Search results for 'Astral body' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. D. P. Walker (1958). The Astral Body in Renaissance Medicine. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 21 (1/2):119-133.score: 90.0
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  2. Roger Smook (1975). Would Survival Have to Be Survival of an Astral Body? A Reply to Professor Flew. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):481 - 494.score: 90.0
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  3. G. R. S. Mead (1967). The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition: An Outline of What the Philosophers Thought and Christians Taught on the Subject. London, Stuart & Watkins.score: 78.0
    He served as editor of The Theosophical Society's Theosophical Review, and later formed The Quest Society and edited its journal, The Quest Review.
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  4. Geoffrey Samuel & Jay Johnston (eds.) (2013). Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West: Between Mind and Body. Routledge.score: 78.0
     
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  5. Joe Fearn (2003). Astral Projection and Out of Body Experiences. Philosophy Now 42:10-13.score: 72.0
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  6. Jay Johnston (2008). Angels of Desire: Esoteric Bodies, Aesthetics and Ethics. Equinox Pub. Ltd.score: 68.0
    Subtle bodies -- Difference -- Subtle subjects of desire -- "Seering" desire : the between -- Inhabiting sight -- Durée : the aesthetics of desired time -- An ethics of emptiness -- Witnessing : detached immersion -- An ethics of grace : the law of desiring angels -- Conclusion : the angelic ternary.
     
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  7. Mioara Merie (2008). The 'Airy Envelope of the Spirit': Empirical Eschatology, Astral Bodies and the Spiritualism of the Howitt Circle. Intellectual History Review 18 (2):189-206.score: 30.0
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  8. Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral (...)
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  9. J. Campbell (1995). The Body Image and Self-Consciousness. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press. 29--42.score: 21.0
    in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez (eds.), The Body and the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995), 29-42.
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  10. J. Almog (2001). What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    In his Meditations, Rene Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions (...)
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  11. Thomas Nagel (1998). Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy 73 (285):337-52.score: 18.0
    Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- person perspective -- (...)
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  12. Douglas C. Long (1969). Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophical Forum 1:259-273.score: 18.0
    [p. 259] After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature of the self that he claims to know with certainty to exist. He concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Although a considerable amount of critical effort has been expended in attempts to show how he thought he could move to this important conclusion, his reasoning has remained quite unconvincing. In particular, his critics have insisted, (...)
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  13. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Mind-Body Problem. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 18.0
    * Argument from authoritative self-knowledge ("privileged access" to one's own mental states) 1. We have a "privileged access" to our own mental states in the sense we have the authority on what mental states we are in. 2. Through introspection, we are aware of our mental states but not aware of them as physical states of any sort or as functional states. 3. Therefore, our mental states cannot be physical states.
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  14. Marcus Arvan, A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism.score: 18.0
    This paper provides a simple proof of mind-body dualism. I show, first, that all properties known to humankind, aside from qualitative properties of consciousness, are fundamentally relational properties. I then show that relational properties are always fully describable in language. Finally, I point out that qualitative properties of consciousness are clearly not fully describable in language. Thus, qualitative properties of consciousness are fundamentally different than all other properties known to humankind.
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  15. Daniel Holbrook (1992). Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction. Southwest Philosophical Studies 14:74-83.score: 18.0
    In his "Meditations on First Philosophy", Descartes argues for there being a radical difference between mind and body. Yet, we know that mind and body interest. How is this possible? Descartes's answer tothis question is that human nature is a "substantial union" of mind and body. In this essay, Descartes's solution is explained and critically examined.
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  16. Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.score: 18.0
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be (...)
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  17. Markku Roinila (2011). Leibniz on Emotions and the Human Body. In Breger Herbert, Herbst Jürgen & Erdner Sven (eds.), Natur und Subjekt (IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress Vorträge). Leibniz Geschellschaft.score: 18.0
    Descartes argued that the passions of the soul were immediately felt in the body, as the animal spirits, affected by the movement of the pineal gland, spread through the body. In Leibniz the effect of emotions in the body is a different question as he did not allow the direct interaction between the mind and the body, although maintaining a psychophysical parallelism between them. -/- In general, he avoids discussing emotions in bodily terms, saying that general (...)
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  18. Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.score: 18.0
    This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context.
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  19. Karl R. Popper (ed.) (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. Routledge.score: 18.0
    One of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century, Sir Karl Popper here examines the problems connected with human freedom, creativity, rationality and the relationship between human beings and their actions. In this illuminating series of papers, Popper suggests a theory of mind-body interaction that relates to evolutionary emergence, human language and what he calls "the three worlds." Rene; Descartes first posited the existence of two worlds--the world of physical bodies and the world of mental states. Popper argues (...)
