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  1. Audrey Yap (forthcoming). Dedekind and Cassirer on Mathematical Concept Formation. Philosophia Mathematica:nku029.
    Dedekind's major work on the foundations of arithmetic employs several techniques that have left him open to charges of psychologism, and through this, to worries about the objectivity of the natural-number concept he defines. While I accept that Dedekind takes the foundation for arithmetic to lie in certain mental powers, I will also argue that, given an appropriate philosophical background, this need not make numbers into subjective mental objects. Even though Dedekind himself did not provide that background, one can nevertheless (...)
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  2. Audrey Yap (2014). Idealization, Epistemic Logic, and Epistemology. Synthese 191 (14):3351-3366.
    Many criticisms of epistemic logic have centered around its use of devices such as idealized knowers with logical omniscience and perfect self-knowledge. One possible response to such criticisms is to say that these idealizations are normative devices, and that epistemic logic tells us how agents ought to behave. This paper will take a different approach, treating epistemic logic as descriptive, and drawing the analogy between its formal models and idealized scientific models on that basis. Treating it as descriptive matches the (...)
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  3. Audrey Yap (2013). Ad Hominem Fallacies, Bias, and Testimony. Argumentation 27 (2):97-109.
    An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make ad (...)
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  4. Audrey Yap (2011). Gauss' Quadratic Reciprocity Theorem and Mathematical Fruitfulness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (3):410-415.
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  5. Audrey Yap (2010). Feminism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance. Hypatia 25 (2):437 - 454.
    The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.
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  6. Tomohiro Hoshi & Audrey Yap (2009). Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Branching Temporal Structures. Synthese 169 (2):259 - 281.
    van Bentham et al. (Merging frameworks for interaction: DEL and ETL, 2007) provides a framework for generating the models of Epistemic Temporal Logic ( ETL : Fagin et al., Reasoning about knowledge, 1995; Parikh and Ramanujam, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 2003) from the models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic ( DEL : Baltag et al., in: Gilboa (ed.) Tark 1998, 1998; Gerbrandy, Bisimulations on Planet Kripke, 1999). We consider the logic TDEL on the merged semantic framework, and its extension (...)
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  7. Audrey Yap (2009). Logical Structuralism and Benacerraf's Problem. Synthese 171 (1):157 - 173.
    There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by (...)
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  8. Audrey Yap (2009). Predicativity and Structuralism in Dedekind's Construction of the Reals. Erkenntnis 71 (2):157 - 173.
    It is a commonly held view that Dedekind’s construction of the real numbers is impredicative. This naturally raises the question of whether this impredicativity is justified by some kind of Platonism about sets. But when we look more closely at Dedekind’s philosophical views, his ontology does not look Platonist at all. So how is his construction justified? There are two aspects of the solution: one is to look more closely at his methodological views, and in particular, the places in which (...)
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  9. Angela Potochnik & Audrey Yap (2006). Revisiting Galison's 'Aufbau/Bauhaus' in Light of Neurath's Philosophical Projects. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):469-488.
    Historically, the Vienna Circle and the Dessau Bauhaus were related, with members of each group familiar with the ideas of the other. Peter Galison argues that their projects are related as well, through shared political views and methodological approach. The two main figures that connect the Vienna Circle to the Bauhaus—and the figures upon which Galison focuses—are Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath. Yet the connections that Galison develops do not properly capture the common themes between the Bauhaus and Neurath’s philosophical (...)
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