Jerry Fodor has proposed a causal theory of meaning based on the notion of a certain asymmetric dependency between the causes of a symbol's tokens. This theory is held to be an improvement on Dennis Stampe's causal theory of meaning and Fred Dretske's information theoretic account, because it allegedly solves what Fodor calls the “disjunction problem”, and does so without recourse to the kind of optimal (ideal) conditions to which Stampe and Dretske appeal. A series of counterexamples is proposed (...) to Fodor's account, which, it is argued, can only be met by reintroducing that same appeal to optimal conditions that he had sought to eliminate. It is then argued that Fodor's notion of asymmetric dependence is not fundamental to the explanation of why a symbol means what it does: on the contrary, the symbol's meaning what it does is explanatorily prior to the obtaining of the asymmetry, so the asymmetry cannot be used to explain the symbol's meaning. Finally, it is argued that the “disjunction problem “ as it is defined by Fodor is not a genuine problem for causal theories of meaning. (shrink)

Fodor’s asymmetric-dependence theory of content is probably the best known and most developed causal or informational theory of mental content. Many writers have attempted to provide counterexamples to Fodor’s theory. In this paper, I offer a more fundamental critique. I begin by attacking Fodor’s view of the dialectical situation. Fodor’s theory is cast in terms of laws covering the occurrence of an individual thinker’s mental symbols. I show that, contrary to Fodor’s view, we cannot restrict consideration to hypothetical (...) cases in which his conditions for content are satisfied, but must consider whether the relevant laws exhibit the specified asymmetric-dependence relations in actual cases. My central argument is that the laws that the theory requires do not in fact exhibit the appropriate asymmetric-dependence relations. I show that, in general, part of the mechanism for the crucial, supposedly content-determining law for a mental symbol is not shared by the mechanisms for the other laws covering the occurrence of the same mental symbol. As a result, the former law can be eliminated (by eliminating the non-overlapping part of the mechanism) without eliminating the latter laws. The latter laws do not asymmetrically depend on the former law. (shrink)

In (1990), Jerry Fodor has defended a naturalized conception of meaning for Mentalese expressions which relies on the notion of asymmetric dependence. According to this conception, any naturalized theory of meaning must be able to account for the fact that meaning is robust, namely that any token of a certain Mentalese expression “x” retains the expression’s meaning, X, for any Y (≠ X) which happens to cause it. Now, this robustness of “x”‘s meaning can precisely be explained in (...) terms of the subsistence of an asymmetric dependence of any nomic connection between Ys and “x”‘s tokens on another nomic connection between Xs and “x”‘s tokens. According to Fodor, then, this relation between nomic connections can account in perfectly naturalistic terms for “x” meaning X, by providing a sufficient condition for such a meaning. In what follows, however, I will try to show, first, that the subsistence of asymmetric dependencies of the kind envisaged by Fodor is not enough for assigning meaning to a certain expression. Indeed, there are dependencies of this kind which are meaning-irrelevant. Secondly, I will claim that asymmetric dependence relations are not able even to support for the robustness of meaning. For there are cases in which according to the structure of these relations we would have to conclude that meaning is altered although robustness would require to have it unchanged. (shrink)

Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter.

Where does the cognitive system begin and end? Intracranialists maintain that the cognitive system is entirely identifiable with the biological central nervous system. Transcranialists, on the other hand, suggest that the cognitive system can extend beyond the biological CNS. In the second division of Supersizing the Mind, Clark defends the transcranial account against various objections. Of interest for this paper is Clark’s response to what he calls “asymmetry arguments.”Asymmetry arguments can be summarized as follows: subtract the props and aids, and (...) the organism may create replacements. But subtract the organism, and all cognitive activity ceases. Although I am sympathetic to Clark’s overall project, I find his response to the asymmetry arguments inadequate in light of his responses to other objections. For this reason, I maintain that Clark’s response requires revision. By adopting a process metaphysics and appealing to mereological dependencies, I believe that Clark can provide a substantive response to asymmetry arguments that is consistent with his overall theory. This paper unfolds as follows: after summarizing Clark’s response to the asymmetry objection in, I will argue that his response is unsuccessful in. My argument hinges on the claim that Clark does not take into account the full intent of Rupert’s asymmetry argument. In I modify Clark’s response by appealing to mereology and the asymmetrical dependencies found therein. I conclude in that this modification provides Clark with an adequate response to the asymmetry argument and is consistent with his overall transcranialist account. The further question of whether this account assists Clark in responding to other intracranialist objections is beyond the scope of this paper. (shrink)