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  20. Shaun Gallagher (1986). Lived Body and Environment. Research in Phenomenology 16 (1):139-170.score: 18.0
    Merleau-Ponty developed a phenomenology of the body that promoted a non-dualistic account of human existence. In this paper I intend to develop Merleau-Ponty's analysis further by questioning his account of the body on the issues of body perception, and the body's relation to its environment. To clarify these issues I draw from both the phenomenological tradition and recent psychological investigations.
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  21. Michael Heidelberger (2003). The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism. In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 233--262.score: 18.0
    It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and (...)
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  22. Michael G. F. Martin (2000). Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality, and the Mind-Body Problem. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.score: 18.0
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  23. Christopher James Ryan (2009). Out on a Limb: The Ethical Management of Body Integrity Identity Disorder. Neuroethics 2 (1):21-33.score: 18.0
    Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), previously called apotemnophilia, is an extremely rare condition where sufferers desire the amputation of a healthy limb because of distress associated with its presence. This paper reviews the medical and philosophical literature on BIID. It proposes an evidenced based and ethically informed approach to its management. Amputation of a healthy limb is an ethically defensible treatment option in BIID and should be offered in some circumstances, but only after clarification of the diagnosis and consideration (...)
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  24. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 18.0
    Contemporary theories of self-consciousness typically begin by dividing experiences of the self into types, each requiring separate explanation. The stereotypical case of an out of body experience (OBE) may be seen to suggest a distinction between the sense of oneself as an experiencing subject, a mental entity, and a sense of oneself as an embodied person, a bodily entity. Point of view, in the sense of the place from which the subject seems to experience the world, in this case (...)
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  25. Brian O'Shaughnessy (1998). Proprioception and the Body Image. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge: Mit Press. 175--203.score: 18.0
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  26. Douglas C. Long (1977). Disembodied Existence, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.score: 18.0
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at (...)
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  27. Stevan Harnad (2000). Correlation Vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind-Body Problem is Hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):54-61.score: 18.0
    The Mind/Body Problem (M/BP) is about causation not correlation. And its solution (if there is one) will require a mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality is needed to show how/why M (...)
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  28. Przemysław Nowakowski (2011). Phantom Body as Bodily Self-Consciousness. Avant 2 (1):135–149.score: 18.0
    In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and (...)
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  29. Stephen Burwood (2008). The Apparent Truth of Dualism and the Uncanny Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):263-278.score: 18.0
    It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one’s body. Thus, Drew Leder argues that these play “a crucial role in encouraging and supporting Cartesian dualism” as they “seem to support the doctrine of an immaterial mind trapped inside an alien body”. In this paper I argue that as dualism does (...)
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  30. Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Self for the Body. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.score: 18.0
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), (...)
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  31. Colin R. Marshall (2009). The Mind and the Body as 'One and the Same Thing' in Spinoza. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):897-919.score: 18.0
    I argue that, contrary to how he is often read, Spinoza did not believe that the mind and the body were numerically identical. This means that we must find some alternative reading for his claims that they are 'one and the same thing' (I describe three such alternative readings).
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  32. Alex Byrne (2006). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.score: 18.0
    b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images.
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  33. Kevin Aho (2009). Heidegger's Neglect of the Body. State University of New York Press.score: 18.0
    In Heidegger's Neglect of the Body, Kevin A. Aho suggests the critics largely fail to appreciate Heidegger's nuanced understanding of Dasein, which is not to be ...
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  34. Monica Meijsing (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Body. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):34-50.score: 18.0
    Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they (...)
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  35. Helena De Preester & Manos Tsakiris (2009). Body-Extension Versus Body-Incorporation: Is There a Need for a Body-Model? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):307-319.score: 18.0
    This paper investigates the role of a pre-existing body-model that is an enabling constraint for the incorporation of objects into the body. This body-model is also a basis for the distinction between body extensions (e.g., in the case of tool-use) and incorporation (e.g., in the case of successful prosthesis use). It is argued that, in the case of incorporation, changes in the sense of body-ownership involve a reorganization of the body-model, whereas extension of the (...)
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  36. Herbert Feigl (1971). Some Crucial Issues of Mind-Body Monism. Synthese 22 (May):295-312.score: 18.0
    Assuming that the qualities of immediate experience ('sentience') are the subjective aspect of the neurophysiological cerebral processes, And assuming that all behavior is ultimately susceptible to physical explanation, There are a number of ways in which mind-Body monism can be stated. But there are also a number of serious difficulties for a logically coherent formulation of the identity thesis of the mental and the physical.
