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Berit Brogaard [104]B. Brogaard [5]Berit O. Brogaard [5]
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Profile: Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri St. Louis)
  1. Berit Brogaard, Comments on Philippe Schlenker's Be Articulate! A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection.
    “When a speaker says something of the form A and B, he may take it for granted that A (or at least that his audience recognizes that he accepts that A) after he has said it. The proposition that A will be added to the background of common assumptions before the speaker asserts that B. Now suppose that B expresses a proposition that would, for some reason, be inappropriate to assert except in a context where A, or something entailed by (...)
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  2. Berit Brogaard, Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?
    Roderick Chisholm argued that ‘look’ can be used in three different ways: epistemically, comparatively and non-comparatively. Chisholm’s non-comparative sense of ‘look’ played an important role in Frank Jackson’s argument for the sense-datum theory. The question remains..
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  3. Berit Brogaard, Donkey Sentences and Quantifier Variability.
    the Central Division of the APA in Chicago, April 19-21 2007. The paper proposes an account of conditional donkey sentences, such as ‘if a farmer buys a donkey, he usually vaccinates it’, which accommodates the fact that the adverb of quantification seems to affect the interpretation of pronouns that are not within its syntactic scope. The analysis defended takes donkey pronouns to go proxy for partitive noun phrases with varying quantificational force. The variation in the interpretation of donkey pronouns, it (...)
     
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  4. Berit Brogaard, I Know. Therefore, I Understand.
    The so-called Meno problem is one of the recent trendy topics in epistemology.1 In a nutshell, the Meno problem is that of explaining why we value knowledge more than true belief. In his recent book The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jon Kvanvig argues quite convincingly that no existing account of knowledge can accommodate the intuition that the value of knowledge exceeds the value of true belief.
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  5. Berit Brogaard, Perspectival Truth and Color Perception.
    Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the contents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind) have a truth-value only relative to a particular perspective (or standard) determined by the context of the speaker or bearer of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms, moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere (Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming). The main aim of this paper is to defend perspectivalism about color perception and color discourse. The (...)
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  6. Berit Brogaard, Russell's Theory of Descriptions Vs. The Predicative Analysis: A Reply to Graff.
    I. Descriptions in Predicative Position The predicative analysis and Russell’s theory part company when it comes to the argument structure assigned to sentences like (1). (1) Washington is the greatest French soldier. On a standard Russellian analysis, (1) has the following (a) logical form and (b) truth conditions.
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  7. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Color Synesthesia. In Kimberly A. Jameson (ed.), Cognition & Language, Encyclopedia of Color Science and Technology. Springer.
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  8. Berit Brogaard (ed.) (forthcoming). Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.
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  9. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings. Inquiry.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions Herman Cappelen argues that unlike what is commonly thought, contemporary analytic philosophers do not typically rely on intuitions as evidence. If they do indeed rely on intuitions, that should be evident from their written works, either explicitly in the form of ‘intuition’ talk or by means of other indicators. However, Cappelen argues, while philosophers do engage in ‘intuition’ talk, that is not a good indicator that they rely on intuitions, as ‘intuition’ and its cognates have many (...)
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  10. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press.
    There are two competing views of knowledge-how: Intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. According to the reductionist varieties of intellectualism defended by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) and Berit Brogaard (2007, 2008, 2009), knowledge-how simply reduces to knowledge-that. To a first approximation, s knows how to A iff there is a w such that s knows that w is a way to A. For example, John knows how to ride a bicycle if and only if there is a way w such that (...)
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  11. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Perceptual Reports. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual reports are utterances of sentences that contain a perceptual verb, such as ‘look’, ‘sound’, ‘feel’, ‘see’, and ‘perceive’. It is natural to suppose that at least in many cases, these types of reports reflect aspects of the phenomenal character and representational content of a subject’s perceptual experiences. For example, an utterance of ‘my chair looks red but it’s really white’ appears to reflect phenomenal properties of the speaker’s experience of a chair. Whether perceptual reports actually reflect these things is (...)
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  12. Berit Brogaard (ed.) (forthcoming). Philosophical Studies Volume on High-Level Content.
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  13. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case (...)
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  14. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Synesthetic Binding and the Reactivation Model of Memory. In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blendings: New essays on synaesthesia. Oxford University Press.
    Despite the recent surge in research on, and interest in, synesthesia, the mechanism underlying this condition is still unknown. Feedforward mechanisms involving overlapping receptive fields of sensory neurons as well as feedback mechanisms involving a lack of signal disinhibition have been proposed. Here I show that a broad range of studies of developmental synesthesia indicate that the mechanism underlying the phenomenon may involve reinstatement of brain activity in different sensory or cognitive streams in a way that is similar to what (...)
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  15. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology. In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology. Synthese Library.
  16. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'. Philosophy Compass.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with (...)