PurposeExisting research suggests that the competitive advantage provided by technological development depends to a large extent on the speed and coordination of the technology’s implementation, and on how adoptable the technological applications are considered. While accepting this argument, the authors consider the explanatory model to be inadequate. This study aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion by analysing institutionalised industrial relations and other organisation-level factors, which are important for workplace restructuring and societal change.Design/methodology/approachThe analysis is based on a representative nation-wide (...) work and working conditions survey (N= 4,100) from Finland, which includes a variety of themes, including practices, changes and well-being at work. Changes are understood as organisational changes, focusing on modern technologies such as robotisation and digitalisation.FindingsThe results indicate that occupational division at workplace (low-skilled vs high-skilled occupations) affects job insecurity and acceptance of technologies at work. The characteristics of workplaces, such as the employees’ participation and involvement in the development of the organisation, play a significant part in both the acceptance and the implementation and outcomes of the technological transformations in the workplace.Practical implicationsThe research provides new and interesting insights into working life practices. Furthermore, it reveals how technology acceptance and employment perspectives relate to working conditions and lessons learned from past reforms.Originality/valueThe authors consider current theories such as technology acceptance model at the micro level and that way rationalise the need for this study. This study shows the importance of individual, organisational and wider contextual factors in technology acceptance. (shrink)

China has for almost four decades been experiencing a market transition and an associated tax state transition, leading to the emergence of capitalists who increasingly control economic resources and serve as important sources of tax revenue. Some theories suggest that these changes should give capitalists political power. From the perspective of the taxation institution, using a mechanism-based case study, this article investigates whether China’s emerging capitalists have gained bargaining power with the party-state. Findings suggest that hidden bargaining, patron-clientelism, legislature co-optation, (...) and legal repression constrain their bargaining power. The underinstitutionalized taxation system has co-opted the capitalists through patronage and, more important, deterrence, thereby building an asymmetric mutual dependence between the local state and capital owners. (shrink)

In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.

In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.

The author expounds critically Roderick Chisholm's theory of modal mereology and undertakes to redeploy and reconcile this with the Lesniewski-Tarski theory of part-whole, modally augmented. An argument is presented for the principle that what belongs to an aggregate as a part belongs essentially to it. This principle is argued not to imply that every part of an ordinary substance is essentially part of it (such substances not being aggregates), and to give no particular support to Roderick Chisholm's postulation of entia (...) successiva in substitution for ships, trees, and houses as ordinary conceived. Entia successiva are not good candidates for identification with these. (shrink)

We employ a frequency-dependent asymmetric and causality analysis to investigate the connectedness between gold and cryptocurrencies during the COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, the variational mode decomposition-based quantile regression is utilised. Findings from the study divulge that the variational mode functions at the lower quantiles are mostly significant and negative indicating that gold acts as a safe haven, a diversifier at most market conditions with insignificant coefficients, and a hedge at normal market conditions for most cryptocurrencies at various investment horizons. Particularly, (...) hedging benefits mostly occur in the short- and medium-term for Bitcoin and Ripple, as well as Bitcoin and Dogecoin in the long-term with gold. This implies that there is high persistence in the hedging properties of gold with Bitcoin, followed by Ripple. We notice more significant relationship between gold and some cryptocurrencies in the long-term of the COVID-19 pandemic relative to the medium-term emphasising the delayed responses of prices to information. Investors are recommended to be observant and mindful of investing in these markets due to the different dynamics. (shrink)

