Online research in philosophy

Engineering science is a scientific discipline that from the point of view of epistemology and the philosophy of science has been somewhat neglected. When engineering science was under philosophical scrutiny it often just involved the question of whether engineering is a spin-off of pure and applied science and their methods. We, however, hold that engineering is a science governed by its own epistemology, methodology and ontology. This point is systematically argued by comparing the different sciences with respect to a particular (...) set of characterization criteria. (shrink)

In this study we argue that there is an interconnection between; the mechanistic worldview and competition, and the organic worldview and cooperation. To illustrate our main thesis we introduce two cases; first, Max Havelaar, a paradigmatic case of how business might function in an economy based upon solidarity and sustainability. Second, TINE, a Norwegian grocery corporation engaged in collusion in order to force a small competitor out of the market. On the one hand, in order to encourage market behaviour (...) that integrates economic, societal and environmental values we find that transparent cooperation within a context of an organic worldview takes care of important intrinsic as well as instrumental values. On the other hand, we find evidence for asserting that cooperation based upon a mechanistic worldview, typically leads to group egotistical consequences undermining the long term common good. (shrink)

A survey of recent research reveals that there is a growing interest in knowledge regarding the opinions and attitudes toward ethics amongst business school faculty members. Based on an empirical study conducted in Norway we address the following issue: “What do faculty members of the Norwegian Business Schools consider to be their responsibilities in preparing their students for leading positions in public and private organizations?” Moving on to interpreting the results from the survey, we discuss the empirical findings by comparing (...) the data using four different theoretical perspectives; neo-classical economics, strategic management, corporate social responsibility and socio-economics. The implications are highlighted. (shrink)

I try to convince the reader that we all too often consider our decisions more or less unreasonable – and due to emotions overpowering reason. The dualism: reason/emotion may be dangerously misleading. Psychoanalysis may be said to have been the first systematic effort to help us find the real reasons for our important decisions and views. Personal maturity involves both strength of emotions and clearness of thinking.

There is no doubt that Spinoza values what he calls living under the guidance of reason, and that he somehow equates such a life with happiness. What is less clear is exactly how he conceives of such a life, and thus how he conceives of human happiness. According to Arne Naess's interpretation of Spinoza, the virtuous and free person will prefer the life of action, and happiness is best realised through living an active life “in the world”. Other scholars, (...) however, have interpreted Spinoza as suggesting that the maximally free person will prefer a life of contemplation “outside the world”. In this paper, I address Naess's relationship with this aspect of Spinoza's practical philosophy, and propose my own interpretation of Spinoza where happiness, or living under the guidance of reason, consists in a combination of activity and contemplation. (shrink)

According to Arne Naess, his environmental philosophy is influenced by the philosophy of language called empirical semantics, which he first developed in the 1930s as a participant in the seminars of the Vienna Circle. While no one denies his claim, most of his commentators defend views about his environmental philosophy that contradict the tenets of his semantics. In particular, they argue that he holds that deep ecology’s supporters share a world view, and that the movement’s platform articulates shared principles. (...) Naess, however, rejects this conception of deep ecology, and, moreover, he is compelled to do so because of his long-standing views on semantics. Naess’s semantics thus poses a particularly difficult problem for the first group of theorists who endorsed Naess. (shrink)

While much of Arne Naess’s ecosophy underscores the importance of understanding one’s ecological Self, his analyses of gestaltism are significant in that they center less on questions of the self than on questions of nature and what is other-than-human. Rather than the realization of a more expansive Self, gestalt ontology calls for a “gestalt shift” in our thinking about nature, one that allows for its intrinsic value to emerge clearly. Taking such a gestalt shift as a central task enables (...) Naess to avoid some common criticisms of his view. (shrink)

Arne Johan Vetlesen argues that to do evil is to intentionally inflict pain on another human being, against his or her will, and cause serious and foreseeable harm. Vetlesen investigates why and in what sort of circumstances such a desire arises, and how it is channeled, or exploited, into collective evildoing. He argues that such evildoing, pitting whole groups against each other, springs from a combination of character, situation, and social structure. Vetlesen shows how closely perpetrators, victims, and (...) bystanders interact, and how aspects of human agency are recognized, denied, and projected by different agents. (shrink)

Ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion. There are deeper concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness.

