a perfect world, physicians and drug producers would have only one goal: to advance the health of their patients. Unfortunately, ours is not a perfect world. While every physician’s prime responsibility—by oath and by law—is to the patient, every pharmaceutical producer’s first and foremost obligation, by design, is to shareholders and employees. Their ultimate objectives are diagonally diverse. This situation calls for a code of ethics to govern the marketing and prescription of pharmaceuticals. This paper attempts to identifythe business (...) practices prevailing in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, in order to provide a basis for constructing an appropriate code of ethics. The research is based on surveys or in-depth interviews of physicians, patients, retail pharmacists, and drug manufacturers. (shrink)
The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.
Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I (...) argue that the different functional properties of these mental states are enough to distinguish them, and that norm-application doesn't help us draw the functional distinctions. (shrink)
Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether (...) to believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'. (shrink)
Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberatively. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in (...) some cases he is not motivated by them. In this paper I will argue that Shah cannot use Engel's suggestion because, given his definition of doxastic deliberation, epistemic akrasia is impossible in the context of deliberation about belief. Furthermore, epistemic akrasia is in conflict with the phenomenon of doxastic transparency that Shah tries to explain. (shrink)
Nishi Shah has recently argued that transparency in doxastic deliberation supports a strict version of evidentialism about epistemic reasons. I argue that Shah's argument relies on a principle that is incompatible with the strict version of evidentialism Shah wishes to advocate.
In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not (...) available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism. (shrink)
Principle 2 of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act (MCA) requires that decision-making capacity should be assumed, unless there is conclusive evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to the contrary (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005). In his article “The Paradox of the Assessment of Capacity Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005,” Ajit Shah (2011) raises the concern that the new Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS), introduced through the Mental Health Act (Department of Health 2007), conflict with this principle (henceforth, the (...) principle of presumed capacity) because, in practice, they will encourage the routine assessment of capacity even in the absence of any positive evidence of diminished capacity .. (shrink)
The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) were recently introduced into the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) via an amendment to mental health legislation in England and Wales. As Shah (2011) discusses, the rationale behind creating these protocols was to close what is commonly referred to as the ‘Bournewood gap’; a legislative loophole that allowed a severely autistic man (H.L.) who did not initially dissent to admission to be detained in a hospital and deprived of his liberty in his ‘best interests’ (...) as judged by his clinical team. Before the implementation of the DOLS, patients who lacked the capacity to consent to admission or treatment but who were nonetheless compliant could be admitted informally and treated as .. (shrink)
to be at the very beginning of the modern tradition. What is a mental representation (what is its nature) and how does it represent to the thinker what it represents? Where did this modern tradition begin? I shaH not quarrel with those scholarly..
In 1978, as the protests against the Shah of Iran reached their zenith, philosopher Michel Foucault was working as a special correspondent for Corriere della Sera and le Nouvel Observateur . During his little-known stint as a journalist, Foucault traveled to Iran, met with leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini, and wrote a series of articles on the revolution. Foucault and the Iranian Revolution is the first book-length analysis of these essays on Iran, the majority of which have never before appeared (...) in English. Accompanying the analysis are annotated translations of the Iran writings in their entirety and the at times blistering responses from such contemporaneous critics as Middle East scholar Maxime Rodinson as well as comments on the revolution by feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir. In this important and controversial account, Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson illuminate Foucault's support of the Islamist movement. They also show how Foucault's experiences in Iran contributed to a turning point in his thought, influencing his ideas on the Enlightenment, homosexuality, and his search for political spirituality. Foucault and the Iranian Revolution informs current discussion on the divisions that have reemerged among Western intellectuals over the response to radical Islamism after September 11. Foucault's provocative writings are thus essential for understanding the history and the future of the West's relationship with Iran and, more generally, to political Islam. In their examination of these journalistic pieces, Afary and Anderson offer a surprising glimpse into the mind of a celebrated thinker. (shrink)
I am very grateful to Toby Williamson and Ajit Shah for their insightful commentaries on my paper on mental competence. By linking their commentaries to the Mental Capacity Act of 2005, they both reflect a strong embeddedness in clinical practice, which I very much appreciate. Both authors seem, more or less, to agree on the need for an anthropological conceptualization of mental competence beyond a rather “mechanistic decision-making ability.” However, they do disagree on the pace (Williamson) and direction ( (...) class='Hi'>Shah) of my approach. I, therefore, use this opportunity to clarify some issues that were raised by my approach to mental competence, rather than discussing again the need for an anthropological approach. .. (shrink)