Asymmetric cell division generates cell diversity and contributes to cellular aging and rejuvenation. Here, we review the molecular mechanisms enabling budding yeast to recognize spindle pole bodies (SPB, centrosome equivalent) based on their age, and guide their non‐random mitotic segregation: SPB inheritance requires the distinction of old from new SPBs and is regulated by the SPB‐inheritance network (SPIN) and the mitotic exit network (MEN). The SPIN marks the pre‐existing SPB as old and the MEN recognizes these marks translating them (...) into spindle orientation. We next revisit other molecules and structures that partition depending on their age rather than their abundance at mitosis as, for example, DNA, centrosomes, mitochondria, and histones in yeast and other systems. The recurrence of this differential behavior suggests a functional significance for numerous cell types, which we then discuss. We conclude that non‐random segregation may facilitate asymmetric cell fate determination and thereby indirectly aging and rejuvenation. (shrink)

The segregation of damaged components at cell division determines the survival and aging of cells. In cells that divide asymmetrically, such as Saccharomyces cerevisiae, aggregated proteins are retained by the mother cell. Yet, where and how aggregation occurs is not known. Recent work by Zhou and collaborators shows that the birth of protein aggregates, under specific stress conditions, requires active translation, and occurs mainly at the endoplasmic reticulum. Later, aggregates move to the mitochondrial surface through fis1‐dependent association. During replicative aging, (...) aggregate association with the mother‐cell mitochondria contributes to the asymmetric segregation of aggregates, because mitochondria in the daughter cell do not carry aggregates. With increasing age of mother cells, aggregates lose their connection to the mitochondria, and segregation is less asymmetric. Relating these findings to other mechanisms of aggregate segregation in different organisms, we postulate that fusion between aggregates and their tethering to organelles such as the vacuole, nucleus, ER, or mitochondria are common principles that establish asymmetric segregation during stress resistance and aging. (shrink)

Frequently, historical comparisons are asymmetrical in the sense that they investigate one case carefully while limiting themselves to a mere sketch of the other case which serve as comparative reference point. The debate on the German Sonderweg and the rich historical literature originating from this debate can serve as examples. This article reconstructs the pros and cons within this controversial debate, reports its results and puts it into a broader historical context. It analyzes the comparative logic implied by the Sonderweg (...) thesis and argues that the interpretation of modern German history in the sense of a Sonderweg can only be maintained if related to the question why Germany turned fascist and totalitarian in the interwar period while other societies did not, and if Western countries are selected as units of comparison. The choice of comparative reference points turns out to be decisive and partly dependent on normative priorities and conventions. The article points to dangers and opportunities inherent in asymmetrical comparison. (shrink)

This thesis is guided by the following question: what, if anything, makes a life meaningful? My answer to this question is asymmetric welfarism about meaning in life. According to asymmetric welfarism, the meaning of a life depends upon two factors. First, a life is conferred meaning insofar as it promotes or protects the well-being of other welfare subjects. Second, a life is made meaningless insofar as it decreases or minimises the well-being of other welfare subjects. The meaning of (...) a life is determined by the net balance between these two factors; the more the good outweighs the bad, the more meaningful a life that is. I argue that asymmetric welfarism is the most plausible theory about meaning in life. To do this, I show how such a view captures a variety of intuitions about meaning in life while defending it from objections. This is the business of chapters 1, 2, and 3. Specifically, chapter 1 lays the groundwork, chapter 2 advances the case in favour of asymmetric welfarism, while chapter 3 defends asymmetric welfarism from objections. But some objections cannot be so easily overturned by a mere argument. Such objections do not just count against asymmetric welfarism, but also support competing theories. In order to overcome both, I show how such objections, and the theories they motivate, are best understood as tracking a different, but related, evaluative dimension a life can have. This is the business of chapters 4, 5, and 6. Specifically, chapter 4 argues that subjective theories are best understood as being about fulfilment, chapter 5 argues that purpose theories are best understood as being about purpose, and chapter 6 argues that differing views about the role of morality confuse morality and significance with meaning. These other evaluative dimensions which stand alongside meaning in life are fulfilment, purpose, significance, morality, and prudential value. (shrink)