Some three score years ago, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess found himself dissatisfied with “what are called ‘theories of truth’ in philosophical literature.” “The discussion has already lasted some 2500 years,” he wrote. “The number of participants amounts to a thousand, and the number of articles and books devoted to the discussion is much greater.” In this great ocean of words, he went on, the philosophers had often made bold statements about what “the man in the street” or “Das (...) Volk” or “la conscience humaine” made of truth or Wahrheit or vérité. And Naess had a few simple questions about these claims: “How do the philosophers know these things? What is the source of their knowledge? What have they done to arrive at it? … their writings,” he complained, “contain almost nothing of this matter.”1 And so Naess began the research that resulted in the publication in 1938 of his first book in English: “Truth” As Conceived By Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. (shrink)

Though there exists a vast literature dealing with Hannah Arendt's thoughts on evil in general and Adolf Eichmann in particular, few attempts have been made to assess Arendt's position on evil by tracing its connection with her reflections on conscience. This essay examines the nature and significance of such a connection. Beginning with her doctoral dissertation on St Augustine and ending with her posthumously published studies in The Life of the Mind, Arendt's oeuvre exhibits strong thematic continuity: the triad thinking-conscience-evil (...) forms its most enduring core. A puzzling core, to be sure, considering the controversies triggered, especially regarding her notion of the 'banality of evil'. By placing the role of conscience at the very center of Arendt's lifelong reflections, this essay explores the - in many ways related - influence exerted by St Augustine and Heidegger. Heidegger's conception of conscience in Sein und Zeit is identified as a crucial source for understanding - so the claim holds - why Arendt found Heidegger's philosophy particularly wanting as regards the question of evil. Key Words: Arendt • Augustine • conscience • evil • Heidegger • Socrates • thinking. (shrink)

This is the first book to explore the cognitive science of effortless attention and action. Attention and action are generally understood to require effort, and the expectation is that under normal circumstances effort increases to meet rising demand. Sometimes, however, attention and action seem to flow effortlessly despite high demand. Effortless attention and action have been documented across a range of normal activities--from rock climbing to chess playing--and yet fundamental questions about the cognitive science of effortlessness have gone largely unasked. (...) -/- This book draws from the disciplines of cognitive psychology, neurophysiology, behavioral psychology, genetics, philosophy, and cross-cultural studies. Starting from the premise that the phenomena of effortless attention and action provide an opportunity to test current models of attention and action, leading researchers from around the world examine topics including effort as a cognitive resource, the role of effort in decision making, the neurophysiology of effortless attention and action, the role of automaticity in effortless action, expert performance in effortless action, and the neurophysiology and benefits of attentional training. -/- Contributors: Joshua M. Ackerman, James H. Austin, John A. Bargh, Roy F. Baumeister, Sian L. Beilock, Chris Blais, Matthew M. Botvinick, Brian Bruya, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Marci S. DeCaro, Arne Dietrich, Yuri Dormashev, László Harmat, Bernhard Hommel, Rebecca Lewthwaite, Örjan de Manzano, Joseph T. McGuire, Brian P. Meier, Arlen C. Moller, Jeanne Nakamura, Evgeny N. Osin, Michael I. Posner, Mary K. Rothbart, M. R. Rueda, Brandon J. Schmeichel, Edward Slingerland, Oliver Stoll, Yiyuan Tang, Töres Theorell, Fredrik Ullén, Robert D. Wall, Gabriele Wulf. (shrink)

There is an international deep ecology social movement with key terms, slogans, and rhetorical use of language comparable to what we find in other activist “alternative” movements today. Some supporters of the movement partake in academic philosophy and have developed or at least suggested philosophies, “ecosophies,” inspired by the movement. R. A. Watson does not distinguish sufficiently between the movement and the philosophical expressions with academic pretensions. As a result, he falsely concludes that deep ecology implies setting man apart from (...) nature-a kind of “anthropocentrism” in his terminology: humans and only humans have no right to interfere with natural processes. What the deep ecology movement insists on is rather that life on Earth has intrinsic value and that human behavior should and must change drastically-and soon. (shrink)

