Search results for 'Approximate Truth' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Duncan Macintosh (1994). Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.score: 240.0
    Scientific Realists argue that it would be a miracle if scientific theories were getting more predictive without getting closer to the truth; so they must be getting closer to the truth. Van Fraassen, Laudan et al. argue that owing to the underdetermination of theory by data (UDT) for all we know, it is a miracle, a fluke. So we should not believe in even the approximate truth of theories. I argue that there is a test for (...)
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  2. Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity and Evidence. Acta Analytica.score: 222.0
    The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can (at least some times) constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of (...)
     
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  3. Seungbae Park (2014). Approximate Truth Vs. Empirical Adequacy. Epistemologia 37 (1):106-118.score: 212.0
    Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall (...)
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  4. Shelby D. Hunt (2011). Theory Status, Inductive Realism, and Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):159 - 178.score: 180.0
    The concept of approximate truth plays a prominent role in most versions of scientific realism. However, adequately conceptualizing ?approximate truth? has proved challenging. This article argues that the goal of articulating the concept of approximate truth can be advanced by first investigating the processes by which science accords theories the status of accepted or rejected. Accordingly, this article uses a path diagram model as a visual heuristic for the purpose of showing the processes in (...)
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  5. Thomas Weston (1992). Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):53-74.score: 180.0
    This paper describes a theory of accuracy or approximate truth and applies it to problems in the realist interpretation of scientific theories. It argues not only that realism requires approximate truth, but that an adequate theory of approximation also presupposes some elements of a realist interpretation of theories. The paper distinguishes approximate truth from vagueness, probability and verisimilitude, and applies it to problems of confirmation and deduction from inaccurate premises. Basic results are cited, but (...)
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  6. Peter Smith (1998). Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):253-277.score: 180.0
    Arguably, there is no substantial, general answer to the question of what makes for the approximate truth of theories. But in one class of cases, the issue seems simply resolved. A wide class of applied dynamical theories can be treated as two-component theories—one component specifying a certain kind of abstract geometrical structure, the other giving empirical application to this structure by claiming that it replicates, subject to arbitrary scaling for units etc., the geometric structure to be found in (...)
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  7. Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008). Approximate Truth and Descriptive Nesting. Erkenntnis 68 (2):213 - 224.score: 180.0
    There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories, quantum mechanics and special relativity, are false if taken together and literally. If they are in fact false, then how should they count as providing knowledge of the physical world? One might imagine that, while strictly false, our best physical theories are nevertheless in some sense probably approximately true. This paper presents a notion of local probable approximate truth in terms of descriptive nesting relations between current and (...)
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  8. Thomas Weston (1987). Approximate Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (2):203 - 227.score: 180.0
    The technical results presented here on continuity and approximate implication are obviously incomplete. In particular, a syntactic characterization of approximate implication is highly desirable. Nevertheless, I believe the results above do show that the theory has considerable promise for application to the areas mentioned at the top of the paper.Formulation and defense of realist interpretations of science, for example, require approximate truth because we hardly ever have evidence that a particular scientific theory corresponds perfectly with a (...)
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  9. David B. Resnik (1992). Convergent Realism and Approximate Truth. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:421 - 434.score: 180.0
    I examine the role that approximate truth plays in arguments for convergent realism and diagnose some difficulties that face attempts to defend realism by employing this slippery concept. Approximate truth plays two important roles in convergent realism: it functions as a truth surrogate and it helps explain the success of science. I argue that approximate truth cannot perform both of these roles. If it adequately fulfills its role as a (...) surrogate, then it cannot explain the success of science. If it adequately explains the success of science, then it cannot function as a truth surrogate. (shrink)
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  10. Robert John Schwartz (1981). Approximate Truth and Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):606-610.score: 156.0
    In this paper I show that Goodman's theory of projectibility, although partly successful, is inadequate since it fails to take into consideration the "approximate" nature of certain scientific hypotheses.
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  11. Peter Smith (1998). Approximate Truth for Minimalists. Philosophical Papers 27 (2):119-128.score: 150.0
  12. Richard N. Boyd (1976). Approximate Truth and Natural Necessity. Journal of Philosophy 73 (18):633-635.score: 150.0
  13. Richard Boyd (1990). Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method. In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. 355-391.score: 150.0
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  14. David Miller, Smith's Defence of Approximate Truth.score: 150.0
    The example can be generalized. Suppose that ϕ and ψ are suffi- ciently different functions of an independent variable t. We may show that whenever X’s predictions for ϕ and ψ lie (weakly) between Z’s predictions and T’s predictions (the true values), then there are other quantities, interdefinable with ϕ and ψ, that reverse the ordering.