Analogies must be symmetric. If a is like b, then b is like a. So if a has property R, and if R is within the scope of the analogy, then b (probably) has R. However, analogical arguments generally single out, or depend upon, only one of a or b to serve as the basis for the inference. In this respect, analogical arguments are directed by an asymmetry. I defend the importance of this neglected – even when explicitly mentioned – (...) feature in understanding analogical arguments. (shrink)

Metaphysical orthodoxy maintains that the relation of ontological dependence is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. The goal of this paper is to challenge that orthodoxy by arguing that ontological dependence should be understood as non- symmetric, rather than asymmetric. If we give up the asymmetry of dependence, interesting things follow for what we can say about metaphysical explanation— particularly for the prospects of explanatory holism.

Some philosophers think that knowledge or justification is both necessary and sufficient for rational action: they endorse knowledge-action or justification-action biconditionals. This paper offers a novel, metaphysical challenge to these biconditionals, which proceeds with a familiar question: What depends on what? If you know that p iff it is rational for you to act on p, do you know that p partly because it is rational for you to act on p, or is it rational for you to act on (...) p partly because you know that p? And a structurally similar question can be asked regarding justification-action biconditionals. I argue that proponents of these biconditionals cannot give a satisfactory answer to these questions. This is because each direction of these biconditionals strongly supports an opposite order of explanation to the one that is supported by the other direction. Given the traditional assumption that metaphysical explanations—even partial ones—are asymmetric, I argue that these biconditionals should be rejected. While knowledge might be necessary for rational action, and it might be sufficient, it cannot be both. And the same goes for justification. (shrink)

The notions of sustainability that are most widely accepted, domestically and internationally, are underwritten not only by duties to contemporaries, but also, and crucially, by responsibilities to non-overlapping generations. The point of this chapter is to argue that intergenerational dependence suggests that such responsibility is grounded in a form of reciprocity that is often called indirect: A gives to B but B gives ‘back’ to C. On this view, a current generation takes responsibility for the well-being of future generations (...) because it is indebted to previous generations. In conversation with economic and philosophical literature, including so-called care ethics, I develop the basic idea further toward a concept I call asymmetrical intergenerational reciprocity. This concept connects reciprocity with altruistic concerns and with asymmetrical responsibility for the next generation. The basic point is that, as opposed to construing reciprocity as mutual advantage, asymmetrical reciprocity demands the return of benefits to a previously uninvolved third party, and thus invites the combination with an other-regarding concern for the well-being of this third party, future people in this case. (shrink)

In 1995, Francisco Ayala considered biblical Eve a myth, because a relatively recent single-pair bottleneck is unable to sustain the observed polymorphism of the human immune system. In 2011, Kenneth Kemp showed that Ayala’s conclusion depends on an implicit condition, to wit, that God animates all and only progeny of two animated parents. Here we show that both biology (the polymorphism) and scripture (Eve’s historical existence) are equally saved, upon assuming that God animates _all and only progeny of animated mothers_. (...) We present three reasons in favor this _prima facie_ rather odd restriction: (i) it solves two long-standing biological riddles; (ii) it explains Eve’s scriptural title of “mother of all living”; and (iii) it fully respects the theology of Christ’s perfect humanity (for His lacking a biological father). (shrink)

We consider a two-player contest in which one contestant has a headstart advantage, but both can exert further effort. We allow the prize to depend on total performance in the contest and consider the respective cases in which efforts are productive and destructive of prize value. When the contest success function takes a logit form, and marginal cost is increasing in effort, we show that a Nash equilibrium exists and is unique both in productive and destructive endogenous prize contests. In (...) equilibrium, the underdog expends more resources to win the prize, but still his probability of winning remains below that of the favorite. In a productive contest, the underdog behaves more aggressively and wins the prize more often in comparison to a fixed-value contest. Thus, the degree of competitive balance—defined as the level of uncertainty of the outcome—depends upon the prize nature of the contest. (shrink)

