Search results for 'Approximate Truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Duncan Macintosh (1994). Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.
    Scientific Realists argue that it would be a miracle if scientific theories were getting more predictive without getting closer to the truth; so they must be getting closer to the truth. Van Fraassen, Laudan et al. argue that owing to the underdetermination of theory by data (UDT) for all we know, it is a miracle, a fluke. So we should not believe in even the approximate truth of theories. I argue that there is a test for (...)
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  2. Seungbae Park (2014). Approximate Truth Vs. Empirical Adequacy. Epistemologia 37 (1):106-118.
    Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall (...)
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  3.  25
    Michael J. Shaffer (2015). Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence. Acta Analytica 30 (3):249-266.
    The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular condition concerning (...)
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  4. Thomas Weston (1992). Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):53-74.
    This paper describes a theory of accuracy or approximate truth and applies it to problems in the realist interpretation of scientific theories. It argues not only that realism requires approximate truth, but that an adequate theory of approximation also presupposes some elements of a realist interpretation of theories. The paper distinguishes approximate truth from vagueness, probability and verisimilitude, and applies it to problems of confirmation and deduction from inaccurate premises. Basic results are cited, but (...)
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  5. Peter Smith (1998). Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):253-277.
    Arguably, there is no substantial, general answer to the question of what makes for the approximate truth of theories. But in one class of cases, the issue seems simply resolved. A wide class of applied dynamical theories can be treated as two-component theories—one component specifying a certain kind of abstract geometrical structure, the other giving empirical application to this structure by claiming that it replicates, subject to arbitrary scaling for units etc., the geometric structure to be found in (...)
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  6.  38
    Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008). Approximate Truth and Descriptive Nesting. Erkenntnis 68 (2):213 - 224.
    There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories, quantum mechanics and special relativity, are false if taken together and literally. If they are in fact false, then how should they count as providing knowledge of the physical world? One might imagine that, while strictly false, our best physical theories are nevertheless in some sense probably approximately true. This paper presents a notion of local probable approximate truth in terms of descriptive nesting relations between current and (...)
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  7. Shelby D. Hunt (2011). Theory Status, Inductive Realism, and Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):159 - 178.
    The concept of approximate truth plays a prominent role in most versions of scientific realism. However, adequately conceptualizing ?approximate truth? has proved challenging. This article argues that the goal of articulating the concept of approximate truth can be advanced by first investigating the processes by which science accords theories the status of accepted or rejected. Accordingly, this article uses a path diagram model as a visual heuristic for the purpose of showing the processes in (...)
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  8.  21
    Thomas Weston (1987). Approximate Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (2):203 - 227.
    The technical results presented here on continuity and approximate implication are obviously incomplete. In particular, a syntactic characterization of approximate implication is highly desirable. Nevertheless, I believe the results above do show that the theory has considerable promise for application to the areas mentioned at the top of the paper.Formulation and defense of realist interpretations of science, for example, require approximate truth because we hardly ever have evidence that a particular scientific theory corresponds perfectly with a (...)
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  9.  11
    David B. Resnik (1992). Convergent Realism and Approximate Truth. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:421-434.
    I examine the role that approximate truth plays in arguments for convergent realism and diagnose some difficulties that face attempts to defend realism by employing this slippery concept. Approximate truth plays two important roles in convergent realism : it functions as a truth surrogate and it helps explain the success of science. I argue that approximate truth cannot perform both of these roles. If it adequately fulfills its role as a truth surrogate, (...)
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  10.  14
    Robert John Schwartz (1981). Approximate Truth and Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):606-610.
    In this paper I show that Goodman's theory of projectibility, although partly successful, is inadequate since it fails to take into consideration the "approximate" nature of certain scientific hypotheses.
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  11.  61
    Richard Boyd (1990). Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method. In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press 355-391.
  12. Richard N. Boyd (1976). Approximate Truth and Natural Necessity. Journal of Philosophy 73 (18):633-635.
  13. Peter Smith (1998). Approximate Truth for Minimalists. Philosophical Papers 27 (2):119-128.
  14.  1
    Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008). Approximate Truth and Descriptive Nesting. Erkenntnis 68 (2):213-224.