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  17. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Status of Consciousness in Nature. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Consciousness, Volume 2. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
    The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn't have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no metaphysical gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap in (...)
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  18. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Varieties of Synesthetic Experience. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    In her response to my "Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery" Ophelia Deroy presents an argument for an interesting new account of synesthesia. On this account, synesthesia can be thought of as "a perceptual state (e.g. of a letter)" that is "changed or enriched by the incorporation of a conscious mental image (e.g. a color)." I reply that while this is a plausible account of some types of synesthesia, some forms cannot be accounted (...)
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  19. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief. In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we (...)
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  20. Berit Brogaard, Kristian Marlow & Kevin Rice (forthcoming). The Long-Term Potentiation Model for Grapheme-Color Binding in Synesthesia. In David Bennett & Chris Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    The phenomenon of synesthesia has undergone an invigoration of research interest and empirical progress over the past decade. Studies investigating the cognitive mechanisms underlying synesthesia have yielded insight into neural processes behind such cognitive operations as attention, memory, spatial phenomenology and inter-modal processes. However, the structural and functional mechanisms underlying synesthesia still remain contentious and hypothetical. The first section of the present paper reviews recent research on grapheme-color synesthesia, one of the most common forms of synesthesia, and addresses the ongoing (...)
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  21. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (forthcoming). A Counterfactual Account of Essence. The Reasoner.
    Kit Fine (1994. “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16) argues that the standard modal account of essence as de re modality is ‘fundamentally misguided’ (p. 3). We agree with his critique and suggest an alternative counterfactual analysis of essence. As a corollary, our counterfactual account lends support to non-vacuism the thesis that counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are not always vacuously true.
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  22. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (forthcoming). Why Counterpossibles Are Non-Trivial. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), Synthese volume.
    I. Non-Trivial Counterpossibles On Lewis’ account, a subjunctive of the form ‘if it were the case that p, it would be the case that q’ (represented as ‘p → q’) is to be given the following rough meta-linguistic truth-conditions1.
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  23. Berit Brogaard, Simo Vanni & Juha Silvanto (forthcoming). Seeing Mathematics: Perception and Brain Activity in a Case of Acquired Synesthesia. Neurocase.
    We studied the patient JP who has exceptional abilities to draw complex geometrical images by hand and a form of acquired synesthesia for mathematical formulas and objects, which he perceives as geometrical figures. JP sees all smooth curvatures as discrete lines, similarly regardless of scale. We carried out two preliminary investigations to establish the perceptual nature of synesthetic experience and to investigate the neural basis of this phenomenon. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, image-inducing formulas produced larger fMRI (...)
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  24. Dimitria Electra Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Time and Time Perception. Topoi.
    There is little doubt that we perceive the world as tensed—that is, as consisting of a past, present and future each with a different ontological status—and transient—that is, as involving a passage of time. We also have the ability to execute precisely timed behaviors that appear to depend upon making correct temporal judgments about which changes are truly present and which are not. A common claim made by scientists and philosophers is that our experiences of entities enduring through transient changes (...)
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  25. Joe Salerno & Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Williamson on Counterpossibles. The Reasoner.
    Lewis/Stalnaker semantics has it that all counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. Non-vacuism, by contrast, says the truth-values of counterpossibles are affected by the truth-values of the consequents. Some counterpossibles are true, some false. Williamson objects to non-vacuism. He asks us to consider someone who answered ‘11’ to ‘What is 5 + 7?’ but who mistakenly believes that he answered ‘13’. For the non-vacuist, (1) is false, (2) true: (1) If 5 + 7 were 13, x (...)
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  26. Berit Brogaard (2014). An Empirically-Informed Cognitive Theory of Propositions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):534-557.
    (2013). An empirically-informed cognitive theory of propositions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 534-557.
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  27. Berit Brogaard (2014). A Partial Defense of Extended Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):39-62.
    The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended-mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. (...)
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  28. Berit Brogaard (2014). Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.
    According to the extended knowledge account of assertion, we should only assert and act on what we know. Call this the ‘Knowledge Norm’. Because moral and prudential rules prohibit morally and prudentially unacceptable actions and assertions, they can, familiarly, override the Knowledge Norm. This, however, raises the question of whether other epistemic norms, too, can override the Knowledge Norm. The present paper offers an affirmative answer to this question and then argues that the Knowledge Norm is derived from a more (...)
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  29. Berit Brogaard (2014). The Phenomenal Use of 'Look' and Perceptual Representation. Philosophy Compass 9 (7):455-468.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the semantics of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson's argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson's argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with an argument (...)
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  30. Berit Brogaard, Kristian Marlow & Kevin Rice (2014). Unconscious Influences on Decision Making in Blindsight. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):22-23.