Confronted with Adolf Eichmann, evildoer par excellence, Hannah Arendt sought in vain for any 'depth' to the evil he had wrought. How is the philosopher to approach evil ? Is the celebrated criterion of impartiality ill-equipped to guide judgment when its object is evil - as exhibited, for instance, in the recent genocide in Bosnia? This essay questions the ability of the neutral 'third party' to respond adequately to evil from a standpoint of avowed impartiality. Discussing the different roles of (...) perpetrator and victim, I argue that in any knowledge about evil the victim is the supremely privileged source; this being so, the non-party to the occurrence of evil must privilege the testimony of the victimized - even at the cost of strict impartiality of moral judgment. Key Words: Arendt • evil • genocide • Goldhagen • impartiality • judgment • Kant • Levinas. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss an approach called grounded action cognition , which aims to provide a theory of the interdependencies between motor control and action-related cognitive processes, like perceiving an action or thinking about an action. The theory contrasts with traditional views in cognitive science in that it motivates an understanding of cognition as embodied , through application of Barsalou’s general idea of grounded cognition . To guide further research towards an appropriate theory of grounded action cognition we distinguish (...) between grounding qua acquisition and grounding qua constitution. On this basis, we distinguish three possible theoretical conceptions of grounded action cognition. In addition to these methodological and conceptual analyses, we draw on recent empirical evidence to motivate our inclination towards a particular theory. According to this theory certain representations are involved in action cognition and action perception that are not modality-specific as usually proposed by advocates of grounded cognition. Further, the evidence is in favor of our more specific theory stating that for some cognitive abilities, some motor abilites are constitutive. (shrink)

An active ethically conscious consumer has been acclaimed as the new hero and hope for an ethically improved capitalism. Through consumers’ “voting” at the checkout, corporations are supposed to be held accountable for their conduct. In the literature on political consumerism, this has mainly been approached as political participation and governance. In this article, we do a critical review of this literature. We do so by questioning the existence of what we call a “generic active consumer model.” At the core (...) of this position, there is a belief that the active consumer is a universal entity, available across nations and time. Instead we call for an approach that takes accord of the ways consumers and consumer roles are framed in interactive processes in markets, governance structures, and everyday life. Consumers in different countries assess their responsibilities and their powers as consumers differently due to different institutionalizations within distinctive contexts. We also must take into account how the inertia of ordinary consumption and the moral complexities of everyday life restrict the adoption of an active consumerist role. Hence, the debate on political consumerism should make for a more realistic notion of ethical consumer-sovereignty and its role in improving the workings of capitalism. In our view, these findings have severe implications for understanding both theories of political consumption and the dynamics of political consumption per se. (shrink)

: This essay examines the content and significance of the notion of "identification" as it appears in the works of theorists of deep ecology. It starts with the most frequently expressed conception of identification—termed "identification-as-belonging"—and distinguishes several different variants of it. After reviewing two criticisms of deep ecology that appear to target this notion, it is argued that there is a second, less frequently noticed type of identification that appears primarily in the work of Arne Naess—"identification-as-kinship." Following this analysis, (...) it is suggested that identification-as-kinship may be less vulnerable to the criticisms that are aimed at identification-as-belonging. (shrink)

Michael S. Gazzaniga, a pioneer and world leader in cognitive neuroscience, has made an initial attempt to develop neuroethics into a brain-based philosophy of life that he hopes will replace the irrational religious and political belief-systems that still partly govern modern societies. This article critically examines Gazzaniga’s proposal and shows that his actual moral arguments have little to do with neuroscience. Instead, they are based on unexamined political, cultural and moral conceptions, narratives and values. A more promising way of interpreting (...) the belief-forming system of the brain is to say that we cannot avoid thinking in terms of wider frameworks and narratives that are socially embedded and historically developed; consequently, any moral discussion has to be in terms of these frameworks and narratives. (shrink)

The paper assumes as a general abstract norm that the specific potentialities of living beings be fulfilled. No being has a priority in principle in the realizing of its possibilities, but norms of increasing diversity or richness of potentialities put limits on the development of destructive life-styles. Application is made to the mixed Norwegian communities of certain mammals and humans. A kind of modus vivendi is established which is firmly based on cultural tradition. It is fairly unimportant whether the term (...) 'rights (of animals)' is or is not used in the fight for human peaceful coexistence with a rich fauna. (shrink)

