Online research in philosophy

Levelt et al. attempt to “model their theory” with WEAVER++. Modeling theories requires a model theory. The time is ripe for a methodology for building, testing, and evaluating computational models. We propose a tentative, five-step framework for tackling this problem, within which we discuss the potential strengths and weaknesses of Levelt et al.'s modeling approach.

Pulvermüller identifies two major flaws of the subtraction method of neuroimaging studies and proposes remedies. We argue that these remedies are themselves flawed and that the cognitive science community badly needs to take initial steps toward a cross-fertilization between mind mappers and cognitive modelers. Such steps could include the development of computational task models that transparently and falsifiably link the input (stimuli) and output (changes in blood flow or brain waves) of neuroimaging studies to changes in information processing activity that (...) is the stuff of cognitive models. (shrink)

Glenberg's conception of “meaning from and for action” is too narrow. For example, it provides no satisfactory account of the “logic of Elfland,” a metaphor used by Chesterton to refer to meaning acquired by being told something. All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means that for one awful instant we remember that we forget. G. K. Chesterton (in Gardner 1994, p. 101).