This essay investigates how a liberal state should treat violations of human rights within minority cultures. It is argued that the best approach gives due weight to the following three features: the free exercise of culture, protection of human rights and the balance of power between the majority and minority communities in a given polity. This balanced approach is contrasted with the theories of Kukathas, Okin and Spinner-Halev, who are criticised for concentrating on only the first, second and third of (...) these features respectively. The Arab Israeli Plonit case and the Indian Muslim Shah Bano case are used to illustrate this argument. The Israeli treatment of Plonit shows the virtues of the author's preferred approach, while the Indian treatment of Shah Bano indicates the dangers of concentrating on the second feature alone, as many liberals advocate, and neglecting the other two. (shrink)
DAVID BARSAMIAN: REGIME CHANGE is a new term in the lexicon. Kind of like change of address. It sounds somewhat innocuous. It certainly sounds a lot better than invasion, overthrow and occupation. The U.S. is an old hand at regime change. We’re in a year that marks a couple of anniversaries. Today is the 30th anniversary of the U.S.-backed coup in Chile. October 25 marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Grenada. But I’m particularly thinking of regime change (...) in Iran. 50 years ago, in August 1953, Operation Ajax, carried out by a CIA agent who was incidentally Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson, overthrew the conservative parliamentary democracy led by Mohammed Mossadeq and restored the Shah to the Peacock Throne, where he ruled for the next 25 years. (shrink)
There is evidence of continued food insecurity and malnutrition in Pakistan despite significant progress made in terms of food production in recent years. According to “Vision 2030” of the Planning Commission of Pakistan, about half of the population in the country suffers from absolute to moderate malnutrition, with the most vulnerable being children, women, and elderly among the lowest income group. The Government of Pakistan has been taking a series of policy initiatives and strategic measures to combat food insecurity issues. (...) These range from increasing production to food imports, implementation of poverty reduction strategies, nutritional improvement programs, as well as provision of social safety nets. The article aims to instill some fresh thinking into the debate regarding the challenges of food security. It underscores the limitations of hitherto policy response, and suggests crucial measures to improve the present grim scenario. Policy makers, planners, practitioners, and academicians in countries with comparable socio-political and economic setup can view this discussion as a case study and may apply the findings in their domain accordingly. (shrink)
A recent story in USA Today about the war in Afghanistan drew a direct parallel to the film Black Hawk Down : When the history of the war is written, the traumatic battle in the mountains around the Shah-e-Kot Valley will be remembered as a testament to heroism: A bloodied, outnumbered band of US servicemen held off a determined al-Qaeda force on frigid rocky terrain at least 8,000 feet above sea level. Call it Black Hawk Down in the snow. (...) (Jonathan Weisman, "Deadliest day for US", USA Today 3/6/02). Why would a reporter (Jonathan Weisman) interrupt his recitation of the facts of the battle, right near the start of his article, to suggest that readers should mimic the judgment of the film? Because the film seems to have a message, not only about history, but about the current US war on terrorism: support our troops, and don�t question a war�s intent or methods. (shrink)
We consider fixed point logics, i.e., extensions of first order predicate logic with operators defining fixed points. A number of such operators, generalizing inductive definitions, have been studied in the context of finite model theory, including nondeterministic and alternating operators. We review results established in finite model theory, and also consider the expressive power of the resulting logics on infinite structures. In particular, we establish the relationship between inflationary and nondeterministic fixed point logics and second order logic, and we consider (...) questions related to the determinacy of games associated with alternating fixed points. (shrink)
This article discusses radical changes in the Muslim world during the last hundred years. The main emphasis is on the tension between secularism and religious authority and the prospect of political democracy. The article starts from Toynbee’s assumption that social-political change is a response to a preceding condition. Three countries are compared. Modern Turkey emerged in the 1920s from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and its traditionalist outlook. Under Mustafa Kemal, Turkey was transformed into a radically secular and modernizing (...) regime inspired by French laicism. Some 50 years later, Iran switched from the modernizing and anti-clerical regime of the Shah to a semi-theocracy under Khomeini. Thirty years later, the uprising in Egypt followed neither the Kemalist nor Khomeini’s example. Responding to a preceding autocracy, the goal was neither secularism nor clericalism but to correct a basic political deficit: the lack of democracy. (shrink)
Primary titles in the area of Jaina philosophy are identified, focusing on English-language materials published in the twentieth century. Included is a brief survey of individual books and book series, with more extensive commentary on two important books published within the past five years: Nathmal Tatia's translation of Umāsvāti's "Tattvārthasūtra" (That Which Is) and Nagin J. Shah's translation of Nyāyavijayaji's "Jaina Darsana" (Jaina philosophy and religion).
Before 1979, when the Shah was in power, Washington strongly supported these programmes. Today the standard claim is that Iran has no need for nuclear power, and therefore must be pursuing a secret weapons programme. "For a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources," Henry Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post last year.
