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  1. Paul Bohan Broderick, Johannes Lenhard & Arnold Silverberg (2006). Dispositional Versus Epistemic Causality. Minds and Machines 16 (3).
    Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...)
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  2. Arnold Silverberg (2006). Chomsky and Egan on Computational Theories of Vision. Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.
    Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr.
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  3. Arnold Silverberg (2003). Psychological Laws. Erkenntnis 58 (3):275-302.
    John McDowell claims that the propositional attitudes, and our conceptual abilities in general, are not appropriate topics for inquiry of the sort that is done in natural science. He characterizes the natural sciences as making phenomena intelligible in terms of their place in the realm of laws of nature. He claims that this way of making phenomena intelligible contrasts crucially with essential features of our understanding of propositional attitudes and conceptual abilities. In this article I show that scientific work of (...)
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  4. Arnold Silverberg (1996). Psychological Laws and Nonmonotonic Logic. Erkenntnis 44 (2):199-224.
    In this essay I enter into a recently published debate between Stephen Schiffer and Jerry Fodor concerning whether adequate sense can be made of the ceteris paribus conditions in special science laws, much of their focus being on the case of putative psychological laws. Schiffer argues that adequate sense cannot be made of ceteris paribus clauses, while Fodor attempts to overcome Schiffer's arguments, in defense of special science laws. More recently, Peter Mott has attempted to show that Fodor's response to (...)
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  5. Arnold Silverberg (1995). Narrow Content: A Defense. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-27.
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  6. Arnold Silverberg (1995). Narrow Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-127.
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  7. Arnold Silverberg (1994). Meaning Holism and Intentional Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):29-53.
    In this essay I defend meaning holism against certain criticisms that Jerry Fodor has presented against it. In "Psychosemantics" he argued that meaning holism is incompatible with the development of scientific psychology given the ways in which scientific psychology adverts to intentional content. In his recent book "Holism" (co-authored with Ernest Lepore) he indicates that he still upholds this argument. I argue that Fodor's argument fails, and argue in favor of the compatibility of meaning holism with scientific psychology. I also (...)
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  8. Arnold Silverberg (1992). Putnam on Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):111-31.
  9. Arnold Silverberg (1984). Review: Charles Chihara, The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation; Tyler Burge, Semantical Paradox. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (3):995-996.
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