Though doubtless two of the leading philosophers in ethics today, Habermas and Levinas have yet to be subjected to sys tematic comparison. This essay undertakes a first step. Differences of terminology aside, Habermas and Levinas can be seen to pursue, via separate routes, a similar core idea. I term this the idea of immanent normativity. While Habermas locates an unchosen normative pull in the medium of interpersonal communication, Levinas locates an unconditional ethical command in the Other as face. Hence they (...) unite in strongly opposing social contract theory's notion of moral ity as optional and of responsibility as conditional upon self-interest. Key Words: contractualism • Habermas • Levinas • vulnerability. (shrink)

The sheer complexity of Spinoza's thinking makes it impossible for any movement to use him as a patron. But philosophically engaged ecologists and environmentalists may find in his system an inexhaustible source of inspiration. This holds good even if he was personally a ?speciesist? and uninterested in animals or landscapes. Underestimation of his potential help is due to a variety of factors: failure to pay enough attention to the structure of his system, belief in its close resemblance to that of (...) Hobbes, and interpretation of ?understanding love of God? as a contemplative, general attitude incompatible with environmentalist activism and interest in every living being. The system of Spinoza is compatible with activism ? like that of Jan de Witt ? and with respect for all things as ?expressions of the power of God or Nature? (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to improve on the logical and measure-theoretic foundations for the notion of probability in the law of evidence, which were given in my contributions Åqvist [ (1990) Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989). Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, pp 43–54; (1992) Towards a logical theory of legal evidence: semantic analysis (...) of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Martino AA (ed) Expert systems in law. Elsevier Science Publishers BV, Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp 67–86]. The present approach agrees with the one adopted in those contributions in taking its main task to be that of providing a semantic analysis, or explication, of the so called Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength (“proof-strength”) as applied to the establishment of matters of fact in law-courts. However, it differs from the one advocated in our earlier work on the subject in explicitly appealing to what is known as “Pro-et-Contra Argumentation”, after the famous Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. It tries to bring out the logical form of that interesting kind of reasoning, at least in the context of the law of evidence. The formal techniques used here will be seen to be largely inspired by the important work done by Patrick Suppes, notably Suppes [(1957) Introduction to logic. van Nostrand, Princeton and (1972) Finite equal-interval measurement structures. Theoria 38:45–63]. (shrink)

Arne Naess's ?rules of Gandhian nonviolence? might usefully be applied to recent debates in ecophilosophy. The ?radical ecologies? have increasingly been depicted as mutually exclusive alternatives lacking any common ground, and many of the hostile and antagonistic attitudes that Naess cautions against have become prevalent. Naess suggests, however, that fundamental differences concerning theory and practice can coexist with a respect for one's opponents, an openness to the views of others, and a commitment to cooperation in the pursuit of mutually (...) held goals. I raise questions about the scope of deep ecology in the light of Naess's non?ideological, ?deep questioning? approach. First, I ask whether an expanded consideration of the social institutional implications of deep ecology would not increase its depth, relevance, and appeal to proponents of other ecologies. Second, I pose the question of whether certain tendencies to define deep ecology in stark opposition to other ecophilosophies have not impeded the original aims of the movement. And, finally, I suggest that possible answers to these questions are implicit in Arne Naess's ecophilosophy. (shrink)

A brief account is given of Pyrrhonian scepticism, as portrayed by Sextus Empiricus. This scepticism differs significantly from the views commonly attributed to 'the sceptic' which take scepticism to be a view or philosophical position to the effect that there can be no knowledge. The Pyrrhonist makes no philosophical assertions, because he does not find the arguments in favor of any position to be decisively stronger than the arguments against. Objections to scepticism, for instance that the sceptic cannot consistently show (...) trust and confidence, that he must ignore the obvious achievements of science, and that he cannot distinguish between appearance and reality, are found to be indecisive in the case of Pyrrhonism. After submitting Pyrrhonism to criteria of positive mental health, the author concludes by suggesting there are cases where a sceptical bent of mind should be encouraged. (shrink)

Recent cases in retailing reflect that ethics have a major impact on brands and performance, in turn, demonstrating that brand owners, employees, and consumers focus on ethical values. In this study, we analyze how various sources of social power affect corporate ethical values, retailer’s commitment to the retail organization, and ultimately sales and service quality. Multi-source data based on a sample of 225 retailers indicated a strong link between power, ethics, and commitment and that these affected output performance.