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  37. Marleen Rozemond (1999). Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction: What's the Problem? Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (3):435-467.score: 18.0
    I argue that Descartes treated the action of body on mind differently from the action of mind on body, as was common in the period. Descartes explicitly denied that there is a problem for interaction but his descriptions of interaction seem to suggest that he thought there was a problem. I argue that these descriptions are motivated by a different issue, the seemingly arbitrary connections between particular physical states and the particular mental states they produce. Within scholasticism there (...)
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  38. Joseph T. Rouse (2005). Mind, Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language. Inquiry 48 (1):38-61.score: 18.0
    Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical-perceptual openness to the world, which (...)
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  39. Glenn Carruthers (2008). Types of Body Representation and the Sense of Embodiment. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1302):1316.score: 18.0
    The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body (...)
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  40. Charles T. Wolfe & Ofer Gal (eds.) (2010). The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge. Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science. Springer.score: 18.0
  41. Lisa Shapiro (2003). Descartes Passions of the Soul and the Union of Mind and Body. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (3):211-248.score: 18.0
    I here address Descartes' account of human nature as a union of mind and body by appealing to The Passions of the Soul. I first show that Descartes takes us to be able to reform the naturally instituted associations between bodily and mental states. I go on to argue that Descartes offers a teleological explanation of body-mind associations (those instituted both by nature and by artifice). This explanation sheds light on the ontological status of the union. I suggest (...)
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  42. Italo Testa (2012). Hegel's Naturalism, or Soul and Body in the Encyclopedia. In David Stern (ed.), Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, SUNY Press Albany, New York (pp. 19-35). SUNY Press.score: 18.0
    Paper given at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, University of South Carolina, October 24-26, 2008 -/- The local problem of the soul-body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between Nature and Spirit. This relates to Hegel's naturalism: the idea that there is one single reality - living reality - and different levels of description of it. This implies, moreover, that it is possible to ascribe some form of naturality (...)
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  43. Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Collingwood's Solution to the Problem of Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368.score: 18.0
    This paper contrasts two approaches to the mind-body problem and the possibility of mental causation: the conceptual approach advocated by Collingwood/Dray and the metaphysical approach advocated by Davidson. On the conceptual approach to show that mental causation is possible is equivalent to demonstrating that mentalistic explanations possess a different logical structure from naturalistic explanations. On the metaphysical approach to show that mental causation is possible entails explaining how the mind can intelligibly be accommodated within a physicalist universe. I argue (...)
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  44. Nicholas Humphrey (2000). In Reply [Reply to Commentaries on "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"]. Humphrey, Nicholas (2000) in Reply [Reply to Commentaries on "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"]. [Journal (Paginated)] 7 (4):98-112.score: 18.0
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  45. Glenn Carruthers (2009). Is the Body Schema Sufficient for the Sense of Embodiment? An Alternative to de Vignmont's Model. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):123-142.score: 18.0
    De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. (...)
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  46. Michael Della Rocca (1996). Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    This first extensive study of Spinoza's philosophy of mind concentrates on two problems crucial to the philosopher's thoughts on the matter: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind's relation to the body. Della Rocca contends that Spinoza's positions are systematically connected with each other and with a principle at the heart of his metaphysical system: his denial of causal or explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. In this way, (...)
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  47. Nebojsa Kujundzic & William Buschert (1994). Instruments and the Body: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Research in Phenomenology 24 (1):206-215.score: 18.0
    We argue that no sharp boundary can be drawn between the ``authentic'' human body and its instruments. In contrast to some other theorists of the continental canon--notably Heidegger and the Frankfurt school--Sartre and Merleau-Ponty can be read as asserting that the body (transitively) ``lives'' its instruments, weaving with them an intricate web of habitual actions and experiences. For Merleau-Ponty especially, the human body and its instruments are capable of complementing, supplementing, and melting into one another.
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  48. Marleen Rozemond (2003). Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism. Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2):343-367.score: 18.0
    In this paper I analyze Descartes's puzzling claim that the mind is whole in the whole body and whole in its parts, what Henry More called "holenmerism". I explain its historical background, in particular in scholasticism. I argue that like his predecessors, Descartes uses the idea for two purposes, for mind-body interaction and for the union of body and mind.
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  49. Robert A. Larmer (1986). Mind-Body Interactionism and the Conservation of Energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (September):277-85.score: 18.0
    One of the major reasons underlying the widespread rejection of the theory that the mind is an immaterial substance distinct from the body, But which nevertheless acts on the body, Is that it is felt that such a theory commits one to denying the principle of the conservation of energy. My aim in this article is to assess the strength of this objection. My thesis is that the usual replies are inadequate, But--Strong as this objection appears--Some important logical (...)
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