Knowledge consists of the triad: information, interpretation, and judgement. Much of modern political economy has miscarried by proceeding as though knowledge were merely “information” that is, as though interpretation were symmetric and final. Economic prosperity depends greatly on new knowledge or “discovery” of profit opportunities that translate into social betterment. These discoveries are often a transcending of the working interpretation, not merely the acquisition of new information. The evolution of interpretations is key to appreciating voluntarism as a maxim for policy. (...) Smith, Hayek, and Kirzner taught that bad public policy is partly the result of not knowing better, not of evil or greed. Economists may justify their efforts and their salaries chiefly by teaching citizens to know better. Such is the economist’s calling.La connaissance consiste en une triade : information, interprétation, et jugement. Une bonne part de l’économie politique moderne a échoué en assimilant la connaissance à l’information, ce qui revenait à dire que l’interprétation était symétrique et ultime. La prospérité économique repose dans une grande mesure sur l’émergence de nouvelles connaissances ou la “découverte” d’occasions de profit porteuses d’améliorations sociales. Souvent ces découvertes transcendent l’interprétation courante et non seulement l’acquisition de nouvelles informations. L’évolution des interprétations est essentielle pour évaluer le volontarisme en tant que maxime pour la politique. Smith, Hayek et Kirzner nous ont enseigné que des politiques publiques inappropriées résultent en partie d’une déficience de connaissances plutôt que de mauvaises intentions ou d’avidité. Les économistes peuvent justifier leurs efforts et leurs salaires essentiellement en apprenant aux citoyens à s’enrichir de connaissances. Telle est la vocation de l’économiste. (shrink)

In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past needn’t be. A substantial literature arose in connection with this distinction, though no consensus emerged as to the proper way to analyze it. It is time, I believe, to revisit these issues. The central claim of this paper is that the attempts to analyze the hard/soft fact distinction got off on fundamentally the wrong track. The crucial feature of soft facts is that they (in some sense) depend on the future. Following recent work on the notion of dependence, however, I argue that the literature on the soft/hard distinction has failed to capture the sense of dependence at stake. This is because such attempts have tried to capture softness in terms of purely modal notions like entailment and necessitation. As I hope to show, however, such notions cannot capture the sort of asymmetrical dependence relevant to soft facthood. Arguing for this claim is the first goal of this paper. My second goal is to gesture towards what an adequate account of soft facthood will really look like. (shrink)

Dependency care is an asymmetric good; everyone needs to receive it, but it is not the case that we all have to provide it. Despite ethicists’ of care’s theorizing about the importance of dependency care, it has yet to be theorized within a form of liberalism. This paper theorizes two components of a liberal theory of dependency care. First, it advances a liberal justification to include the receipt of dependency care among the benefits of social cooperation. Then, it advances (...) an autonomy-based principle to guide how care should be provided (“strong proceduralism”). Strong proceduralism is based on an account of autonomy that incorporates the significance of a person’s skills when he parses options. Strong proceduralism consequently requires educational efforts to teach care-giving skills to groups who have not previously possessed them. I hypothesize that strong proceduralism will secure adequate care provision as the outcome of autonomous choice, but if an inadequate number of people choose to provide care, then a secondary stage of deliberations will be necessary. If the outcome of those secondary deliberations is that people want to have their care needs met, then a fair process for distributing infringements on autonomy must be devised. (shrink)

This paper defends Flatland—the view that there exist neither determination nor dependence relations, and that everything is therefore fundamental—from the objection from explanatory inefficacy. According to that objection, Flatland is unattractive because it is unable to explain either the appearance as of there being determination relations, or the appearance as of there being dependence relations. We show how the Flatlander can meet the first challenge by offering four strategies—reducing, eliminating, untangling and omnizing—which, jointly, explain the appearance as of (...) there being determination relations where no such relations obtain. Since, plausibly, dependence relations just are asymmetric determination relations, we argue that once we come mistakenly to believe that there exist determination relations, the existence of other asymmetries (conceptual and temporal) explains why it appears that there are dependence relations. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel account of practical factor effects on knowledge attributions that is consistent with the denial of contextualism, relativism and pragmatic encroachemt. The account goes as follows. Knowledge depends on factors like safety, reliability or probability. In many cases, it is uncertain just how safe, how reliably formed or how probable the target proposition is. This means that we have to estimate these quantities in order to form knowledge judgements. Such estimates of uncertain quantities are independently known (...) to be affected by pragmatic factors. When overestimation is costlier than underestimation, for instance, we tend to underestimate the relevant quantity to avoid greater losses. On the suggested account, high stakes and other pragmatic factors induce such “asymmetric loss functions” on quantities like safety, reliability and probability. This skews our estimates of these quantities and thereby our judgements about knowledge. The resulting theory is an error-theory, but one that rationlizes the error in question. (shrink)

