Search results for 'Avowals' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Avowals: Expression, Security, and Knowledge: Reply to Matthew Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):47-63.score: 18.0
    In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals’ security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles (without being grounded in self-beliefs), Moore’s paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its connection to showing one’s mental state, and the ‘performance equivalence’ between avowals and other expressive acts.
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  2. Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):311-35.score: 15.0
  3. Andy Hamilton (2000). The Authority of Avowals and the Concept of Belief. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):20-39.score: 15.0
  4. Raymond D. Bradley (1964). Avowals of Immediate Experience. Mind 73 (April):186-203.score: 15.0
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  5. James E. Tomberlin (1968). The Expression Theory of Avowals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (September):91-96.score: 15.0
  6. Brian Ellis (1976). Avowals Are More Corrigible Than You Think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (August):201-5.score: 15.0
  7. Eike von Savigny (2006). Taking Avowals Seriously: The Soul a Public Affair. In Alois Pichler & Simo Säätelä (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works. Ontos.score: 15.0
  8. Ángel García Rodríguez (forthcoming). How to Be an Expressivist About Avowals Today. Nordic Wittgenstein Review.score: 14.0
    According to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides . In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is (...)
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  9. Andy Hamilton (2008). Intention and the Authority of Avowals. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):23 – 37.score: 12.0
    There is a common assumption that intention is a complex behavioural disposition, or a motivational state underlying such a disposition. Associated with this position is the apparently commonsense view that an avowal of intention is a direct report of an inner motivational state, and indirectly an expression of a belief that it is likely that one will A. A central claim of this article is that the dispositional or motivational model is mistaken since it cannot acknowledge either the future-direction of (...)
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  10. David Wolfsdorf (2004). Socrates' Avowals of Knowledge. Phronesis 49 (2):75 - 142.score: 12.0
    The paper examines Socrates' avowals and disavowals of knowledge in the standardly accepted early Platonic dialogues. All of the pertinent passages are assembled and discussed. It is shown that, in particular, alleged avowals of knowledge have been variously misinterpreted. The evidence either does not concern ethical knowledge or its interpretation has been distorted by abstraction of the passage from context or through failure adequately to appreciate the rhetorical dimensions of the context or the author's dramaturgical interests. Still, six (...)
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  11. Eike V. Savigny (1990). Avowals in the Philosophical Investigations: Expression, Reliability, Description. Noûs 24 (4):507-527.score: 12.0
    In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein contrues psychological facts as patterns exhibited by `weaves' which include a person's behaviour as well as her temporal and social surroundings. Avowals, in being linguistic elements of such patterns, come to be taken as expressing psychological facts in a way that given the general liberty in pattern description, is normal with all conspicuous elements of behavioural patterns. Speakers come to be taken to express psychological facts because avowals are semantically self-predicating (which is understandable (...)
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  12. Dorit Bar-On (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; (...)
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  13. Jonathan Lear (2004). Avowal and Unfreedom. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448-454.score: 9.0
  14. Frank Hofmann (2005). Immediate Self-Knowledge and Avowal. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):193-213.score: 9.0
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  15. Dorit Bar-On (2008). Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
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  16. Dorit Bar-On, Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge (Reply to Brueckner) UNC-Chapel Hill.score: 9.0
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
     
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  17. Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311 - 335.score: 9.0
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  18. Brice Noel Fleming (1955). On Avowals. Philosophical Review 64 (4):614-625.score: 9.0
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  19. Timothy Berard (1998). Attributions and Avowals of Motive in the Study of Deviance: Resource or Topic? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 28 (2):193–213.score: 9.0
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  20. M. J. Cresswell (1967). Professor Bradley's Avowals. Mind 76 (301):121-122.score: 9.0
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  21. Edward Sankowski (1981). Wittgenstein on the Cognitive Status of Avowals. Philosophical Studies 28:164-175.score: 9.0
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  22. F. E. Sparshott (1961). Avowals and Their Uses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:63 - 76.score: 9.0
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  23. Maura Tumulty (2010). Showing by Avowing. Acta Analytica 25 (1):35-46.score: 8.0
    Dorit Bar-On aims to account for the distinctive security of avowals by appealing to expression. She officially commits herself only to a negative characterization of expression, contending that expressive behavior is not epistemically based in self-judgments. I argue that her account of avowals, if it relies exclusively on this negative account of expression, can't achieve the explanatory depth she claims for it. Bar-On does explore the possibility that expression is a kind of perception-enabling showing. If she endorsed this (...)