The etymological origin of ecology in the human house is the point of departure of this article. It argues that oikos is not merely a vague metaphor for ecology, but that built households provide a key to understanding the household of nature. Three households support this claim: the cabins of Henry Thoreau, Aldo Leopold and Arne Noess. The article suggests that their views on the household of nature stand in direct relationship with their respective homes. They also have a (...) distant epistemological bird's-eye view of nature seen from homes which were located - symbolically or in reality - on a mountain top. (shrink)

Arne Naess has come under many influences, most notably Gandhi and Spinoza. The Buddhist influence on his work, though less pervasive, provides the most direct account of key deep ecological concepts such as Self?realization and intrinsic value. I read Ecosophy T as a rigorously phenomenological branch of Deep Ecology. like early Buddhism, Naess responds to the human suffering that causes environmental destruction by challenging us to return to the reality of lived experience. This Buddhist reading clarifies, but it also (...) complicates. It reaffirms Naess's essential vision, but it challenges him at two points: first, to affirm that Self?realization is a process of co?realization with all beings, not just with sentient beings. Second, while this reading accepts that humans do not create the value of nature, it questions whether its value is best expressed in terms of the ?intrinsic value? of radical environmental ethicists. (shrink)

In his Guide to the Lakes (1810, 1835), the English Romantic poet William Wordsworth used the word 'nature' in two senses. Sometimes it denoted a holistic ideal, in the manner of metaphysicians, and sometimes a concrete landscape of discrete things, in the manner of natural scientists. The Guide to the Lakes thus marks a watershed in Western philosophy of nature. Although chronologically the ideal preceded the concrete landscape, conceptually the concrete landscape precedes the ideal, much as in Nietzsche's 'fiction of (...) causation'. (shrink)

In the late forties and in the fifties, what was then known as the Oslo School of Philosophy, that is, Arne Naess and his students, received some fame, or notoriety, for its empirical investigations of lay uses of various epistemological terms, such as 'true', 'certain', 'probable'. It is less known that Arne Naess, in 1953, opened up a series of investigations into conceptual frameworks, the comparability of conceptual frameworks, and the senses, if any, in which a conceptual framework (...) can be said to represent knowledge. In the course of these investigations Arne Naess, together with some of his students, developed views that are strikingly close to those of Ludwig Wittgenstein in ber Gewissheit. This paper examines some of those similarities and a few dissimilarities. (shrink)

We analyse three moral dilemmas involving resource allocation in care for HIV-positive patients. Ole Norheim and Kjell Arne Johansson have argued that these cases reveal a tension between egalitarian concerns and concerns for better population health. We argue, by contrast, that these cases reveal a tension between, on the one hand, a concern for equal *chances*, and, on the other hand, both a concern for better health and an egalitarian concern for equal *outcomes*. We conclude that, in these cases, (...) there is much less tension than Norheim and Johansson claim between egalitarian concerns and concerns for better population health. (shrink)

Peter Reed has defended the basis for an environmental ethic based upon feelings of awe for nature together with an existentialist absolute gulf between humans and nature. In so doing, he has claimed that there are serious difficulties with Ecosophy T and the terms, Self-realization and identification with nature. I distinguish between discussions of ultimate norms and the penultimate deep ecology platform. I also clarify and defend a technical use of identification and attempt to show that awe and identification may (...) be compatible concepts. (shrink)

The article comprises a conceptual framework to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of a global health convention. The analyses are inspired by Lawrence Gostin's suggested Framework Convention on Global Health. The analytical model takes a starting-point in events tentatively following a logic sequence: Input (global health funding), Processes (coordination, cooperation, accountability, allocation of aid), Output (definition of basic survival needs), Outcome (access to health services), and Impact (health for all). It then examines to what degree binding international regulations can create (...) order in such a sequence of events. We conclude that a global health convention could be an appropriate instrument to deal with some of the problems of global health. We also show that some of the tasks preceding a convention approach might be to muster international support for supra-national health regulations, negotiate compromises between existing stakeholders in the global health arena, and to utilize WHO as a platform for further discussions on a global health convention. (shrink)