  31. B. Brogaard & K. Marlow (2013). Is the Relativity of Simultaneity a Temporal Illusion? Analysis 73 (4):635-642.
    Tensism holds that the present moment has a special status that sets it apart from the past and the future, independently of perceivers. One of the main objections to this view has been Einstein’s argument from special relativity, which aims at showing that absolute simultaneity is a myth. We argue that the moving observer in a causal variant of Einstein’s original thought experiment is subject to a temporal illusion. Owing to the analogy of the cases, this casts doubt on the (...)
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  32. Berit Brogaard (2013). Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties? Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42.
    I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience.
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  33. Berit Brogaard (2013). It's Not What It Seems. A Semantic Account of 'Seems' and Seemings. Inquiry 56 (2-3):210-239.
    I start out by reviewing the semantics of ?seem?. As ?seem? is a subject-raising verb, ?it seems? can be treated as a sentential operator. I look at the semantic and logical properties of ?it seems?. I argue that ?it seems? is a hyperintensional and contextually flexible operator. The operator distributes over conjunction but not over disjunction, conditionals or semantic entailments. I further argue that ?it seems? does not commute with negation and does not agglomerate with conjunction. I then show that (...)
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  34. Berit Brogaard (2013). Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. 270.
  35. Berit Brogaard & Kristian Marlow (2013). Hearing Colours. The Philosophers' Magazine 63:28-35.
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  36. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2013). Remarks on Counterpossibles. Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
    Since the publication of David Lewis’ Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’ is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis’ semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification (...)
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  37. B. Brogaard (2012). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics * by Francois Recanati. Analysis 72 (4):846-849.
  38. Berit Brogaard (2012). Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  39. Berit Brogaard (2012). Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? On Uriah Kriegel's "Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory&Quot;. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467 - 474.
  40. Berit Brogaard (2012). Context and Content: Pragmatics in Two-Dimensional Semantics. In Keith Allan & Kasia Jaszczolt (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press.
    Context figures in the interpretation of utterances in many different ways. In the tradition of possible-worlds semantics, the seminal account of context-sensitive expressions such as indexicals and demonstratives is that of Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics (the content- character distinction), further pursued in various directions by Stalnaker, Chalmers, and others. This chapter introduces and assesses the notion of context-sensitivity presented in this group of approaches, with a special focus on how it relates to the notion of cognitive significance and whether it includes (...)
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  41. Berit Brogaard (2012). Colour Eliminativism or Colour Relativism? Philosophical Papers 41 (2):305 - 321.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 41, Issue 2, Page 305-321, July 2012.
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  42. Berit Brogaard (2012). Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):538-556.
    Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a (...)
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  43. Berit Brogaard (2012). Non-Visual Consciousness and Visual Images in Blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):595-596.
    In a recent response paper to Brogaard (2011a), Morten Overgaard and Thor Grünbaum argue that my case for the claim that blindsight subjects are not visually conscious of the stimuli they correctly identify rests on a mistaken necessary criterion for determining whether a conscious experience is visual or non-visual. Here I elaborate on the earlier argu- ment while conceding that the question of whether blindsight subjects are visually con- scious of the visual stimuli they correctly identify largely is an empirical (...)
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  44. Berit Brogaard (2012). Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions. OUP USA.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
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  45. Berit Brogaard (2012). Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 109 (10):569-587.
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  46. Berit Brogaard (2012). What Do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel? Philosophers' Imprint 12 (11).
    Discourse containing the verb ‘feel’, almost without exception, purports to describe inner experience. Though this much is evident, the question remains what exactly is conveyed when we talk about what and how we feel? Does discourse containing the word ‘feel’ actually succeed in describing the content and phenomenology of inner experience? If so, how does it reflect the phenomenology and content of the experience it describes? Here I offer a linguistic analysis of ‘feels’ reports and argue that a subset of (...)
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  47. Berit Brogaard (2011). Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes? Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):449-63.
    Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under (...)
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  48. Berit Brogaard (2011). Color Experience in Blindsight? Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):767 - 786.
    Blindsight, the ability to blindly discriminate wavelength and other aspects of stimuli in a blind field, sometimes occurs in people with lesions to striate (V1) cortex. There is currently no consensus on whether qualitative color information of the sort that is normally computed by double opponent cells in striate cortex is indeed computed in blindsight but doesn?t reach awareness, perhaps owing to abnormal neuron responsiveness in striate or extra-striate cortical areas, or is not computed at all. The existence of primesight, (...)
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  49. Berit Brogaard (2011). Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action? Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and (...)
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  50. Berit Brogaard (2011). Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):45-73.
    I argue that McDowell-style disjunctivism, as the position is often cashed out, goes wrong because it takes the good epistemic standing of veridical perception to be grounded in “manifest” facts which do not necessarily satisfy any epistemic constraints. A better form of disjunctivism explains the difference between good and bad cases in terms of epistemic constraints that the states satisfy. This view allows us to preserve McDowell’s thesis that good cases make facts manifest, as long as manifest facts must satisfy (...)
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