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  15. Robert John Schwartz (1990). Approximate Truth, Idealization, and Ontology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):409-425.score: 150.0
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  16. T. S. Weston (1988). Approximate Truth and Ł Ukasiewicz Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (2):229-234.score: 150.0
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  17. Nathan P. Carson (2013). Passionate Epistemology: Kierkegaard on Skepticism, Approximate Knowledge, and Higher Existential Truth. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40 (1):29-49.score: 126.0
    In this article, I probe the extent of Kierkegaard's skepticism and irrationalism by examining the nature and limits of his “objective” and “approximate” knowledge. I argue that, for Kierkegaard, certain objective knowledge of contingent being is impossible and “approximate” knowledge of the same is funded by the volitional passion of belief. But, while Kierkegaard endorses severe epistemic restrictions, he rejects wholesale skepticism, allowing for genuine “approximate” knowledge of mind-independent reality. However, I further argue that we cannot ignore (...)
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  18. Gustavo Cevolani (2013). Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change. Logic Journal of the Igpl 21 (6):999-1016.score: 80.0
    We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some (...)
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  19. Gustavo Cevolani (2014). Truth Approximation, Belief Merging, and Peer Disagreement. Synthese 191 (11):2383-2401.score: 80.0
    In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (...)
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  20. Władysław Krajewski (1978). Approximative Truth of Fact-Statements, Laws, and Theories. Synthese 38 (2):275 - 279.score: 72.0
    The paper is a sketch of a conception of approximative truth (or verisimilitude). The concepts of relative error, and degree of inadequacy are introduced. By means of them the concept of truth-content of quantitative facts-statements, laws and theories is defined. Laws and theories accepted in science have a high truth-content, i.e. they are approximately true.
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  21. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3:239-259.score: 70.0
    Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, (...)
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  22. Remhof Justin (forthcoming). On Nietzsche?S Conception of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence, or Pragmatist? Journal of Nietzsche Studies.score: 66.0
    Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche?s remarks on truth are better situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth rather than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche?s thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth-conditions of propositions are constitutively related to our interests and that truth is (...). (shrink)
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  23. Robert C. Miner (2004). Truth in the Making: Creative Knowledge in Theology and Philosophy. Routledge.score: 66.0
    Truth in the Making represents a sophisticated effort to map the complex relations between human knowledge and creative power, as reflected across more than half a millennium of philosophical enquiry. Showing the intimacy of this problematic to the work of Nicholas of Cusa, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Vico and David Lachterman, the book reveals how questions about creation apparently diluted by secularism in fact retain much of their potency today. If science could counterfeit or synthesize nature precisely from (...)
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  24. Robert Northcott (2013). Verisimilitude: A Causal Approach. Synthese 190 (9):1471-1488.score: 62.0
    I present a new definition of verisimilitude, framed in terms of causes. Roughly speaking, according to it a scientific model is approximately true if it captures accurately the strengths of the causes present in any given situation. Against much of the literature, I argue that any satisfactory account of verisimilitude must inevitably restrict its judgments to context-specific models rather than general theories. We may still endorse—and only need—a relativized notion of scientific progress, understood now not as global advance but rather (...)
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  25. Michael J. Shaffer (2013). E Does Not Equal K. The Reasoner 7:30-31.score: 62.0
    This paper challenges Williamson's "E = K" thesis on the basis of evidential practice. The main point is that most evidence is only approximately true and so cannot be known if knowledge is factive.
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  26. Seungbae Park (2009). Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):115 - 124.score: 60.0
    What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.
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  27. Paul Thagard (2007). Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):28-47.score: 60.0
    What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory (...)
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  28. Anjan Chakravartty, Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations From Art.score: 60.0
    Realists regarding scientific knowledge – those who think that our best scientific representations truly describe both observable and unobservable aspects of the natural world – have special need of a notion of approximate truth. Since theories and models are rarely considered true simpliciter, the realist requires some means of making sense of the claim that they may be false and yet close to the truth, and increasingly so over time. In this paper, I suggest that traditional approaches (...)