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  24. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Précis of Dorit Bar-On's Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):1-7.score: 6.0
  25. Herbert Fingarette (1969). Self-Deception. Humanities Press.score: 6.0
    With a new chapter This new edition of Herbert Fingarette's classic study in philosophical psychology now includes a provocative recent essay on the topic by ...
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  26. Dorit Bar-On (2000). Speaking My Mind. Philsophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.score: 6.0
  27. John Exdell & James Hamilton (1975). The Incorrigibility of First Person Disavowals. Personalist 56:389-394.score: 6.0
     
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  28. K. S. Joshi (1968). Liberation: The Avowed Goal of Indian Philosophy. Philosophy East and West 18 (1/2):77-81.score: 4.0
    The author has sought to remove a confusion regarding the state of liberation, (which is the avowed goal of indian philosophy), Arising from a failure to distinguish between two states both called 'samadhi.' in one sense, 'samadhi' is a state of deep contemplation wherein the mind is made to concentrate on a particular object, To the exclusion of all other thoughts. Another state, Called 'nirvikalpa samadhi,' comes into being when the mind is perfectly silent, Yet watchful and sensitive, Without any (...)
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  29. Jung Soon Park (2008). Rawls' Avowed Error in Rational Contractarianism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:325-340.score: 4.0
    Over twenty years after the publication of A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls avowed that it was an error in Theory to describe a theory of justice as part of the theory of rational choice. This paper elucidates the reasons why Rawls had to make such an avowal of the error in connection with his contractarian rational deduction project of morality, i.e., rational contractarianism. Two major issues are involved here. They are about the construction of the original position and the (...)
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  30. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Basis of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.score: 3.0
    This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
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  31. Matthew Boyle (2010). Bar-on on Self-Knowledge and Expression. Acta Analytica 25 (1):9-20.score: 3.0
    I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’ solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our own present mental states, but (...)
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  32. Matthew Chrisman (2009). Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (3):1-26.score: 3.0
    In this paper, I consider the prospects of two different kinds of expressivism – ethical expressivism and avowal expressivism – in light of two common objections. The first objection stems from the fact that it is natural to think of ethical statements and avowals as at least potential manifestations of knowledge. The second objection stems from the fact that it is natural to treat ethical statements and avowals as truth-evaluable. I argue that, although a recent avowal expressivist attempt (...)
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  33. P. M. S. Hacker (2005). Of Knowledge and Knowing That Someone is in Pain. In Alois Pichler & Simo Saatela (eds.), Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works. The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen.score: 3.0
    1. First person authority: the received explanation Over a wide range of psychological attributes, a mature speaker seems to enjoy a defeasible form of authority on how things are with him. The received explanation of this is epistemic, and rests upon a cognitive assumption. The speaker’s word is a authoritative because when things are thus-and-so with him, then normally he knows that they are. This is held to be because the speaker has direct and privileged access to the contents of (...)
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  34. Charles E. Larmore (2010). The Practices of the Self. The University of Chicago Press.score: 3.0
    Sartre as guide -- Bad faith and sincerity -- The example of Stendhal -- Reflection and being like another -- Being natural -- The ubiquity of convention -- Being like another -- Authenticity and the democratic age -- Mimetism and equality -- Being oneself amid conventions -- Authenticity and the nature of the self -- Foundations of a theory of cognitive reflection -- Psychological interpretation -- The structure of cognitive self-reflection -- The self in cognitive reflection -- Representing and reasoning (...)