Recent global advances in available technology to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission necessitate a rethinking of contemporary and previous ethical debates on HIV testing as a means to preventing vertical transmission. In this paper, we will provide an ethical analysis of HIV-testing strategies of pregnant women. First, we argue that provider-initiated opt-out HIV testing seems to be the most effective HIV test strategy. The flip-side of an opt-out strategy is that it may end up as involuntary testing in a clinical setting. (...) We analyse this ethical puzzle from a novel perspective, taking into account the moral importance of certain hypothetical preferences of the child, as well as the moral importance of certain actual preferences of the mother. Finally, we balance the conflicting concerns and try to arrive at an ethically sound solution to this dilemma. Our aim is to introduce a novel perspective from which to analyse testing strategies, and to explore the implications and possible benefits of our proposal. The conclusion from our analysis is that policies that recommend provider-initiated opt-out HIV testing of pregnant mothers, with a risk of becoming involuntary testing in a clinical setting, are acceptable. The rationale behind this is that the increased availability of very effective and inexpensive life-saving drugs makes the ethical problems raised by the possible intrusiveness of HIV testing less important than the child's hypothetical preferences to be born healthy. Health care providers, therefore, have a duty to offer both opt-out HIV testing and available PMTCT (preventing mother-to-child transmission) interventions. (shrink)

J. Baird Callicott has thrown down the gauntlet once again in the monism?pluralism debate in environmental ethics. In a recent article he argues that his ?communitarianism? (combined with a limited intertheoretic pluralism) is sufficient to get the advantages of pluralism advocated by his critics, while at the same time retaining the framework of moral monism. Callicott's attempt to set the record straight on the monism?pluralism debate has once again derailed us from answering the most important question in this discussion: how (...) do we achieve a compatibilism among ethical theories which will inform better environmental practices? But if Callicott got it wrong, then who is getting it right? Arne Naess, whose work has heretofore been excluded from the mainstream discussion of this issue, has all along understood the heart of the monism?pluralism question. This paper updates the current state of the monism?pluralism debate, provides an answer to Callicott's latest challenge, and advances the thesis that all involved in this argument would do well to take a look at what Naess has to say on this issue. (shrink)

In this article the question is raised whether philosophers, studying Humean problems, might profit from the empirical findings of contemporary psychology. A text from Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is analyzed in an attempt to find out (1) whether his problems are open to empirical testing. Each sentence in the text is classified into normative, declarative, analytic and synthetic. A prevalence of declarative, synthetic sentences is found. Further, the question is examined (2) whether contemporary empirical psychology has contributed to the (...) testing of Hume's hypotheses. The answer is affirmative for some of the statements, and it is suggested that philosophical discussions around these problems should not be carried out as if psychological research were irrelevant. (shrink)

The fact that Oswald T. Avery (1877-1955) did not become a Nobel Laureate for his discovery of DNA as the genetic material has frequently been cited as a prime example of a mistake made in the awarding of the Nobel Prizes. The late Nobel Laureate Arne Tiselius explained the oversight away by saying that Avery "was an old man when he made his discovery" (Litell 1967)—although Avery was actually younger than several others who won the Nobel Prize around the (...) same time. Later, in somewhat of a contradiction, Tiselius said that Avery was the most deserving scientist not to have received the Nobel Prize for his work (Judson 2003).The opening of the Nobel archives 50 years after Avery's name was cited gives insights into .. (shrink)

This article analyses the influence of Hinduism on Ecosophy T. Arne Naess in several of his environmental writings quotes verse 6.29 of the Bhagavadgit?, a Hindu sacred text. The verse is understood to illustrate the close relationship between the ideas of oneness of all living beings, non?injury and self?realization. The article compares the interpretations of the verse of some of the most important Hindu commentators on the Bhagavadgit? with the environmentalist interpretation. There is no agreement in the history of (...) the Hindu tradition on the meaning of the verse. The interpretation of Ecosophy T contrasts sharply with the interpretations of the Hindu monastic traditions but has similarities with the twentieth?century social activist interpretations of Mohandas K. Gandhi and S. Radhakrishnan. In Ecosophy T aspects of this social activist version of Hinduism have been creatively reinterpreted in the context of contemporary environmentalism. (shrink)

A set of basic static predicates, ?in itself, ?existing through itself, ?free?, and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and ? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (...) (?α?????) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, ?The road to freedom through active emotion?, introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including ?being in itself, ?freedom?, etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems. (shrink)

Recent cases in retailing reflect that ethics have a major impact on brands and performance, in turn, demonstrating that brand owners, employees, and consumers focus on ethical values. In this study, we analyze how various sources of social power affect corporate ethical values, retailer’s commitment to the retail organization, and ultimately sales and service quality. Multi-source data based on a sample of 225 retailers indicated a strong link between power, ethics, and commitment and that these affected output performance.