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  29. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2008). Recurrent Transient Underdetermination and the Glass Half Full. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):141 - 148.score: 60.0
    Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
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  30. Theo A. F. Kuipers (1997). The Dual Foundation of Qualitative Truth Approximation. Erkenntnis 47 (2):145-179.score: 60.0
    The main formal notion involved in qualitative truth approximation by the HD-method, viz. ‘more truthlike’, is shown to not only have, by its definition, an intuitively appealing ‘model foundation’, but also, at least partially, a conceptually plausible ‘consequence foundation’. Moreover, combining the relevant parts of both leads to a very appealing ‘dual foundation’, the more so since the relevant methodological notions, viz. ‘more successful’ and its ingredients provided by the HD-method, can be given a similar dual foundation. According to (...)
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  31. Eric Barnes (1995). Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):215-226.score: 60.0
    D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of "approximate causal (...)
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  32. Jean-Pierre Marquis (1991). Approximations and Truth Spaces. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (4):375 - 401.score: 60.0
    Approximations form an essential part of scientific activity and they come in different forms: conceptual approximations (simplifications in models), mathematical approximations of various types (e.g. linear equations instead of non-linear ones, computational approximations), experimental approximations due to limitations of the instruments and so on and so forth. In this paper, we will consider one type of approximation, namely numerical approximations involved in the comparison of two results, be they experimental or theoretical. Our goal is to lay down the conceptual and (...)
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  33. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion. Logos and Episteme 3:653-658.score: 60.0
    In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.
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  34. Michael J. Shaffer (2011). The Ramsey Principle and The Principle of Informational Equilibrium. The Reasoner 5 (3):37-39.score: 60.0
    This paper challenges the soundness of an argument given in support of a Ramseyan analysis of belief defended by Dokic and Engel in their 2001 book.
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  35. Ronald Laymon (1987). Using Scott Domains to Explicate the Notions of Approximate and Idealized Data. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):194-221.score: 54.0
    This paper utilizes Scott domains (continuous lattices) to provide a mathematical model for the use of idealized and approximately true data in the testing of scientific theories. Key episodes from the history of science can be understood in terms of this model as attempts to demonstrate that theories are monotonic, that is, yield better predictions when fed better or more realistic data. However, as we show, monotonicity and truth of theories are independent notions. A formal description is given of (...)
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  36. Didier Dubois & Henri Prade (1996). New Trends and Open Problems in Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning. Theoria 11 (3):109-121.score: 54.0
    This short paper about fuzzy set-based approximate reasoning first emphasizes the three main semantics for fuzzy sets: similarity, preference and uncertainty. The difference between truth-functional many-valued logics of vague or gradual propositions and non fully compositional calculi such as possibilistic logic (which handles uncertainty) or similarity logics is stressed. Then, potentials of fuzzy set-based reasoning methods are briefly outlined for various kinds of approximate reasoning: deductive reasoning about flexible constraints, reasoning under uncertainty and inconsistency, hypothetical reasoning, exception-tolerant (...)
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  37. Henri Prade (1996). New Trends and Open Problems in Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning. Theoria 11 (3):109-121.score: 54.0
    This short paper about fuzzy set-based approximate reasoning first emphasizes the three main semantics for fuzzy sets: similarity, preference and uncertainty. The difference between truth-functional many-valued logics of vague or gradual propositions and non fully compositional calculi such as possibilistic logic (which handles uncertainty) or similarity logics is stressed. Then, potentials of fuzzy set-based reasoning methods are briefly outlined for various kinds of approximate reasoning: deductive reasoning about flexible constraints, reasoning under uncertainty and inconsistency, hypothetical reasoning, exception-tolerant (...)
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  38. Ernest W. Adams (1982). Approximate Generalizations and Their Idealization. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:199 - 207.score: 54.0
    Aspects of a formal theory of approximate generalizations, according to which they have degrees of truth measurable by the proportions of their instances for which they are true, are discussed. The idealizability of laws in theories of fundamental measurement is considered: given that the laws of these theories are only approximately true "in the real world", does it follow that slight changes in the extensions of their predicates would make them exactly true?
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  39. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. 603--615.score: 50.0
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as compared (...)