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  15.  13
    Robert John Schwartz (1990). Approximate Truth, Idealization, and Ontology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):409-425.
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  16. David Miller, Smith's Defence of Approximate Truth.
    The example can be generalized. Suppose that ϕ and ψ are suffi- ciently different functions of an independent variable t. We may show that whenever X’s predictions for ϕ and ψ lie (weakly) between Z’s predictions and T’s predictions (the true values), then there are other quantities, interdefinable with ϕ and ψ, that reverse the ordering.
     
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  17.  5
    T. S. Weston (1988). Approximate Truth and Ł Ukasiewicz Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (2):229-234.
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  18.  12
    Nathan P. Carson (2013). Passionate Epistemology: Kierkegaard on Skepticism, Approximate Knowledge, and Higher Existential Truth. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40 (1):29-49.
    In this article, I probe the extent of Kierkegaard's skepticism and irrationalism by examining the nature and limits of his “objective” and “approximate” knowledge. I argue that, for Kierkegaard, certain objective knowledge of contingent being is impossible and “approximate” knowledge of the same is funded by the volitional passion of belief. But, while Kierkegaard endorses severe epistemic restrictions, he rejects wholesale skepticism, allowing for genuine “approximate” knowledge of mind-independent reality. However, I further argue that we cannot ignore (...)
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  19.  23
    Robert C. Miner (2004). Truth in the Making: Creative Knowledge in Theology and Philosophy. Routledge.
    Truth in the Making represents a sophisticated effort to map the complex relations between human knowledge and creative power, as reflected across more than half a millennium of philosophical enquiry. Showing the intimacy of this problematic to the work of Nicholas of Cusa, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Vico and David Lachterman, the book reveals how questions about creation apparently diluted by secularism in fact retain much of their potency today. If science could counterfeit or synthesize nature precisely from (...)
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  20. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2008). Recurrent Transient Underdetermination and the Glass Half Full. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):141 - 148.
    Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
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  21. Paul Thagard (2007). Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):28-47.
    What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory (...)
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  22. Seungbae Park (2009). Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):115 - 124.
    What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.
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  23.  6
    Pierre-Yves Rochefort, Réalisme scientifique. L'Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    L’attitude réaliste constitue de prime abord la posture du sens commun vis-à-vis de la science. Elle consiste à attribuer à la science l’objectif de décrire littéralement la réalité tout en lui reconnaissant la capacité, en vertu de ses méthodes, d’atteindre ce but. Si le réalisme scientifique apparait comme représentant le sens commun, il a dû, au courant du siècle dernier, s’ériger en véritable posture philosophique argumentée devant l’influence grandissante des différentes formes d’antiréalismes. Dans la mesure où la posture qu’un philosophe (...)
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  24.  78
    Robert Northcott (2013). Verisimilitude: A Causal Approach. Synthese 190 (9):1471-1488.
    I present a new definition of verisimilitude, framed in terms of causes. Roughly speaking, according to it a scientific model is approximately true if it captures accurately the strengths of the causes present in any given situation. Against much of the literature, I argue that any satisfactory account of verisimilitude must inevitably restrict its judgments to context-specific models rather than general theories. We may still endorse—and only need—a relativized notion of scientific progress, understood now not as global advance but rather (...)
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  25. C. Held (2011). Truth Does Not Explain Predictive Success. Analysis 71 (2):232-234.
    Laudan famously argued that neither truth nor approximate truth can be part of an explanation of a scientific theory's predictive success because in the history of science there were theories that enjoyed some limited success but now are considered outright false. The power of his argument lay in the many historic examples he listed . Realists have disputed that all theories on Laudan's list can be regarded as predictively successful but let's suppose momentarily that at least some (...)
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  26.  3
    Ingvar Johansson (forthcoming). In Defense of the Notion of Truthlikeness. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-11.