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  35. E. Frazer & K. Hutchings (2011). Avowing Violence: Foucault and Derrida on Politics, Discourse and Meaning. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (1):3-23.score: 3.0
    This article enquires into the understanding of violence, and the place of violence in the understanding of politics, in the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. These two engaged in a dispute about the place of violence in their respective philosophical projects. The trajectories of their respective subsequent bodies of thought about power, politics and justice, and the degrees of affirmation or condemnation of the violent nature of reality, language, society and authority, can be analysed in relation to political (...)
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  36. Michael Kober (2006). Wittgenstein and Religion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1):87-116.score: 3.0
    It will be shown that Wittgenstein's philosophical approach to religion is substantially shaped by William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience. For neither during the Tractatus period nor later does Wittgenstein thematise religious doctrines, but rather struggles to determine what it means for a sincere person to have a specific religious attitude (James called these attitudes "experiences"). Wittgenstein's almost exclusive focus on attitudes explains, (i) why he is able to strictly discriminate between scientific and empirical claims on the one hand (...)
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  37. Alex Byrne (2011). Review Essay of Dorit Bar-On's "Speaking My Mind". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):705 - 717.score: 3.0
    Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her (...)
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  38. David R. Olson (2007). Self-Ascription of Intention: Responsibility, Obligation and Self-Control. Synthese 159 (2):297 - 314.score: 3.0
    In the late preschool years children acquire a "theory of mind", the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children's ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children's developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability to (...)
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  39. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1972). Belief and Self-Deception. Inquiry 15 (1-4):387-410.score: 3.0
    In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, (...)
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  40. Dorit Bar-On & James Sias (2013). Varieties of Expressivism. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):699-713.score: 3.0
    After offering a characterization of what unites versions of ‘expressivism’, we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism – a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis – and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for (...)
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  41. Robert Pippin, Philosophical Film: Trapped by Oneself in Jacques Tourneur's Out of the Past.score: 3.0
    The belated genre classification, “film noir,” is a contested one, much more so than “Western” or “musical.”2 However, there is wide agreement that there were many stylistic conventions common to the new treatment of crime dramas prominent in the 1940s: grim urban settings, often very cramped interiors, predominantly night time scenes, and so-called “low key” lighting and unusual camera angles.3 But there were also important thematic elements in common.Two are especially interesting. First, noirs were almost always about crime, usually murder, (...)
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  42. Tom Stoneham (1998). On Believing That I Am Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.score: 3.0
    It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd (...)
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  43. Alfred R. Mele (1982). 'Self-Deception, Action, and Will': Comments. Erkenntnis 18 (2):159-164.score: 3.0
    Since the virtues of Professor Audi's paper are obvious and my time is limited, 1 shall restrict myself here to negative comments. I shall argue, first, that condition (1) - the unconscious true belief condition - in Audi's account of "clear cases of self-deception" is too strong and, second, that he does not succeed in justifying his limitation of the self-deceiver to sincere avowals of the proposition with respect to which he is in self-deception.
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  44. Philip W. Bennett (1973). Avowed Reasons and the Covering Law Model. Mind 82 (328):606-607.score: 3.0
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  45. Jonathan Lear (2004). Review: Avowal and Unfreedom. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448 - 454.score: 3.0
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  46. Norman S. Care (1967). On Avowing Reasons. Mind 76 (302):208-216.score: 3.0
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  47. Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (forthcoming). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-11.score: 3.0
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts (e.g., judging that p) leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states (e.g., believing that p). First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately (...)
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  48. James E. White (1971). Avowed Reasons and Causal Explanations. Mind 80 (318):238-245.score: 3.0
  49. D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen (2007). The Product of Self-Deception. Erkenntnis 67 (3):419-437.score: 3.0
    I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a (...)
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