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  40. W. Krajewski (1994). Approximative Truth and Depth as the Main Aims of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 160:119-119.score: 50.0
     
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  41. Theo A. F. Kuipers (2005). The Threefold Evaluation of Theories: A Synopsis of From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism. On Some Relations Between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation (2000). Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):23-85.score: 48.0
    Surprisingly enough, modified versions of the confirmation theory of Carnap and Hempel and the truth approximation theory of Popper turn out to be smoothly synthesizable. The glue between confirmation and truth approximation appears to be the instrumentalist methodology, rather than the falsificationist one.By evaluating theories separately and comparatively in terms of their successes and problems (hence even if they are already falsified), the instrumentalist methodology provides – both in theory and in practice – the straight route for short-term (...)
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  42. Gustavo Cevolani & Luca Tambolo (2013). Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach. Erkenntnis 78 (4):921-935.score: 48.0
    In this paper we provide a compact presentation of the verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) and defend it against the sustained attack recently mounted by Alexander Bird (2007). Advocated by such authors as Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers, VS is the view that progress can be explained in terms of the increasing verisimilitude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness, or approximation to the truth) of scientific theories. According to Bird, VS overlooks the central issue of the appropriate grounding of (...)
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  43. Thomas Mormann (2005). Geometry of Logic and Truth Approximation. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):431-454.score: 48.0
    In this paper it is argued that the theory of truth approximation should be pursued in the framework of some kind of geometry of logic. More specifically it is shown that the theory of interval structures provides a general framework for dealing with matters of truth approximation. The qualitative and the quantitative accounts of truthlikeness turn out to be special cases of the interval account. This suggests that there is no principled gap between the qualitative and quantitative approach. (...)
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  44. Theo A. F. Kuipers (2009). Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation by the 'Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method'. Erkenntnis 70 (3):313 - 330.score: 48.0
    Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all (...)
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  45. Theo Kuipers (2011). Basic and Refined Nomic Truth Approximation by Evidence-Guided Belief Revision in AGM-Terms. Erkenntnis 75 (2):223-236.score: 48.0
    Straightforward theory revision, taking into account as effectively as possible the established nomic possibilities and, on their basis induced empirical laws, is conducive for (unstratified) nomic truth approximation. The question this paper asks is: is it possible to reconstruct the relevant theory revision steps, on the basis of incoming evidence, in AGM-terms? A positive answer will be given in two rounds, first for the case in which the initial theory is compatible with the established empirical laws, then for the (...)
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  46. Theo A. F. Kuipers, Theories Looking for Domains. Fact or Fiction? Reversing Structuralist Truth Approximation.score: 48.0
    The structuralist theory of truth approximation essen-tially deals with truth approximation by theory revision for a fixed domain. However, variable domains can also be taken into account, where the main changes concern domain extensions and restrictions. In this paper I will present a coherent set of definitions of “more truth-likeness”, “empirical progress” and “truth approximation” due to a revision of the domain of intended applications. This set of definitions seems to be the natural counterpart of the (...)
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  47. Theo A. F. Kuipers (2005). Toward a Geometrical Theory of Truth Approximation: Reply to Thomas Mormann. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):455-457.score: 48.0
    This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for generalizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation. It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is, genuine empirical progress as well as observational, referential and (...)
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  48. Roberto Festa, Atocha Aliseda & Jeanne Peijnenburg (eds.) (2005). Confirmation, Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. Rodopi.score: 48.0
    Theo AF Kuipers THE THREEFOLD EVALUATION OF THEORIES A SYNOPSIS OF FROM INSTRUMENTALISM TO CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM. ON SOME RELATIONS BETWEEN CONFIRMATION, EMPIRICAL PROGRESS, AND TRUTH APPROXIMATION (2000) ABSTRACT.
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  49. Theo A. F. Kuipers (2001). Epistemological Positions in the Light of Truth Approximation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:79-88.score: 48.0
    I sketch the most important epistemological positions in the instrumentalism-realism debate, viz., instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, referential realism, and theory realism. I order them according to their answers to a number of successive leading questions, where every next question presupposes an affirmative answer to the foregoing one. I include the answer to questions concerning truth, as well as the most plausible answer to questions concerning truth approximation. Restricting my survey to the natural sciences and hence to the natural world, (...)
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  50. L. A. Zadeh (1975). Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning. Synthese 30 (3-4):407-428.score: 42.0
    The term fuzzy logic is used in this paper to describe an imprecise logical system, FL, in which the truth-values are fuzzy subsets of the unit interval with linguistic labels such as true, false, not true, very true, quite true, not very true and not very false, etc. The truth-value set, , of FL is assumed to be generated by a context-free grammar, with a semantic rule providing a means of computing the meaning of each linguistic truth-value (...)
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