    The notion of truthlikeness, coined by Karl Popper, has very much fallen into oblivion, but the paper defends it. It can be regarded in two different ways. Either as a notion that is meaningful only if some formal measure of degree of truthlikeness can be constructed; or as a merely non-formal comparative notion that nonetheless has important functions to fulfill. It is the latter notion that is defended; it is claimed that such a notion is needed for both a reasonable (...)
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  27. Anjan Chakravartty, Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations From Art.
    Realists regarding scientific knowledge – those who think that our best scientific representations truly describe both observable and unobservable aspects of the natural world – have special need of a notion of approximate truth. Since theories and models are rarely considered true simpliciter, the realist requires some means of making sense of the claim that they may be false and yet close to the truth, and increasingly so over time. In this paper, I suggest that traditional approaches (...)
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  28. Michael J. Shaffer (2013). E Does Not Equal K. The Reasoner 7:30-31.
    This paper challenges Williamson's "E = K" thesis on the basis of evidential practice. The main point is that most evidence is only approximately true and so cannot be known if knowledge is factive.
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  29. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3:239-259.
    Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, (...)
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  30. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion. Logos and Episteme 3:653-658.
    In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.
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  31.  75
    Eric Barnes (1995). Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):215-226.
    D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of "approximate causal (...)
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  32. Michael J. Shaffer (2011). The Ramsey Principle and The Principle of Informational Equilibrium. The Reasoner 5 (3):37-39.
    This paper challenges the soundness of an argument given in support of a Ramseyan analysis of belief defended by Dokic and Engel in their 2001 book.
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  33.  82
    Philip Kitcher (2002). On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):346-364.
    An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximate y true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds (...)
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  34.  28
    Ronald Laymon (1987). Using Scott Domains to Explicate the Notions of Approximate and Idealized Data. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):194-221.
    This paper utilizes Scott domains (continuous lattices) to provide a mathematical model for the use of idealized and approximately true data in the testing of scientific theories. Key episodes from the history of science can be understood in terms of this model as attempts to demonstrate that theories are monotonic, that is, yield better predictions when fed better or more realistic data. However, as we show, monotonicity and truth of theories are independent notions. A formal description is given of (...)
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  35. Brian Edison Mcdonald (1992). Towards a Theory of Meaningfulness and Truth: An Introduction to Variational Semantics. Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    We start with a nearly arbitrary standard classical first order "language" $C\sb{o},$ which is expanded to $C\sb{M,T}$ = "$C\sb{o}+M+T$", where for any variable x, M and T are unary formulas. We start also with a model ${\cal T}\sb{o},$ which together with $C\sb{o}$ represents a fixed non-problematic interpreted first order language. For each $\mu,\tau\subseteq U\sb{o},$ the universe of discourse for ${\cal T}\sb{o},$ the model ${\cal T}\sb{\mu,\tau}$ over $C\sb{M,T}$ is given so that its reduct to $C\sb{o}$ is just ${\cal T}\sb{o},$ and so (...)
     
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  36.  23
    Didier Dubois & Henri Prade (1996). New Trends and Open Problems in Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning. Theoria 11 (3):109-121.
    This short paper about fuzzy set-based approximate reasoning first emphasizes the three main semantics for fuzzy sets: similarity, preference and uncertainty. The difference between truth-functional many-valued logics of vague or gradual propositions and non fully compositional calculi such as possibilistic logic (which handles uncertainty) or similarity logics is stressed. Then, potentials of fuzzy set-based reasoning methods are briefly outlined for various kinds of approximate reasoning: deductive reasoning about flexible constraints, reasoning under uncertainty and inconsistency, hypothetical reasoning, exception-tolerant (...)
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  37.  18
    Henri Prade (1996). New Trends and Open Problems in Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning. Theoria 11 (3):109-121.
    This short paper about fuzzy set-based approximate reasoning first emphasizes the three main semantics for fuzzy sets: similarity, preference and uncertainty. The difference between truth-functional many-valued logics of vague or gradual propositions and non fully compositional calculi such as possibilistic logic (which handles uncertainty) or similarity logics is stressed. Then, potentials of fuzzy set-based reasoning methods are briefly outlined for various kinds of approximate reasoning: deductive reasoning about flexible constraints, reasoning under uncertainty and inconsistency, hypothetical reasoning, exception-tolerant (...)
