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Profile: Ari Maunu (University of Turku)
  1. Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu & Tuomo Aho (2009). Modal Logic From Kant to Possible Worlds Semantics. In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter begins with a discussion of Kant's theory of judgment-forms. It argues that it is not true in Kant's logic that assertoric or apodeictic judgments imply problematic ones, in the manner in which necessity and truth imply possibility in even the weakest systems of modern modal logic. The chapter then discusses theories of judgment-form after Kant, the theory of quantification, Frege's Begriffsschrift, C. I. Lewis and the beginnings of modern modal logic, the proof-theoretic approach to modal logic, possible world (...)
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  2. Ari Maunu (2008). Leibniz's Theory of Universal Expression Explicated. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):247-267.
    According Leibniz's thesis of universal expression, each substance expresses the whole world, i.e. all other substances, or, as Leibniz frequently states, from any given complete individual notion (which includes, in internal terms, everything truly attributable to a substance) one can "deduce" or "infer" all truths about the whole world. On the other hand, in Leibniz's view each (created) substance is internally individuated, self-sufficient and independent of other (created) substances. What may be called Leibniz's expression problem is, how to reconcile these (...)
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  3. Ari Maunu (2006). Alethic Statements Are Not Intensional. Teorema 25 (3):53-61.
    According to the standard view, alethic (or modal) statements are intensional in that the Principle of Substitution (PS) fails for them -- e.g. substituting 'nine' in "Necessarily, nine is composite" with the co-referring 'the number of planets' turns this statement from true to false. It is argued in the paper that we could avoid ascribing intensionality to alethic statements altogether by separating between singular and functional uses of definite descriptions: on the singular use the description given above amounts to 'the (...)
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  4. Ari Maunu (2006). Some Fregean Considerations on Predicates and Their Reference. Tabula Rasa 25.
    The aim of this paper is (i) to defend Frege's view that the referents of predicates are certain kinds of functions, or "concepts", i.e. incomplete entities, and not their extensions (i.e. sets of objects described by those predicates); and (ii) to justify, by a natural augmentation of Frege's semantic theory with modal ingredients, Frege's position that the sameness between concepts, or property-sharing, turns only on the sameness of extensions. Several problems with the doctrine that a predicate's extension is its referent (...)
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  5. Pavel Materna, Ari Maunu, Generalist Transworld Identitism & Decio Krause (2005). Max Cresswell, Even Modal Realists Should Do the Best They Can 3 Leon Horsten, Remarks on the Content and Extension of the Notion of Provability 15 Marcel Crabbé, Une Élimination Des Coupures Ne Tolérant. [REVIEW] Logique Et Analyse 48.
     
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  6. Ari Maunu (2005). Generalist Transworld Identitism (or, Identity Through Possible Worlds Without Nonqualitative Thisnesses). Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):151-158.
    A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there are (...)
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  7. Ari Maunu (2004). Extrinsic Denominations and Universal Expression in Leibniz. Dialogue 43 (1):83-97.
    The paper discusses Leibniz's theory of denominations, expression, and individual notions, the central claim being that the key to many of Leibniz's fundamental theses is to consider his argument, starting from his predicate-in-subject account of truth (that in a true statement the notion of the predicate is contained in that of the subject), against purely extrinsic denominations: this argument shows why there is an internal foundation for all denominations, why everything in the world is interconnected, why each substance expresses all (...)
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  8. Ari Maunu (2004). Leibnizian Soft Reduction of Extrinsic Denominations and Relations. Synthese 139 (1):143-164.
    Leibniz, it seems, wishes to reduce statements involving relations or extrinsic denominations to ones solely in terms of individual accidents or, respectively, intrinsic denominations. His reasons for this appear to be that relations are merely mental things (since they cannot be individual accidents) and that extrinsic denominations do not represent substances as they are on their own. Three interpretations of Leibniz''s reductionism may be distinguished: First, he allowed only monadic predicates in reducing statements (hard reductionism); second, he allowed also `implicitly (...)
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  9. Ari Maunu (2003). No Belief Is Contingently True. Auslegung 26 (2):67-75.
    It is commonly held, plausibly, that many true beliefs are true only contingently, that is, are actually true (or true with respect to the actual world) but would be false were the world in some relevant ways otherwise (i.e. are false with respect to some other possible worlds). However, a radically different approach, according to which no belief is contingently true, is entirely defensible. The key point in this alternative approach is that each belief concerns the world in which the (...)
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  10. Ari Maunu (2002). A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity. Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421.
    It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered.
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  11. Ari Maunu (2002). Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions. Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with his notion of thought -- (...)
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  12. Ari Maunu (2002). Indiscernibility of Identicals and Substitutivity in Leibniz. History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):367-380.
    It is shown that typical arguments from intensionality against the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals (InI) misconstrue this principle, confusing it with the Principle of Substitution (PS). It has been proposed that Leibniz, in his statements like, "If A is the same as B, then A can be substituted for B, salva veritate, in any proposition", is not applying InI to objects nor PS to signs, but is talking about substitution of concepts in propositions, or applying InI to concepts. It (...)
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  13. Ari Maunu (2002). Natural Kind Terms Are Similar to Proper Names in Being World-Independent. Philosophical Writings 19:51-68.
    According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names (and indexicals) and natural kind terms are semantically similar to each other but crucially different from definite descriptions and “ordinary” predicates, respectively. New Theorists say that a name, unlike a definite description, is a directly referential nondescriptional rigid designator, which refers “without a mediation of the content” and is not functional (i.e. lacks a Carnapian intension). Natural kind terms, such as ‘horse’ and ‘water’, are held to have similar distinctions, in contrast (...)
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  14. Ari Maunu, Tamara Zutlevics & Experience Machine (2002). Critical Study. Philosophia 29.
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  15. A. Consequence To Substitutivity & Ari Maunu (2002). A Problem with de Re Belief Ascriptions. Philosophia 29:411.
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  16. Ari Maunu (2000). A Simple Solution to the Problem of De Se Belief Ascriptions. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):199-226.
    I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' ('she herself', (...)
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  17. Ari Maunu (1999). Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will. Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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