For a, b > 0, we consider a temporally homogeneous, one-dimensional diffusion process X(t) defined over I = (-b, a), with infinitesimal parameters depending on the sign of X(t). We suppose that, when X(t) reaches the position 0, it is reflected rightward to δ with probability p > 0 and leftward to -δ with probability 1 - p, where δ > 0. Closed analytical expressions are found for the mean exit time from the interval (-b, a), and for the probability (...) of exit through the right end a, in the limit δ → 0+, generalizing the results of Lefebvre, holding for asymmetric Wiener process. Moreover, in alternative to the heavy analytical calculations, a numerical method is presented to estimate approximately the quantities above. Furthermore, on the analogy of skew Brownian motion, the notion of skew diffusion process is introduced. Some examples and numerical results are also reported. (shrink)

According to the Dependency Theory, truth asymmetrically depends on the world, in the following sense: true propositions are true because the world makes them true. The Dependency Theory strikes many philosophers as incontrovertible, but in this paper I reject it. I begin by presenting a problem for the Dependency Theory. I then develop an alternative to the Dependency Theory which avoids that problem. This alternative is an immodest Identity Theory of Truth, and I end the paper by responding to Dodd’s (...) charge that immodest Identity Theories are incoherent. (shrink)

In defending Levinas’s ethical theory against Ricoeur’s objections in Oneself as Another, I make a two-fold argument in regard to heroic action and the ordinary ethical relation. First, I suggest a definition of the hero as she who does what is right—that is, what is ethically necessary or obligatory—even when it requires extreme sacrifice. Second, I argue that the development of virtuous character, out of which such heroic action comes, is dependent upon the asymmetrical relation between an alterior Other and (...) a self who is willing to sacrifice to do what is right. Re-orienting oneself toward the ethical relation is, itself, a sacrifice, requiring that one adopt a non-reciprocal, asymmetrical devotion to the Other. Thus, ethics, including both heroic and ordinary ethical behavior, ought not be founded on notions of friendship, symmetry, or mutuality, but rather on absolute difference, asymmetry, and self-sacrifice. (shrink)

In recent years, informed consent has been suggested as a way to deal with risks posed by engineered nanomaterials. We argue that while we can learn from experiences with informed consent in treatment and research contexts, we should be aware that informed consent traditionally pertains to certain features of the relationships between doctors and patients and researchers and research participants, rather than those between producers and consumers and employers and employees, which are more prominent in the case of engineered nanomaterials. (...) To better understand these differences, we identify three major relational factors that influence whether valid informed consent is obtainable, namely dependency, personal proximity, and existence of shared interests. We show that each type of relationship offers different opportunities for reflection and therefore poses distinct challenges for obtaining valid informed consent. Our analysis offers a systematic understanding of the possibilities for attaining informed consent in the context of nanomaterial risks and makes clear that measures or regulations to improve the obtainment of informed consent should be attuned to the specific interpersonal relations to which it is supposed to apply. (shrink)

In a recent paper Barnes proposes to characterize ontological emergence by identifying the emergent entities with those entities which are both fundamental and dependent. Barnes offers characterizations of the notions of fundamentality and dependence, but is cautious about committing to the specifics of these notions. This paper argues that Barnes’s characterization of emergence is problematic in several ways. Firstly, emergence is a relation, and merely delimiting relata of this relation tells us little about it. Secondly, the group of entities (...) delimited as dependent and fundamental do not appear to be the group of emergent entities. Rather, some entities appear to be dependent and fundamental and not emergent, whilst other entities appear to be emergent and not dependent and fundamental. The moral drawn is that in order to provide a characterization of emergence one must go beyond what Barnes says explicitly. It is also shown that a potentially fruitful way of doing this would be to further specify the notion of dependence at issue revealing it to be asymmetric and perhaps merely nomological. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the idea that sets depend on, or are grounded in, their members. It is said that a set depends on each of its members, and not vice versa. Members do not depend on the sets that they belong to. We show that the intuitive modal truth conditions for dependence, given in terms of possible worlds, do not accurately capture asymmetric dependence relations between sets and their members. We extend the modal truth conditions (...) to include impossible worlds and give a more satisfactory account of the dependence of a set on its members. Focusing on the case of singletons, we articulate a logical framework in which to evaluate set-theoretic dependence claims, using a normal first-order modal logic. We show that on this framework the dependence of a singleton on its single members follows from logic alone. However, the converse does not hold. (shrink)

In recent years, informed consent has been suggested as a way to deal with risks posed by engineered nanomaterials. We argue that while we can learn from experiences with informed consent in treatment and research contexts, we should be aware that informed consent traditionally pertains to certain features of the relationships between doctors and patients and researchers and research participants, rather than those between producers and consumers and employers and employees, which are more prominent in the case of engineered nanomaterials. (...) To better understand these differences, we identify three major relational factors that influence whether valid informed consent is obtainable, namely dependency, personal proximity, and existence of shared interests. We show that each type of relationship offers different opportunities for reflection and therefore poses distinct challenges for obtaining valid informed consent. Our analysis offers a systematic understanding of the possibilities for attaining informed consent in the context of nanomaterial risks and makes clear that measures or regulations to improve the obtainment of informed consent should be attuned to the specific interpersonal relations to which it is supposed to apply. (shrink)

The idea behind this article is to discuss the importance and to develop the concept of reciprocity in asymmetric professional relationships. As an empirical starting point for an examination of the possible forms of reciprocity between patients and nurses in psychiatry, we chose two qualitative in-depth interviews with two different patients. The manners in which these two patients relate to medical personnel—one is dependent, the other is independent—show that this presents challenges to nurses. The theoretical context is provided by (...) the notion of mature care as it has been developed by feminist-oriented ethics of care, in contrast to the notion of altruistic care. In relation to the concept of mature care, we discuss how nursing can be perceived in demanding relationships with patients in psychiatry. Reciprocity implies that, in principle, the interests of the nurses also matter in a nurse-patient relationship. We show that reciprocity—in practice—is complicated and challenging in a number of different ways. Mature care—with its systematic inclusion of relationships and reciprocity—provides an alternative understanding of what takes place between patients and nurses compared with an altruistic notion of care. As such, mature care can be regarded as an useful paradigm for nurse-patient relationships in psychiatry. (shrink)

According to Armstrong (amongst others) ‘any truth, should depend for its truth for something “outside” it’ where this one-way dependency is explained in terms of the asymmetric relationship that obtains between a truth and its truth-maker. But there’s no need to appeal to truth-makers to make sense of this dependency. The truth of a proposition is essentially determined by the interlocking semantic mechanism of reference and satisfaction which already ensures that the truth-value of a proposition depends on how things (...) stand outside it. By contrast, how things stand outside of a proposition is determined by other worldly mechanisms that have nothing to do with truth. (shrink)

This paper defends Flatland—the view that there exist neither determination nor dependence relations, and that everything is therefore fundamental—from the objection from explanatory inefficacy. According to that objection, Flatland is unattractive because it is unable to explain either the appearance as of there being determination relations, or the appearance as of there being dependence relations. We show how the Flatlander can meet the first challenge by offering four strategies—reducing, eliminating, untangling and omnizing—which, jointly, explain the appearance as of (...) determination relations where no such relations obtain. Since, plausibly, dependence relations just are asymmetric determination relations, we argue that once we come mistakenly to believe that there exist determination relations, the existence of other asymmetries (conceptual and temporal) explains why it appears that there are dependence relations. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the core of cooperative games generated by asymmetric aggregative normal-form games, i.e., games where the payoff of each player depends on his strategy and the sum of the strategies of all players. We assume that each coalition calculates its worth presuming that the outside players stand alone and select individually best strategies. We show that under some mild monotonicity assumptions on payoffs, the resulting cooperative game is balanced and has a non-empty core. Our paper thus offers (...) an existence result for a core notion which is frequently encountered in the theory and applications of cooperative games with externalities. (shrink)