An attempt is made to find a coherent verbal expression of the intuition that reality is a manifold of more or less comprehensive wholes (gestalts), all discernible in terms of qualities. Quantitative natural science is thought to describe abstract structures of reality, not contents. The qualities are neither subjective nor objective, they belong to concrete contents with structures comprising at least three abstract relata: object, subject, and medium. Their status is that of entia rationis, not content of reality. Recent developments (...) in physics suggest that we shall look in vain for physical ?things? of which reality is composed. Adequate expressions of concrete contents form designations rather than declarative sentences. They may obviously contain value terms. The attempt to formulate an ontology along the suggested lines seems to be closely related to phenomenology of a Heideggerian rather than Cartesian kind. It serves the endeavour to change the conception of the man?nature relationship. (shrink)

There is nothing, either in the recent developments of philosophy or in the development of the sciences, which should prevent philosophy from continuing its role of mother-science and the sciences from influencing methods and conclusions of philosophers. The inquiring mind respects no boundaries between disciplines except those which are imposed by differences in questions raised. But basic questions, whether raised by philosophers or by scientists, tend to have components requiring co-ordination of research or analysis of highly different disciplines. Both Anglo-Saxon (...) and continental developments in philosophy justify, however, a distinction between cultivating philosophy and being engaged in solving or resolving a philosophical problem, the former comprising the latter. (shrink)

Ethical guidelines for psychologists are meant to stimulate and help psychologists to act appropriately with respect to clients, colleagues, and other individuals involved in their professional relations. This paper focuses on the similarity of codes of ethics of psychologists in European countries in general, and on specific ethical dilemmas in the area of work and organizations in particular. First, an overview is given of the development of ethical guidelines in Europe and the USA. Second, the results are presented of a (...) survey by E-mail amongst members of the European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations (EFPA) to identify the differences and similarities between ethical guidelines of the affiliate members. Third, the potential dilemmas of stakeholders in work and organizational assessment are addressed. Finally, the results of a survey among Dutch selection psychologists are presented. The purpose of this study was to examine a possible tension between normative behavior and attitudes about normal behavior. It was concluded that ethical guidelines of European countries cover comparable (sub-)principles and that there are indications that individual psychologists agree with the written principles. In addition, suggestions for future research are given. (shrink)

Arne Naess and Paul Taylor are two of the most forceful proponents of the principle of species equality. Problematically, both, when adjudicating conflict of interest cases, resort to employing explicit or implicit species-ranking arguments. I examine how Lawrence Johnson’s critical, species-ranking approach helpfully avoids the normative inconsistencies of “biospherical egalitarianism.” Many assume species-ranking schemes are rooted in arrogant, ontological claims about human, primate, or mammalian superiority. Species-ranking, I believe, is best viewed as a justified articulation of moral priorities in (...) response to individuals’ or entities’ relative ranges of vulnerability and need, rooted in their relative ranges of capacities and interests. (shrink)

The word 'sceptic' usually refers to a theoretical figure whose philosophical importance lies exclusively in his challenge to any attempt to justify the belief in the possibility of knowledge. But the label was once applied to living persons - the so-called Pyrrhonists - whose scepticism encompassed a way of life. Following Sextus Empiricus's portrayal of the Pyrrhonists, Arne Naess has provided comprehensive arguments both in rebuttal of the frequent claims either that scepticism is logically inconsistent or that at least (...) it is impossible to put into practice, and in support of scepticism as a fruitful philosophical attitude. The present essay attempts a critical consolidation of Naess's case for scepticism by drawing more explicitly than he does on his work in empirical semantics. The notion of degrees of preciseness is used to outline a philosophically interesting rationale for the Pyrrhonist's persistent abstention from any act or action that commits him to the truth of a proposition, and also to indicate why possible, or even inevitable lapses on the Pyrrhonist's part need not seriously prejudice either his status as a sceptic or the philosophical value of his sceptical ideal. (shrink)