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Profile: Athanassios Raftopoulos (University of Cyprus)
  1. Athanassios Raftopoulos (forthcoming). What Unilateral Visual Neglect Teaches Us About Perceptual Phenomenology. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Studies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay (Philos Perspect 26:235–246, 2012), based on spatial neglects studies, argued that the property of being suitable for action (an action-property) is part of the perceptual phenomenology of neglect patients. In this paper, I argue that the studies on visual neglect conducted thus far do not support Nanay’s thesis that when patients succeed in detecting the neglected object, it’s action properties (...)
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  2. John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.) (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2014). Nonconceptual Content: A Reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision”. 27 (5):643-651.
    (2014). Nonconceptual content: A reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision”. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 27, No. 5, pp. 643-651. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2014.926441.
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  4. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2013). Getting the World Right: Cognitive Maps and Pictures of Universals. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (1):115-123.
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  5. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2013). The Cognitive Impenetrability of the Content of Early Vision is a Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Purely Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
    I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it is NCC. Then, I (...)
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  6. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2012). The New Science of Mind. Review of Metaphysics 65 (3):677-679.
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  7. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2011). Late Vision: Processes and Epistemic Status. Frontiers in Psychology 2.
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  8. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2010). Can Nonconceptual Content Be Stored in Visual Memory? Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):639-668.
  9. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2010). Cracks on the Mosaic Unity of Science. Metascience 19 (2):293-296.
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  10. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2009). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy? Mit Press.
    An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various ...
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  11. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2006). Defending Realism on the Proper Ground. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
    'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition (...)
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  12. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
    The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The (...)
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  13. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). The Phenomenal Content of Experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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  14. Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science.
    The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
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  15. Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) (2005). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.
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  16. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2004). Two Types of Object Representations in the Brain, One Nondescriptive Process of Reference Fixing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):47-48.
    I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.
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  17. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2001). Is Perception Informationally Encapsulated? The Issue of the Theory‐Ladenness of Perception. Cognitive Science 25 (3):423-451.
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  18. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2001). Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception. Philosophy of Science 3 (September):S187-S199.
    In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call (...)
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  19. Athanassios Raftopoulos (1999). Newton's Experimental Proofs as Eliminative Reasoning. Erkenntnis 50 (1):91-121.
    In this paper I discuss Newton's first optical paper. My aim is to examine the type of argument which Newton uses in order to convince his readers of the truth of his theory of colors. My claim is that this argument is an induction by elimination, and that the Newtonian method of justification is a kind of generative justification, a term due to T. Nickles. To achieve my aim I analyze in some detail the arguments in Newton's first optical paper, (...)
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