Path-dependence offers a promising way of understanding the role historicity plays in explanation, namely, how the past states of a process can matter in the explanation of a given outcome. The two main existing accounts of path-dependence have sought to present it either in terms of dynamic landscapes or branching trees. However, the notions of landscape and tree both have serious limitations and have been criticized. The framework of causal networks is both more fundamental and more general that (...) that of landscapes and trees. Within this framework, I propose that historicity in networks should be understood as symmetry breaking. History matters when an asymmetric bias towards an outcome emerges in a causal network. This permits a quantitative measure for how path-dependence can occur in degrees, and offers suggestive insights into how historicity is intertwined both with causal structure and complexity. (shrink)

Physical contact between organelles are widespread, in part to facilitate the shuttling of protein and lipid cargoes for cellular homeostasis. How do protein‐protein and protein‐lipid interactions shape organelle subdomains that constitute contact sites? The endoplasmic reticulum (ER) forms extensive contacts with multiple organelles, including lipid droplets (LDs) that are central to cellular fat storage and mobilization. Here, we focus on ER‐LD contacts that are highlighted by the conserved protein seipin, which promotes LD biogenesis and expansion. Seipin is enriched in ER (...) tubules that form cage‐like structures around a subset of LDs. Such enrichment is strongly dependent on polyunsaturated and cyclopropane fatty acids. Based on these findings, we speculate on molecular events that lead to the formation of seipin‐positive peri‐LD cages in which protein movement is restricted. We hypothesize that asymmetric distribution of specific phospholipids distinguishes cage membrane tubules from the bulk ER. (shrink)

The contribution by De Dreu and Gross oversimplifies the complexity of the topic. I provide counterarguments that undermine the two sweeping contentions on which the article's argument depends, and I argue that asymmetric conflict is best understood at the finer-grained level of studying the sequences of strikes and counterstrikes that the rival actors have in store for one another.

Trenton Merricks, among others, has recently championed in a series of papers what he takes to be a novel and simple solution to an age-old problem concerning the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom. The solution crucially involves the thesis that God’s beliefs about the future actions of human persons asymmetrically depend on the future actions of those persons. I show that Merricks’s defense of this thesis is inadequate and that the prospects for improving his defense of it would (...) require him to enter the fray of articulating and defending a view about the mechanics whereby divine foreknowledge is achieved—something he and other advocates of the strategy he advances had hoped to avoid. (shrink)

Should a society oriented towards justice provide parents with the possibility of enhancing their children's genes? The opposing arguments of authors in the Rawls School and of the theorist of communicative action, Jürgen Habermas, are analysed in terms of their key concepts. Their positions are then assessed from the point of view of the principles of the pedagogical task to educate towards autonomy under conditions of asymmetry. They each call for respect both of children's difference and of their dependence, (...) and they ask for parents to moderate their expectations. In the light of this, Habermas's critique of genetic intervention, based on a Kantian understanding of autonomy as the capacity to be moral, on Kierkegaard's concept of being able to be oneself, and on respect for finitude, is here to be justified. (shrink)

A certain type of counterfactual is thought to be intimately related to causation, control, and explanation. The time asymmetry of these phenomena therefore plausibly arises from a time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. But why is counterfactual dependence time asymmetric? The most influential account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is David Albert’s account, which posits a new, time-asymmetric fundamental physical law, the so-called “past hypothesis.” Albert argues that the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence (...) arises from holding fixed the past hypothesis when evaluating counterfactuals. In this paper, I argue that Albert’s account misconstrues the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. (shrink)