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  1. Arthur B. Cody (2002). Words, You, and Me. Inquiry 45 (3):277 – 293.
    It is tempting to explicate the mastery of language, as many philosophers have, with how we come to learn language. Interpreting how we come to learn a language necessarily involves saying what the mind's relevant capacities are. Too long we have been told that those capacities are adaptive to, as well as within, a social context; it seemed plausible to argue that we learn to have (propositional) thoughts as we learn and use the language conatively. This essay tries to persuade (...)
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  2. Arthur B. Cody (2000). Informational Darwinism. Inquiry 43 (2):167 – 179.
    The Theory of Evolution has, since Darwin, been sustained by contributions from many sciences, most especially from molecular biology. Philosophers, like biologists and the man in the street, have accepted the idea that the contemporary form of evolutionary theory has arrived at a convincing and final structure. As it now stands, natural selection is thought to work through the information-handling mechanism of the DNA molecule. Variation in the genome?s constructive message is achieved through random errors of processing called mutations. How (...)
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  3. Arthur B. Cody (1998). The Onslaught of Mental States. Inquiry 41 (1):89 – 97.
    The causal theory of action had suffered from inattention or linguistically motivated rejection until it was revived in 1963 by Donald Davidson. Since then the causal theory has had a continuing acceptance without having had an inspection of its assumptions. There are reasons to suspect that the theory is as unfounded as it is undoubted. Those reasons are reviewed here which have to do with the definitive moment when states such as beliefs and desires must change character to become causal (...)
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  4. Arthur B. Cody (1997). Consciousness: Of David Chalmers and Other Philosophers of Mind. Inquiry 40 (4):379 – 405.
    On reading David Chalmers's book, The Conscious Mind (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), one is struck by the author's efforts to meet the difficulties and obscurities in understanding the human mind, as indeed most other philosophers have, by hazarding theories. Such undertakings rest on two broad, usually unexamined, assumptions. One is that we have direct access to our conscious minds such that pronouncements about it and its contents are descriptive. The other is that our actions have causal explanations which (...)
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  5. Arthur B. Cody (1996). Darwin and Dennett: Still Two Mysteries. Inquiry 39 (3 & 4):427 – 457.
  6. Arthur B. Cody (1994). Hannay's Consciousness. Inquiry 37 (1):117-132.
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  7. Arthur B. Cody (1992). Sharpe Paratactics. Inquiry 35 (2):249 – 269.
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  8. Arthur B. Cody (1988). States of Quine. Philosophical Investigations 11 (2):99-111.
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  9. Arthur B. Cody (1971). Is 'Human Action' A Category? Inquiry 14 (1-4):386-419.
    It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human (...)
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  10. Arthur B. Cody (1969). On the Difference It Makes. Inquiry 12 (1-4):394 – 405.
    Man's belief in God is often contrasted with man's disbelief, Atheism; but the nature of human belief is contrastable with the nature of the belief of demons. A point of contrast lies in the consequences of the different sort of reasons men and demons must be understood to have. One consequence has to do with the vision of the world, seeing the world as God's creation, which men are expected to achieve and demons are not. The logic of the ?seeing (...)
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  11. Arthur B. Cody (1967). A Reply to Mr. Dowling. Inquiry 10 (1-4):449-452.
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  12. Arthur B. Cody (1967). Can a Single Action Have Many Different Descriptions? Inquiry 10 (1-4):164 – 180.
    To say that a single human action can be given different descriptions is to imply that the contrast between action and description is intelligible. There are several ways in which such a contrast is easily understood, but those ways do not meet philosophers? needs. They have said that the descriptions are all true, thereby excluding that interpretation in which no more than one description could be true. They have emphasized the word ?different?, therefore that interpretation in which the descriptions are (...)
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  13. Arthur B. Cody (1967). Thinking in Language. Torino, Edizioni Di Filosofia.
     
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