25 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Athanassios Raftopoulos (University of Cyprus)
  1.  48
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2009). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy? MIT Press.
    An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  2. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). The Phenomenal Content of Experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  3. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2010). Cracks on the Mosaic Unity of Science. Metascience 19 (2):293-296.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2001). Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S187-S199.
    In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  5.  13
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2001). Is Perception Informationally Encapsulated? The Issue of the Theory‐Ladenness of Perception. Cognitive Science 25 (3):423-451.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  6. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
    The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  7.  36
    Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2002). Deictic Codes, Demonstratives, and Reference: A Step Toward Solving the Grounding Problem. In Wayne D. Gray & Christian D. Schunn (eds.), CogSci 2002, 24th annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum 762-767.
    In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experiential concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the referents of such demonstratives. To avoid ‘encodingism’, that is, relating representations to representations, we postulate that the process of <span class='Hi'>reference</span> fixing must be bottom-up and nonconceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual content and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate causal relation between representations and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Athanassios Raftopoulos (1999). Newton's Experimental Proofs as Eliminative Reasoning. Erkenntnis 50 (1):91-121.
    In this paper I discuss Newton's first optical paper. My aim is to examine the type of argument which Newton uses in order to convince his readers of the truth of his theory of colors. My claim is that this argument is an induction by elimination, and that the Newtonian method of justification is a kind of generative justification, a term due to T. Nickles. To achieve my aim I analyze in some detail the arguments in Newton's first optical paper, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  9.  55
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2006). Defending Realism on the Proper Ground. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
    'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  10.  78
    John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.) (2015). The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  40
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science.
    The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12.  28
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2013). The Cognitive Impenetrability of the Content of Early Vision is a Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Purely Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
    I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  19
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2015). The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):87-103.
    In this paper, I claim that since there is a cognitively impenetrable stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and cognitive penetrability and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision entails that early vision content is theory neutral. This theory-neutral part undermines relativism. In this paper, I consider two objections against the thesis. The one adduces evidence from cases of rapid perceptual learning to undermine my thesis that early vision is CI. The other emphasizes that the early perceptual system, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  59
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2010). Can Nonconceptual Content Be Stored in Visual Memory? Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):639-668.
    Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory stores nonconceptual content , in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC cannot be stored in visual memory and why only conceptual information can: NCC lasts for a very short time and does not reach either visual short-term memory or visual long-term memory; the content of visual states is stored in memory only if and when (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  11
    Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: An Overview. In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 1-56.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  20
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2004). Two Types of Object Representations in the Brain, One Nondescriptive Process of Reference Fixing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):47-48.
    I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  14
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2014). Nonconceptual Content: A Reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision”. Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):643-651.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  14
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2012). The New Science of Mind. Review of Metaphysics 65 (3):677-679.
  19.  12
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2015). What Unilateral Visual Neglect Teaches Us About Perceptual Phenomenology. Erkenntnis 80 (2):339-358.
    Studies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay , based on spatial neglects studies, argued that the property of being suitable for action is part of the perceptual phenomenology of neglect patients. In this paper, I argue that the studies on visual neglect conducted thus far do not support Nanay’s thesis that when patients succeed in detecting the neglected object, it’s action properties are part of their perceptual (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  14
    Athanassios Raftopoulos (2013). Getting the World Right: Cognitive Maps and Pictures of Universals. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (1):115-123.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2015). Abductive Inference in Late Vision. In Woosuk Park, Ping Li & Lorenzo Magnani (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science Ii. Springer International Publishing
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds.) (2012). Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
    One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds.) (2014). Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
    One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2015). Reframing the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability. In Woosuk Park, Ping Li & Lorenzo Magnani (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science Ii. Springer International Publishing
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography