Search results for 'Avowals' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Avowals: Expression, Security, and Knowledge: Reply to Matthew Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):47-63.score: 24.0
    In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals’ security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles (without being grounded in self-beliefs), Moore’s paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its connection to showing one’s mental state, and the ‘performance equivalence’ between avowals and other expressive acts.
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  2. Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):311-35.score: 21.0
  3. Andy Hamilton (2000). The Authority of Avowals and the Concept of Belief. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):20-39.score: 21.0
  4. Raymond D. Bradley (1964). Avowals of Immediate Experience. Mind 73 (April):186-203.score: 21.0
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  5. James E. Tomberlin (1968). The Expression Theory of Avowals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (September):91-96.score: 21.0
  6. Brian Ellis (1976). Avowals Are More Corrigible Than You Think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (August):201-5.score: 21.0
  7. Eike von Savigny (2006). Taking Avowals Seriously: The Soul a Public Affair. In Alois Pichler & Simo Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works. Ontos.score: 21.0
  8. Ángel García Rodríguez (forthcoming). How to Be an Expressivist About Avowals Today. Nordic Wittgenstein Review.score: 20.0
    According to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides . In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is (...)
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  9. Andy Hamilton (2008). Intention and the Authority of Avowals. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):23 – 37.score: 18.0
    There is a common assumption that intention is a complex behavioural disposition, or a motivational state underlying such a disposition. Associated with this position is the apparently commonsense view that an avowal of intention is a direct report of an inner motivational state, and indirectly an expression of a belief that it is likely that one will A. A central claim of this article is that the dispositional or motivational model is mistaken since it cannot acknowledge either the future-direction of (...)
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  10. David Wolfsdorf (2004). Socrates' Avowals of Knowledge. Phronesis 49 (2):75 - 142.score: 18.0
    The paper examines Socrates' avowals and disavowals of knowledge in the standardly accepted early Platonic dialogues. All of the pertinent passages are assembled and discussed. It is shown that, in particular, alleged avowals of knowledge have been variously misinterpreted. The evidence either does not concern ethical knowledge or its interpretation has been distorted by abstraction of the passage from context or through failure adequately to appreciate the rhetorical dimensions of the context or the author's dramaturgical interests. Still, six (...)
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  11. Eike V. Savigny (1990). Avowals in the Philosophical Investigations: Expression, Reliability, Description. Noûs 24 (4):507-527.score: 18.0
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein contrues psychological facts as patterns exhibited by `weaves' which include a person's behaviour as well as her temporal and social surroundings. Avowals, in being linguistic elements of such patterns, come to be taken as expressing psychological facts in a way that given the general liberty in pattern description, is normal with all conspicuous elements of behavioural patterns. Speakers come to be taken to express psychological facts because avowals are semantically self-predicating (which is understandable (...)
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  12. Dorit Bar-On (2008). Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 15.0
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
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  13. Dorit Bar-On, Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge (Reply to Brueckner) UNC-Chapel Hill.score: 15.0
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
     
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  14. Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311 - 335.score: 15.0
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  15. Brice Noel Fleming (1955). On Avowals. Philosophical Review 64 (4):614-625.score: 15.0
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  16. Timothy Berard (1998). Attributions and Avowals of Motive in the Study of Deviance: Resource or Topic? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 28 (2):193–213.score: 15.0
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  17. M. J. Cresswell (1967). Professor Bradley's Avowals. Mind 76 (301):121-122.score: 15.0
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  18. Edward Sankowski (1981). Wittgenstein on the Cognitive Status of Avowals. Philosophical Studies 28:164-175.score: 15.0
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  19. F. E. Sparshott (1961). Avowals and Their Uses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:63 - 76.score: 15.0
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  20. Jonathan Lear (2004). Avowal and Unfreedom. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448-454.score: 11.0
  21. Frank Hofmann (2005). Immediate Self-Knowledge and Avowal. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):193-213.score: 11.0
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  22. Maura Tumulty (2010). Showing by Avowing. Acta Analytica 25 (1):35-46.score: 10.0
    Dorit Bar-On aims to account for the distinctive security of avowals by appealing to expression. She officially commits herself only to a negative characterization of expression, contending that expressive behavior is not epistemically based in self-judgments. I argue that her account of avowals, if it relies exclusively on this negative account of expression, can't achieve the explanatory depth she claims for it. Bar-On does explore the possibility that expression is a kind of perception-enabling showing. If she endorsed this (...)
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  23. Dorit Bar-On (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; (...)
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  24. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Précis of Dorit Bar-On's Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):1-7.score: 6.0
  25. Herbert Fingarette (1969). Self-Deception. Humanities Press.score: 6.0
    With a new chapter This new edition of Herbert Fingarette's classic study in philosophical psychology now includes a provocative recent essay on the topic by ...
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  26. Dorit Bar-On (2000). Speaking My Mind. Philsophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.score: 6.0
  27. K. S. Joshi (1968). Liberation: The Avowed Goal of Indian Philosophy. Philosophy East and West 18 (1/2):77-81.score: 6.0
    The author has sought to remove a confusion regarding the state of liberation, (which is the avowed goal of indian philosophy), Arising from a failure to distinguish between two states both called 'samadhi.' in one sense, 'samadhi' is a state of deep contemplation wherein the mind is made to concentrate on a particular object, To the exclusion of all other thoughts. Another state, Called 'nirvikalpa samadhi,' comes into being when the mind is perfectly silent, Yet watchful and sensitive, Without any (...)
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  28. Jung Soon Park (2008). Rawls' Avowed Error in Rational Contractarianism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:325-340.score: 6.0
    Over twenty years after the publication of A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls avowed that it was an error in Theory to describe a theory of justice as part of the theory of rational choice. This paper elucidates the reasons why Rawls had to make such an avowal of the error in connection with his contractarian rational deduction project of morality, i.e., rational contractarianism. Two major issues are involved here. They are about the construction of the original position and the (...)
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  29. John Exdell & James Hamilton (1975). The Incorrigibility of First Person Disavowals. Personalist 56:389-394.score: 6.0
     
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  30. E. Frazer & K. Hutchings (2011). Avowing Violence: Foucault and Derrida on Politics, Discourse and Meaning. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (1):3-23.score: 5.0
    This article enquires into the understanding of violence, and the place of violence in the understanding of politics, in the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. These two engaged in a dispute about the place of violence in their respective philosophical projects. The trajectories of their respective subsequent bodies of thought about power, politics and justice, and the degrees of affirmation or condemnation of the violent nature of reality, language, society and authority, can be analysed in relation to political (...)
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  31. Philip W. Bennett (1973). Avowed Reasons and the Covering Law Model. Mind 82 (328):606-607.score: 5.0
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  32. Jonathan Lear (2004). Review: Avowal and Unfreedom. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448 - 454.score: 5.0
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  33. Norman S. Care (1967). On Avowing Reasons. Mind 76 (302):208-216.score: 5.0
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  34. Ryan Coyne (2011). An Uncertain Avowal. Process Studies 40 (2):340-347.score: 5.0
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  35. James E. White (1971). Avowed Reasons and Causal Explanations. Mind 80 (318):238-245.score: 5.0
  36. Pepita Haezrahi (1952). The Avowed and the Unavowed Sources of Kant's Theory of Ethics. Ethics 62 (3):157-168.score: 5.0
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  37. Ralph Hanna (1986). Roger Dahood, Ed., The Avowing of King Arthur. (Garland Medieval Texts, 10.) New York and London: Garland, 1984. Pp. 155. $26. [REVIEW] Speculum 61 (1):132-134.score: 5.0
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  38. P. C. H. Cheng (2002). AVOW Diagrams Enhance Conceptual Understanding of Electricity: Principles of Effective Representational Systems. Cognitive Science 26 (6):685-736.score: 5.0
     
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  39. Michel Foucault (2014). Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice. University of Chicago Press.score: 5.0
     
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  40. Leovino Ma Garcia (1998). Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Reflection on the Human Being's Avowal of the Fault. Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture 2 (2):157-187.score: 5.0
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  41. S. Margel (2000). Mendacium-Est-Fabula'or the Right to Lie by Avowing Innocence-JJ Rousseau, From The'4th Promenade'to the Epigraph of the'Confessions. Archives de Philosophie 63 (1):5-29.score: 5.0
     
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  42. Edward Swiderski (2005). Outside Poland Few Have Paid Attention to Ingarden's Avowal That the Hu-Man Being, or in His Terms the “Person,” Occupied a Central Place in His. In Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (ed.), Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden. Ontos. 5--159.score: 5.0
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  43. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Basis of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.score: 3.0
    This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
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  44. Matthew Boyle (2010). Bar-on on Self-Knowledge and Expression. Acta Analytica 25 (1):9-20.score: 3.0
    I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’ solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our own present mental states, but (...)
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  45. Matthew Chrisman (2009). Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (3):1-26.score: 3.0
    In this paper, I consider the prospects of two different kinds of expressivism – ethical expressivism and avowal expressivism – in light of two common objections. The first objection stems from the fact that it is natural to think of ethical statements and avowals as at least potential manifestations of knowledge. The second objection stems from the fact that it is natural to treat ethical statements and avowals as truth-evaluable. I argue that, although a recent avowal expressivist attempt (...)
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  46. P. M. S. Hacker (2005). Of Knowledge and Knowing That Someone is in Pain. In Alois Pichler & Simo Saatela (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works. The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen.score: 3.0
    1. First person authority: the received explanation Over a wide range of psychological attributes, a mature speaker seems to enjoy a defeasible form of authority on how things are with him. The received explanation of this is epistemic, and rests upon a cognitive assumption. The speaker’s word is a authoritative because when things are thus-and-so with him, then normally he knows that they are. This is held to be because the speaker has direct and privileged access to the contents of (...)
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  47. Charles E. Larmore (2010). The Practices of the Self. The University of Chicago Press.score: 3.0
    Sartre as guide -- Bad faith and sincerity -- The example of Stendhal -- Reflection and being like another -- Being natural -- The ubiquity of convention -- Being like another -- Authenticity and the democratic age -- Mimetism and equality -- Being oneself amid conventions -- Authenticity and the nature of the self -- Foundations of a theory of cognitive reflection -- Psychological interpretation -- The structure of cognitive self-reflection -- The self in cognitive reflection -- Representing and reasoning (...)
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  48. Michael Kober (2006). Wittgenstein and Religion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1):87-116.score: 3.0
    It will be shown that Wittgenstein's philosophical approach to religion is substantially shaped by William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience. For neither during the Tractatus period nor later does Wittgenstein thematise religious doctrines, but rather struggles to determine what it means for a sincere person to have a specific religious attitude (James called these attitudes "experiences"). Wittgenstein's almost exclusive focus on attitudes explains, (i) why he is able to strictly discriminate between scientific and empirical claims on the one hand (...)
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  49. Alex Byrne (2011). Review Essay of Dorit Bar-On's "Speaking My Mind". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):705 - 717.score: 3.0
    Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her (...)
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