Although the argument against the neo‐Darwinian theory of evolution presented by Stephen R. L. Clark in From Athens to Jerusalem is based upon sound principles, it fails to provide an a priori refutation. If it did work, it would refute all objective scientific theories, since all of them make consciousness and subjectivity, as Clark characterises them, incomprehensible. Scientism, the thesis that science is the only source of truth, is Clark's real target, rather than science per se, but he does not (...) diagnose this error as it is made by authors such as Jacques Monod and Richard Dawkins. Scientism is not essential to materialism in general, and a successful version of ‘supervenience‐materialism’could avoid both reductionism and scientism. However, Clark still has a reply. He may use his discussion of the value of truth to provide a more general critique of materialism, which in my view is far more effective. (shrink)

In his paper "Noneism or Allism" David Lewis argued that Richard Sylvan's rehabilitation of Meinong's theory of objects was not a noneist one but rather an allist, that is, that all objects whatsoever actually exist and thus Meinong and Sylvan are among the greatest "entity-multipliers". But this is exactly what Sylvan tried to show is not the case. I'll argue that Lewis' attack ultimately fails in re-instating an old serious misinterpretation of Meinongian metaphysics. In doing so he deflects attention away (...) from the substance of Sylvan's position and casts him as the defender of something unintelligible. (shrink)

Meinongian metaphysics uses “exists” as a genuine predicate, which entails that there are some objects that do not exist. The formal details of this position have been elucidated by several authors, but the question of how to explicate the predicate has received less attention. This paper examines Panayot Butchvarov’s thesis that existence is power, which is deduced from an argument that begins with the knowability of existent objects. It is argued that this account presupposes the thinking subject, and that when (...) this presupposition is made explicit, it helps to clarify the deduction that Butchvarov uses, and has several other advantages with respect to Meinongian metaphysics. (shrink)

Meinongian metaphysics uses “exists” as a genuine predicate, which entails that there are some objects that do not exist. The formal details of this position have been elucidated by several authors, but the question of how to explicate the predicate has received less attention. This paper examines Panayot Butchvarov’s thesis that existence is power, which is deduced from an argument that begins with the knowability of existent objects. It is argued that this account presupposes the thinking subject, and that when (...) this presupposition is made explicit, it helps to clarify the deduction that Butchvarov uses, and has several other advantages with respect to Meinongian metaphysics. (shrink)

Asking the question “Why is there something instead of nothing?” almost always inspires a reaction of awe or wonder. This emotional response is both appropriate and desirable, whether or not a legitimate answer to the question is obtainable. The question is deep, and the fact about which it asks is impossible to explain by citing some other fact or some antecedent condition. In this paper I consider several possible responses, including a rejection of the question as meaningless, positions that posit (...) the existence of a necessary being, and teleological explanations that posit the instantiation of value in the world. It is argued that each of these positions is either an unacceptable response or fails to diminish our sense of awe at the existence of the world. (shrink)

Asking the question “Why is there something instead of nothing?” almost always inspires a reaction of awe or wonder. This emotional response is both appropriate and desirable, whether or not a legitimate answer to the question is obtainable. The question is deep, and the fact about which it asks is impossible to explain by citing some other fact or some antecedent condition. In this paper I consider several possible responses, including a rejection of the question as meaningless, positions that posit (...) the existence of a necessary being, and teleological explanations that posit the instantiation of value in the world. It is argued that each of these positions is either an unacceptable response or fails to diminish our sense of awe at the existence of the world. (shrink)

This book explores the question of why there is something instead of nothing. Several responses to this question are possible, but only some of them address the question seriously, respecting its emotional aspects as well as its cognitive dimension. The author carefully distinguishes those answers that are truly satisfactory, in both respects, from those that are inadequate. It can be argued that the existence of the world has no explanation at all, or that there is a necessary being whose existence (...) is self-explanatory, or that the world exists because it has value. Each kind of response is defensible to some degree, and it is argued that where they are defensible, they have a common content. Incorporating aspects of both the 'analytical' and 'continental' traditions, this book also responds to several historical philosophers concerned with these questions, including Plato, Leibniz, Kant and Nietzsche. (shrink)

David Pearce has described a proposal which outlines an explanation space within which the question "Why is there something instead of nothing? " can be given a legitimate answer. This is how he describes his endeavour, and he makes it clear that his ideas are purely speculative. He does not have a straightforward answer to the question, nor even a theory. All that he has is a sketch of what a theory which "explains existence" might be like, and how it (...) might arrive at its conclusions. While I must admit that I find his sketch compelling in many ways, there are problems and paradoxes lurking in the very idea that one could explain why the world exists. In the case of Pearce 's proposal, the explanation takes the form of showing that there is nothing to explain. As such, it is similar to necessitarian responses to the problem, which claim that there is no alternative to the existence of the world since something - God, for example - exists as a matter of logical necessity. Pearce does not exactly endorse a traditional necessitarian theory, but he comes awfully close. In my opinion, there is a recognition of balance and proportion in his thesis which makes his thesis more appealing than any reliance upon a deus-ex-machina. (shrink)