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  38.  6
    Ernest W. Adams (1982). Approximate Generalizations and Their Idealization. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:199 - 207.
    Aspects of a formal theory of approximate generalizations, according to which they have degrees of truth measurable by the proportions of their instances for which they are true, are discussed. The idealizability of laws in theories of fundamental measurement is considered: given that the laws of these theories are only approximately true "in the real world", does it follow that slight changes in the extensions of their predicates would make them exactly true?
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  39. Babette E. Babich (1986). Towards a Perspectival Aesthetics of Truth: Nietzsche, Philosophy, and Science. Dissertation, Boston College
    This work presents truth as an aesthetic value in Nietzsche's epistemic account of Western morals and scientific culture. An expression of Nietzsche's special, selective style as a deconstructive hermeneutic in and among texts and readers is offered to facilitate this reading. ;Nietzsche's claim that the world is Will to Power construes all events as mutually interpretive expressions. Where truth is determined as a perspectival expression, the Real must be thought to incorporate multiple truths reflecting its ambiguous, ambivalent abundance. (...)
     
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  40. L. A. Zadeh (1975). Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning. Synthese 30 (3-4):407-428.
    The term fuzzy logic is used in this paper to describe an imprecise logical system, FL, in which the truth-values are fuzzy subsets of the unit interval with linguistic labels such as true, false, not true, very true, quite true, not very true and not very false, etc. The truth-value set, , of FL is assumed to be generated by a context-free grammar, with a semantic rule providing a means of computing the meaning of each linguistic truth-value (...)
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  41.  28
    Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp & Sylvia Wenmackers (2014). Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge. Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1129-1150.
    Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, (...)
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  42. Larry Laudan (1981). A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
    This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms (...)
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  43. D. M. Armstrong (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
    Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is the most recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, (...)
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  44.  24
    Bertrand Russell (2013). An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth. Routledge.
    Bertrand Russell is concerned in this book with the foundations of knowledge. He approaches his subject through a discussion of language, the relationships of truth to experience and an investigation into how knowledge of the structure of language helps our understanding of the structure of the world. This edition includes a new introduction by Thomas Baldwin, Clare College, Cambridge.
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  45. Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, (...)
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  46. Moti Mizrahi (2013). The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far. Synthese 190 (15):3209-3226.
    In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is (...)
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  47. James Ladyman (2011). Structural Realism Versus Standard Scientific Realism: The Case of Phlogiston and Dephlogisticated Air. Synthese 180 (2):87 - 101.
    The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not (...)
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  48.  95
    D. Harker (2013). How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence Without Proximity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):79-106.
    The most influential arguments for scientific realism remain centrally concerned with an inference from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories. Recently, however, and in response to antirealists' objections from radical discontinuity within the history of science, the arguments have been refined. Rather than target entire theories, realists narrow their commitments to only certain parts of theories. Despite an initial plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces significant challenges. In this article, I outline four prerequisites for a (...)
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  49. Dean Peters (2014). What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories Are the Correct Targets for “Selective” Scientific Realism? Philosophy of Science 81 (3):377-397.
    Selective scientific realists disagree on which theoretical posits should be regarded as essential to the empirical success of a scientific theory. A satisfactory account of essentialness will show that the (approximate) truth of the selected posits adequately explains the success of the theory. Therefore, (a) the essential elements must be discernible prospectively; (b) there cannot be a priori criteria regarding which type of posit is essential; and (c) the overall success of a theory, or ‘cluster’ of propositions, not (...)
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  50.  90
    Peter Vickers (2012). Historical Magic in Old Quantum Theory? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):1-19.
    Two successes of old quantum theory are particularly notable: Bohr’s prediction of the spectral lines of ionised helium, and Sommerfeld’s prediction of the fine-structure of the hydrogen spectral lines. Many scientific realists would like to be able to explain these successes in terms of the truth or approximate truth of the assumptions which fuelled the relevant derivations. In this paper I argue that this will be difficult for the ionised helium success, and is almost certainly impossible for (...)
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